Institutional investors and corporate governance

We provide a comprehensive overview of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance with three main components. First, we establish new stylized facts documenting the evolution and importance of institutional ownership. Second, we provide a detailed characterization of key aspects of the legal and regulatory setting within which institutional investors govern portfolio firms. Third, we synthesize the evolving response of the recent theoretical and empirical academic literature in finance to the emergence of institutional investors in corporate governance. We highlight how the defining aspect of institutional investors – the fact that they are financial intermediaries – differentiates them in their governance role from standard principal blockholders. Further, not all institutional investors are identical, and we pay close attention to heterogeneity amongst institutional investors as blockholders

A decade of hybrid reporting and accountabilities of the Hanyeping Company (1909–1919)

Using a model of hybrid reporting and accountabilities, this article considers the reporting and accountability of the Hanyeping Company in the Beiyang era. The results of the study suggest that the Hanyeping Company attempted to provide comprehensive accounts of its activities to satisfy the needs of a plethora of domestic and foreign stakeholders through a combination of detailed Western and Chinese accounts. In keeping with Western and indigenous Chinese expectations of accounting, the Hanyeping Company prepared accounts that demonstrated characteristics of Auyeung’s demonstrated features of nineteenth-century Westernised reporting and the traditional reporting model. This suggests that the period between 1909 and 1919 experienced a decade of reporting hybridisation in direct contrast to the so-called period of accounting stagnation of the late Qing Dynasty