Research on Markets for Inventions and Implications for R&D Allocation Strategies

Several streams of literature have examined the phenomenon of “markets for inventions”, that is, the trade of elements of knowledge which are “disembodied” from individuals, organizations, and products. The aims of this paper are to bring together the various streams of research in this area and discuss their major assumptions and limitations, in order to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the phenomenon, and identify promising paths for future research. We start our review by identifying the object of market exchange—that is, an invention whose knowledge has been codified and disembodied from individuals, organizations, or artifacts. We then identify those factors that enable firms to trade inventions, distinguishing between institutional-, firm-, and industry-level factors. We close our analysis of the extant literature by discussing the implications of markets for inventions for firm behavior and performance. Against this background, we highlight an important avenue for future research. A neglected implication of the development of invention markets is that firms are confronted with a wide variety of technological paths from which to choose, because the opportunity to acquire technologies on the market offers them a greater variety that can their internal R&D departments. However, the streams of research on markets for inventions and on R&D allocation strategies have been surprisingly disconnected so far. Hence, in the final section, we start to establish and explore the link between these literatures, and to identify a research agenda in this domain

Corporate Venture Capital as a Real Option in the Market for Technology

We apply real options (RO) theory to understand the role of corporate venture capital (CVC) investments and its relationship with internal R&D capabilities in supporting the acquisition of external technologies. We formulate hypotheses about key drivers of the option value of CVC and the decision to exercise the RO using a dyadic dataset of global pharmac eutical firms and their biotech partners. Our findings suggest that the option value of CVC is higher for investors with weaker scientific capabilities; engaging the markets for technology in distant technological fields; and, when their innovation pipeline is tilted toward the late-stage development process. Finally , the licensing of high-value technologies is the most likely form of option exercise when technological uncertainty is reduced post-CVC. Managerial Summary: Despite the fact that one of the main goals of corporate venture capital (CVC) investments in high-tech industries is to gain a window on fut ure tech- nologies, the relationship between CVC and other strategies used to acquire external technologies, such as licensing, has not been adequately explored. To address this gap, we formulat e hypotheses about key drivers of the decision to make CVC investments as a wait-and-see strat- egy in the markets for technology (MFT) using a longitudinal dataset of global pharmaceutical firms and their biotech partners. We find that investors' scientific capabilities, technological domains, and research pipelines impact investors' decisions to make CVC investments prior to other MFT transactions. In our research setting, investors typically acquire high-value technologies via licensing when technological uncertainty is reduced post-CVC

How Reliable Is the Market for Technology?

Research has focused on why and when firms access external technology markets. Less is known about the reliability of patents attached to licensed technologies during litigation. Unreliable patents expose a firm to loss of downstream revenues. We address this by constructing a data set of patent litigation in the pharmaceutical industry and exploit a change in patent law that exogenously increased the probability of litigation. We find that licensed patents are more likely to fall during litigation. This effect is isolated to firms with fewer intellectual property capabilities and less patenting experience, suggesting that benefits from external technology are not shared equally

Assets with "Warts": How Reliable is the Market for Technology?

Existing research has focused on why and when firms may choose to access the external technology market. Surprisingly, however, less is known about the reliability of the patents attached to these external technologies in the face of litigation. “Weak” external patents expose a firm to the potential loss of downstream revenues. To address this question we construct a novel dataset of patent litigation in the pharmaceutical industry. We exploit a change in U.S. patent law as a natural experiment to test whether external patents are more reliable than those developed internally. We find that acquired patents are more likely to fall during litigation; they are less reliable then internal technologies. Losses lead to an average reduction in market capitalization of $450 million. Overall, our results demonstrate the critical importance of the underlying reliability of external patents and provides a cautionary note to the potential benefits of accessing external technology markets

including, © notice, is given to the source. R&D and the Patent Premium

We analyze the effect of patenting on R&D with a model linking a firm's R&D effort with its decision to patent, recognizing that R&D and patenting affect one another and are both driven by many of the same factors. Using survey data for the U.S. manufacturing sector, we estimate the increment to the value of an innovation realized by patenting it, and then analyze the effect on R&D of changing that premium. Although patent protection is found to provide a positive premium on average in only a few industries, our results also imply that it stimulates R&D across almost al

R&D, Knowledge Spillovers, and Competition among Firms with Asymmetric Technological Capabilities

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