Application of the war of attrition game to the analysis of intellectual property disputes

In many developing countries intellectual property infringement and the commerce of pirate goods is an entrepreneurial activity. Digital piracy is very often the only media for having access to music, cinema, books and software. At the same time, bio-prospecting and infringement of indigenous knowledge rights by international consortiums is usual in places with high biodiversity. In these arenas transnational actors interact with local communities. Accusations of piracy often go both ways. This article analyzes the case of southeast Mexico. Using a war of attrition game theory model it explains different situations of intellectual property rights piracy and protection. It analyzes different levels of interaction and institutional settings from the global to the very local. The article proposes free IP zones as a solution of IP disputes. The formation of technological local clusters through Free Intellectual Property Zones (FIPZ) would allow firms to copy and share de facto public domain content for developing new products inside the FIPZ. Enforcement of intellectual property could be pursuit outside of the FIPZ. FIPZ are envisioned as a new type of a sui generis intellectual property regime

On the Enforcement of Territorial Use Rights Regulations: A Game Theoretic Approach

Territorial Use Rights (commonly known as TURFs in the literature) consists in the allocation of fishing rights to individuals and/or groups to fish in certain geographical locations. A requisite for these communities to be granted fishing rights is the formulation of a management and exploitation plan (MEP). While thus far the literature on TURFs has been centred on the biological and technical aspects of it, to our knowledge there is no work squarely dealing with the issue of enforcement of the MEP that the community, once granted the fishing use rights, have to comply with. We formally explore this issue from an economic perspective by formulating a static game of norm compliance in a regime of common property resource exploitation. The key characteristic of this game is a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism, where fishermen monitor and sanction one another. We found that in the absence of any endogenous regulation from the part of the fishing community, TURFs can not avoid the economic overexploitation of the fishery. We discuss the importance of economic incentives (and disincentives) in the formulation of endogenous regulations aimed at ensuring compliance of the MEP. Our results on the relevance of economic incentives in the context of a TURF regulation can also be used to highlight the importance of less conventional enforcement tools.Territorial Use Rights, Enforcement, Game Theory, Chile

Reference point hyperplane trees

Our context of interest is tree-structured exact search in metric spaces. We make the simple observation that, the deeper a data item is within the tree, the higher the probability of that item being excluded from a search. Assuming a fixed and independent probability p of any subtree being excluded at query time, the probability of an individual data item being accessed is (1−p)d for a node at depth d. In a balanced binary tree half of the data will be at the maximum depth of the tree so this effect should be significant and observable. We test this hypothesis with two experiments on partition trees. First, we force a balance by adjusting the partition/exclusion criteria, and compare this with unbalanced trees where the mean data depth is greater. Second, we compare a generic hyperplane tree with a monotone hyperplane tree, where also the mean depth is greater. In both cases the tree with the greater mean data depth performs better in high-dimensional spaces. We then experiment with increasing the mean depth of nodes by using a small, fixed set of reference points to make exclusion decisions over the whole tree, so that almost all of the data resides at the maximum depth. Again this can be seen to reduce the overall cost of indexing. Furthermore, we observe that having already calculated reference point distances for all data, a final filtering can be applied if the distance table is retained. This reduces further the number of distance calculations required, whilst retaining scalability. The final structure can in fact be viewed as a hybrid between a generic hyperplane tree and a LAESA search structure

Theoretical design proposal for simulated hot asphalt mixture at a temperature below zero degrees Celsius

In the world there are adverse climates, climates that hinder the good construction and paving of roads, generating insecurity among the locals and visitors. This over time affects the economy of a country, as a road boosts tourism, transport and commerce. Therefore, a mixture was designed to mitigate a problem in the placement of hot asphalt mixture at temperatures below zero degrees Celsius. That is, a conventional mix design was proposed, but with different types of filler (lime, Portland cement type I and silica) tested with the Marshall and Lottman method which are governed according to the EG-2013 standards [1] and parameters established in the Asphalt Institute [2]. To find the optimum, it was tested with 5.0%, 5.5% 6.0% and 6.5% asphalt cement. Then with the results obtained a comparative analysis was performed. Finally, specimens without any additives were made, the specimens once prepared at 140°C were subjected to freezing, resulting in the three types of filler, that the hot asphalt mixture with incorporation of Portland cement type I to a 5, 90% of asphalt cement is the optimum since, subject to extreme temperatures below 0°C they comply with the parameters required in the standards