The Logical Burdens of Proof. Assertion and Hypothesis

The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) justification. In a first, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent from justification and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second, antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justification and results in two logical systems of information and justification: AR4 and AR4¢, respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a wide variety of epistemic norms. After comparing the different norms of justification involved in these logical systems, two hexagons expressing Aristotelian relations of opposition will be gathered in order to clarify how (a fragment of) pragmatic formulas can be interpreted in a fuzzy-based question-answer semantics

On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics

We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation the truth of p is epistemically necessary

Some Logical Notations for Pragmatic Assertions

The pragmatic notion of assertion has an important inferential role in logic. There are also many notational forms to express assertions in logical systems. This paper reviews, compares and analyses languages with signs for assertions, including explicit signs such as Frege’s and Dalla Pozza’s logical systems and implicit signs with no specific sign for assertion, such as Peirce’s algebraic and graphical logics and the recent modification of the latter termed Assertive Graphs. We identify and discuss the main ‘points’ of these notations on the logical representation of assertions, and evaluate their systems from the perspective of the philosophy of logical notations. Pragmatic assertions turn out to be useful in providing intended interpretations of a variety of logical systems

Towards a Psychology in Shades of Grey. An Epistemological Analysis

According to Sergio Salvatore’s Psychology as science of the explanandum, there is an urgent need of a rigorous language for the explanandum in psychology. This attitute is what Salvatore calls “psychology in black and white”. In this paper, we point out that the epistemological method of explication may be a good tool for the conceptual clarification of the terms that may work as the explanandum in a psychological explanation. Two forms of explications are presented, Carnap’s explication and Kant’s explication. Differently from Carnap’s explication, Kant’s explication does not necessarily require a process of formalization and, for this reason, it may be much more suitable for clarifying complex psychological terms (possibly difficult to be formalized). Still, formalization in psychology can accomplish a very important task. Abstracting by some aspects of ‘reality’ (e.g., by some of its colours) we can better elucidate the deeper structure of reality (in black and white) and, with sound epistemological methods, we can even imagine (using again Sergio Salvatore’s metaphor of colours) to see reality in shades of grey

Philosophical aspects of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA): a critical review

The goal of this paper is to review and critically discuss the philosophical aspects of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). Given that estimates of seismic hazard are typically riddled with uncertainty, diferent epistemic values (related to the pursuit of scientifc knowledge) compete in the selection of seismic hazard models, in a context infuenced by non-epistemic values (related to practical goals and aims) as well. We frst distinguish between the diferent types of uncertainty in PSHA. We claim that epistemic and nonepistemic considerations are closely related in the selection of the appropriate estimate of seismic hazard by the experts. Finally, we argue that the division of scientifc responsibility among the experts can lead to responsibility gaps. This raises a problem for the ownership of the results (“no one’s model” problem) similar to the “problem of many hands” in the ethics of technology. We conclude with a plea for a close collaboration between philosophy and engineering

Anxiety and its Regulation: Neural Mechanisms and Regulation Techniques According to the Experiential-Dynamic Approach

Although anxiety is not necessarily a pathological phenomenon, it can become dysregulated, causing suffering. Indeed, emotion dysregulation lies at the core of many psychopathologies. Thus, anxiety regulation is central to all effective psychological treatment. The predominant perspective on emotion regulation and dysregulation is appraisal theory, which proposes that the cognitive appraisal of an event generates an emotional response. According to Gross’s process model, any emotion can become dysregulated when the patient lacks or fails to use an appropriate regulatory strategy. Therefore, the clinician must teach the patient better regulatory strategies. The perspective we put forward departs from Gross’s model based on appraisal theory. The experiential-dynamic emotion-regulation model, EDER, grounded in affective neuroscience and modern psychodynamic psychotherapy proposes that (1) emotions precede cognition (temporal and neuroanatomical primacy), (2) emotions are not inherently dysregulated (they have specific properties of time and strength proportional to the quality of the stimulus), and (3) dysregulation derives from the combination of emotions plus conditioned anxiety, or from secondary-defensive affects, both leading to dysregulated-affective states (DASs). To regulate DAS, the clinician must regulate the dysregulating anxiety or restructure the defenses, which create defensive affects, and then help the client to fully express the underlying emotions that elicit anxiety and defenses. In this chapter, we specifically focus on dysregulated anxiety, its neural bases, and how to regulate it according to the EDER model. First, we present hypotheses and data to show the neural bases of anxiety. Then, specific strategies and techniques to regulate anxiety are explained and clinical excerpts illustrate their application

On assertion and denial in the logic for pragmatics

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence

How to Say 'Yes' or 'No': Logical Approaches to Modes of Assertion and Denial

How to Say 'Yes' or 'No': Logical Approaches to Modes of Assertion and Denial. Book of Abstracts

A survey on Biostatisticians Serving in the Italian Ethics Committees

Background. Italian ethics committees (ECs) have the responsibility for evaluating and monitoring clinical research. Methods. An electronic survey targeted to the biostatisticians operating in the 95 ECs in Italy, was launched in November 2016. Several aspects were explored such as education, job title, training in biostatistics and experience in the evaluation of protocols within the EC. Results. Seventy case report forms were returned (74%), and the response rate was highest for ECs located in the South (78%) and lowest in the North (51%). The biostatisticians in the respondent ECs were prevalently male, aged 50-60 years, with postgraduate education in medical specialties and statistics. The annual workload varied depending on the type of institution and geographical area, with an annual median number of protocols examined ranging from 80 in hospital ECs to 198 in university hospital ECs, and from 80 to 108, in the South and the Centre, respectively. Of these, 40% were observational study protocols. The EC biostatisticians proposed to reject 5% of protocols and to suspend with the request of clarification or amendments 10%. Only 61% and 79% of these opinions, respectively, were regarded as binding by the other EC members. Conclusion. The biostatistician will not be able to play a significant role in the EC as long as the required skill-set remains vague and his/her opinion on a protocol is underrated