Mixed oligopoly, productive efficiency, and spillover

The purpose of this paper is to examine the public sector's cost-reducing investment when there exists the effect of R&D spillover. We show that the investment in the mixed oligopoly is not higher than that in the public monopoly. When the cost-reducing effect of investment for each firm is the same, the investment in the mixed oligopoly is equal to that in the public monopoly. In such a case, the emergence of private firms has a positive impact on social welfare. Our model is an extended version of Nishimori and Ogawa (2002), which study the R&D investment by the public sector.state-owned public firm

Characterizing the Nash social welfare relation for infinite utility streams: a note

This note provides an axiomatic analysis of a social welfare ordering over infinite utility streams. We offer two characterizations of an infinite-horizon version of the Nash criterion.Infinite generations, intergenerational equity, the Nash criterion

Privatization and the Environment

We investigate the privatization policy of an industry where the production process generates emissions. We show that the high degree of negative externality leads to production substitution from the public firm to private firms. Moreover, we show that, if the degree of negative externality is sufficiently high, then a mixed oligopoly is preferable to a pure oligopoly for social welfare, even if the number of firms in the market is large. Furthermore, we consider free entry of private firms.production substitution

Optimal Production Tax and Privatization Policies under an Endogenous Market Structure

We investigate the optimal tax and privatization policies in a mixed oligopoly in which a state-owned public firm competes against private firms in a free-entry market. First, we investigate the domestic private firm case. The optimal tax rate is strictly positive except for the full privatization and full nationalization cases, and the relationship between the optimal tax rate and degree of privatization is inverted U-shaped. Further, the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing in the tax rate. Next, we investigate the foreign private firm case and find that the two policies are mutually independent

Inequality aversion in long-term contracts

This paper examines a two-period moral hazard model with an inequality-averse agent. We show how the agent's past performance will help the principal to relax incentive compatibility constraints and how the existence of an inequality aversion of the agent affects a level of wage in each period in a long-term contract. In particular, we focus on the performance in period 1 on the level of wage in period 2. We show that the agent's wage in period 2 depends on performance in periods 1 and 2. This implies that the long-term relationship creates the opportunity for intertemporal risk and inequality sharing

Inequality aversion in long-term contracts

This paper examines a two-period moral hazard model with an inequality-averse agent. We show how the agent's past performance will help the principal to relax incentive compatibility constraints and how the existence of an inequality aversion of the agent affects a level of wage in each period in a long-term contract. In particular, we focus on the performance in period 1 on the level of wage in period 2. We show that the agent's wage in period 2 depends on performance in periods 1 and 2. This implies that the long-term relationship creates the opportunity for intertemporal risk and inequality sharing

Entry-License Tax: Stackelberg versus Cournot

This study investigates how leadership affects public policies in markets where the number of firms is endogenously determined. We focus on the relationship between the relative efficiency of an incumbent firm and the optimal entry tax (entry barrier). We find that this relationship depends on whether the incumbent can commit to the output before the entries of new firms. The optimal entry tax is decreasing (res. increasing) in the productivity of the incumbent when it takes (res. does not take) leadership. We also find that the optimal entry barrier occurring when the incumbent takes leadership is lower than that when it does not

Entry-License Tax: Stackelberg versus Cournot

This study investigates how leadership affects public policies in markets where the number of firms is endogenously determined. We focus on the relationship between the relative efficiency of an incumbent firm and the optimal entry tax (entry barrier). We find that this relationship depends on whether the incumbent can commit to the output before the entries of new firms. The optimal entry tax is decreasing (res. increasing) in the productivity of the incumbent when it takes (res. does not take) leadership. We also find that the optimal entry barrier occurring when the incumbent takes leadership is lower than that when it does not

The Arrow Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series) Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen with Kenneth J. Arrow, Partha Dasgupta, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Joseph E. Stiglitz

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