511 research outputs found

    Theory of Menu Auction and Applications

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    Thesis advisor: Hideo KonishiMy doctoral dissertation contains three essays on menu auction and its related applications. The first chapter is a theoretical generalization of classical menu auction model, and the second and the third chapters are applications to a resource allocation problem and an industrial organization problem. Menu auction (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) is a first-price package auction with complete information. They show that every Nash equilibrium under some refinements always leads to an efficient outcome. Therefore, this becomes a natural efficiency benchmark for package auction designs (e.g., Ausubel and Milgrom 2002). Menu auction can also be viewed as a model of economic influence where the auctioneer is going to choose an action which affects bidders' payoff so that each bidder tries to influence the outcome by monetary transfer to the auctioneer. This framework is widely adopted in political lobbying models where the special interest groups lobbying the government over trade policies (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994). However, the applicability is limited by quasi-linear preferences and the absence of budget constraints. In my first chapter, ``Menu Auctions with Non-Transferable Utilities and Budget Constraints'', I extends Bernheim and Whinston's (1986) menu auction model under transferable utilities to a framework with non-transferable utilities and budget constraints. Under appropriate definitions of equilibria consistent with subgame perfection, it is shown that every truthful Nash equilibrium (TNE) is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) and that the set of TNE payoffs and the set of CPNE payoffs are equivalent, as in a transferable utility framework. The existence of a CPNE is assured in contrast with the possible non-existence of Nash equilibrium under the definition by Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997). Moreover, the set of CPNE payoffs is equivalent to the bidder-optimal weak core. The second chapter relates menu auction to a resource allocation problem. Kelso and Crawford (1982) propose a wage-adjustment mechanism resulting in a stable matching between heterogeneous firms and workers. Instead of a benevolent social planner, in ``Profit-Maximizing Matchmaker'' (w. Hideo Konishi), we consider a profit-maximizing auctioneer to solve this many-to-one assignment problem. If firms can only use individualized price, then the auctioneer can only earn zero profit in every Nash equilibrium and the sets of stable assignments and strong Nash equilibria are equivalent. Otherwise, the auctioneer might earn positive profit even in a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. This reinforces Milgrom's (2010) argument on the benefit of using simplified message spaces that it not only reduces information requirement but also improves resource allocation. The third chapter applies menu auction in an industrial organization problem. In ``Choosing a Licensee from Heterogeneous Rivals'' (w. Hideo Konishi and Anthony Creane), we consider a firm licensing its production technology to rivals when firms with heterogeneous in production costs competing in a Cournot market. While Katz and Shapiro (1986) show that a complete transfer in duopoly can be joint-profit reducing, we show that it is always joint-profit improving provided that at least three firms remain in the industry after transfer. While transfers between similarly efficient firms may reduce welfare, the social welfare must increase if the licensor is the most efficient in the industry, contrast with Katz and Shapiro (1985) in the duopoly environment. This has an important implication in competition regulation. Then we investigate relative efficiency of the licensee under different licensing auction mechanisms. With natural refinement of equilibria, we show that a menu auction licensee, a standard first-price auction licensee, and a joint-profit maximizing licensee are in (weakly) descending order of efficiency.Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012.Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.Discipline: Economics

    Sharing Sequential Values in a Network

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    Published in Journal of Economic Theory https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.004</p

    Sharing sequential values in a network

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    Ministry of Education, Singapore under its Academic Research Funding Tier

    Unified China; Divided Europe

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    This paper studies the causes and consequences of political centralization and fragmentation in China and Europe. We argue that the severe and unidirectional threat of external invasion fostered political centralization in China while Europe faced a wider variety of smaller external threats and remained politically fragmented. We test our hypothesis using data on the frequency of nomadic attacks and the number of regimes in China. Our model allows us to explore the economic consequences of political centralization and fragmentation. Political centralization in China led to lower taxation and hence faster population growth during peacetime than in Europe. But it also meant that China was relatively fragile in the event of an external invasion. Our results are consistent with historical evidence of warfare, capital city location, tax levels, and population growth in both China and Europe

    Experimental Demonstration of Stationary Dark-State Polaritons Dressed by Dipole-Dipole Interaction

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    Dark-state polaritons (DSPs) based on the effect of electromagnetically induced transparency are bosonic quasiparticles, representing the superpositions of photons and atomic ground-state coherences. It has been proposed that stationary DSPs are governed by the equation of motion closely similar to the Schr\"{o}dinger equation and can be employed to achieve Bose-Einstein condensation (BEC) with transition temperature orders of magnitude higher than that of the atomic BEC. The stationary-DSP BEC is a three-dimensional system and has a far longer lifetime than the exciton-polariton BEC. In this work, we experimentally demonstrated the stationary DSP dressed by the Rydberg-state dipole-dipole interaction (DDI). The DDI-induced phase shift of the stationary DSP was systematically studied. Notably, the experimental data are consistent with the theoretical predictions. The phase shift can be viewed as a consequence of elastic collisions. In terms of thermalization to achieve BEC, the μ\mum2^2-size interaction cross-section of the DDI can produce a sufficient elastic collision rate for the stationary DSPs. This work makes a substantial advancement toward the realization of the stationary-DSP BEC

    A Study of the Talent Training Project Management for Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan: The Application of a Hybrid Data Envelopment Analysis Approach

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    The purpose of this study is to evaluate the training institution performance and to improve the management of the Manpower Training Project (MTP) administered by the Semiconductor Institute in Taiwan. Much literature assesses the efficiency of an internal training program initiated by a firm, but only little literature studies the efficiency of an external training program led by government. In the study, a hybrid solution of ICA-DEA and ICA-MPI is developed for measuring the efficiency and the productivity growth of each training institution over the period. The technical efficiency change, the technological change, pure technical efficiency change, scale efficiency change, and the total factor productivity change were evaluated according to five inputs and two outputs. According to the results of the study, the training institutions can be classified by their efficiency successfully and the guidelines for the optimal level of input resources can be obtained for each inefficient training institution. The Semiconductor Institute in Taiwan can allocate budget more appropriately and establish withdrawal mechanisms for inefficient training institutions

    Effect of diabetes on mortality and length of hospital stay in patients with renal or perinephric abscess

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    OBJECTIVES: We compared the risk of in-hospital mortality and the length of hospital stay between diabetic and non-diabetic patients hospitalized for renal or perinephric abscess. METHOD: The data analyzed in this study were retrieved from Taiwan's National Health Insurance claims. The risk of in-hospital mortality and the length of hospital stay were compared between 1,715 diabetic patients, hospitalized because of renal or perinephric abscess in Taiwan between 1997 and 2007, and a random sample of 477 non-diabetes patients with renal or perinephric abscess. RESULTS: The in-hospital mortality rates from renal or perinephric abscess for the diabetic patients and the non-diabetic patients were not different, at 2.3% and 3.4%, respectively. However, diabetes was significantly associated with a longer length of hospital stay among patients with renal abscess, by 3.38 days (95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.59-5.17). CONCLUSIONS: Diabetes does not increase the risk of in-hospital mortality from renal or perinephric abscess. Nevertheless, appropriate management of patients with diabetes and concurrent renal or perinephric abscess is essential to reduce the length of hospital stay
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