Predation and reputation acquisition in debt markets

This paper presents a model of predation based on reputational differences between the entrant and an incumbent. While the incumbent has an established reputation in the debt market, the entrants’s quality is not yet known in the debt market. We show that the incumbent may have incentives to prey in order to interfere with the “reputation acquisition” of the entrant.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

To volunteer or not to volunteer? A cross-country study of volunteering

This paper uses data from the 4th wave of the European Values Survey (EVS) to investigate the factors that in?uence the decision to participate in volunteering activities, considering both volunteering in general as well as volunteering in particular types of activities. Like previous studies we include several socioeconomic and demographic variables. However our study also includes attitudinal variables and country dummy variables that capture the impact of country speci?c factors. Our results show that there are signi?cant differences across countries in the propensity for volunteering and that the determinants of volunteeringare quite di¤erent for the various types of volunteering.Volunteer labor; European Values Survey; Nonpro?t organizations.

Delivered versus Mill Nonlinear Pricing in Free Entry Markets

This paper discusses a model where consumers simultaneously differ according to one unobservable (preference for quality) and one observable characteristic (location). In these circumstances nonlinear prices arise in equilibrium. The main question addressed in this work is whether firms should be allowed to practise different nonlinear prices at each location (delivered nonlinear pricing) or should be forced to set an unique nonlinear contract (mill nonlinear pricing). Assuming that firms can costless relocate, we show that the free entry long-run number of firms may be either smaller, equal, or higher under delivered nonlinear pricing. In addition, we show that delivered nonlinear pricing yields in the long-run higher welfare and, consequently, our results support the view that discriminatory nonlinear pricing should not be prohibited.

Delivered versus Mill Nonlinear Pricing in Free Entry Markets

This paper discusses a model where consumers simultaneously differ according to one unobservable (preference for quality) and one observable characteristic (location). In these circumstances nonlinear prices arise in equilibrium. The main question addressed in this work is whether firms should be allowed to practise different nonlinear prices at each location (delivered nonlinear pricing) or should be forced to set an unique nonlinear contract (mill nonlinear pricing). Assuming that firms can costless relocate, we show that the free entry long-run number of firms may be either smaller, equal, or higher under delivered nonlinear pricing. In addition, we show that delivered nonlinear pricing yields in the long-run higher welfare and, consequently, our results support the view that discriminatory nonlinear pricing should not be prohibited.Delivered nonlinear pricing, Mill nonlinear pricing, Asymmetric information, Pricing regulation

New housing supply: what do we know and how can we learn more?

This paper reviews the literature on new housing supply. The paper starts by summarizing the results of the empirical studies on housing supply, showing that overall these studies reject the hypothesis of a perfectly elastic housing supply and reveal that housing supply is negatively related with financial costs, inflation and sales delay while showing inconclusive results with respect to the construction costs. In addition, we review a recent branch of the literature on housing supply that uses strategic interaction models. There is evidence that the housing market is not well described by the perfect competition model. Thus, a deeper understanding of housing supply can be achieved by considering theoretical models that take into account the strategic interaction between land developers and by using data where the unit of analysis is the land developer.Housing supply; price elasticity of supply, strategic interaction.

Economies of Scope, Entry Deterrence and Welfare

This paper develops a model where the incumbent may expand to a related market to signal economies of scope and deter entry in the former market. We show that the incumbent only expands when scope economies are large enough. Thus expansion is a signal of larger economies of scope and, for certain parameter values, leads to entry deterrence. Although our game is twoperiod, the expansion strategy creates a long-term advantage. We further investigate the implications of prohibiting an entry-deterrent expansion. A major finding is that, in our model, this prohibition always decreases consumer surplus. In terms of global welfare, the impact is ambiguous but negative for many parameter values

The Determinants of Venture Capital in Europe—Evidence Across Countries

Abstract This article analyses the determinants of European venture capital activity. The main novelty of our work is in accounting for the idiosyncrasies of the European venture capital market. In particular, we investigate whether the size of the merger and acquisition market (M&A) is important in explaining venture capital. Moreover, our work is the first that analyses the impact of the degree of information asymmetry at the macro level, the direct impact of the level of entrepreneurial activity and the impact of the unemployment rate on venture capital activity. We use aggregate data from 23 European countries for the period 1998–2003 to estimate panel data models with fixed and random effects. Our results reveal that the size of the M&A market and the market-to-book ratio have a positive impact on venture capital activity whereas the unemployment rate influences the venture capital market negatively. These results highlight the importance of the exit environment and of the degree of asymmetric information for the venture capital market

Delivered versus Mill Nonlinear Pricing in Free Entry Markets

This paper discusses a model where consumers simultaneously differ according to one unobservable (preference for quality) and one observable characteristic (location). In these circumstances nonlinear prices arise in equilibrium. The main question addressed in this work is whether firms should be allowed to practise different nonlinear prices at each location (delivered nonlinear pricing) or should be forced to set an unique nonlinear contract (mill nonlinear pricing). Assuming that firms can costless relocate, we show that the free entry long-run number of firms may be either smaller, equal, or higher under delivered nonlinear pricing. In addition, we show that delivered nonlinear pricing yields in the long-run higher welfare and, consequently, our results support the view that discriminatory nonlinear pricing should not be prohibited.N/

To volunteer or not to volunteer? A cross-country study of volunteering

Comunicação apresentada em 5th Annal Meeting of the Portuguese Economic Journal - Aveiro, 8-9 July 2011This paper uses data from the 4th wave of the European Values Survey (EVS) to inves- tigate the factors that in uence the decision to participate in volunteering activities, con- sidering both volunteering in general as well as volunteering in particular types of activities. Like previous studies we include several socioeconomic and demographic variables. However our study also includes attitudinal variables and country dummy variables that capture the impact of country speci c factors. Our results show that there are signi cant di¤erences across countries in the propensity for volunteering and that the determinants of volunteering are quite di¤erent for the various types of volunteering

The exit decision in the European venture capital market

This article analyses the exit decision in the European venture capital market, studying when to exit and how it interacts with the exit form. Using a competing risks model we study the impact on the exit decision of the characteristics of venture capital investors, of their investments and of contracting variables. Our results reveals that the hazard functions are non-monotonic for all exit forms and suggest that, in Europe, Initial Public Offering candidates take longer to be selected than trade sales. Moreover our results show that, in Europe, venture capitalists associated with financial institutions have quicker exits (stronger for trade sales), and highlight the importance of contracting variables on the exit decision. An unexpected result is that the presence on the board of directors leads to longer investment durations