The octopus mind: Implications for cognitive science

Mather consolidates the case for octopus mind and how it may be structured, shifting the starting point of inquiry from “If octopuses had minds, what would they be like?” to “What is the mind of an octopus like?”

Atrapado en la incertidumbre: El procesamiento predictivo y la inferencia activa en el comportamiento procrastinador del autismo

Un fenómeno a menudo asociado con el autismo es un modo atípico de función ejecutiva, cuyas manifestaciones incluyen dificultad para iniciar tareas. En algunos casos, esto va acompañado de sentimientos de inercia y sensaciones que pueden describirse como inquietud y parálisis simultáneas. En consecuencia, la dificultad para iniciar las tareas puede dar lugar a la procrastinación, ya sea simplemente posponiendo el trabajo en la tarea objetivo o realizando otras tareas no relacionadas antes de dedicarse a la tarea objetivo. Curiosamente, sin embargo, también está documentado que, una vez iniciada una tarea, los autistas pueden centrarse en ella intensamente y durante periodos prolongados de tiempo, especialmente cuando les resulta interesante. Este trabajo utiliza el procesamiento predictivo y la inferencia activa para modelar la relación entre la función ejecutiva, la procrastinación y la hiperfocalización en el autismo. Este modelo integra las causas conocidas y propuestas de los déficits en la función ejecutiva y el papel que desempeña el interés en la regulación de la atención y la motivación. El modelo propone que la procrastinación es el resultado de procesos diferenciales de minimización de errores de predicción, como la ponderación de estímulos sensoriales. Se discuten los vínculos con modelos propuestos previamente, como la coherencia central débil (CCC), y la teoría de los priores altos e inflexibles de los errores de predicción en el autismo (HIPPEA)

Explanation Within Arm’s Reach : A Predictive Processing Framework for Single Arm Use in Octopuses

Octopuses are highly intelligent animals with vertebrate-like cognitive and behavioural repertoires. Despite these similarities, vertebrate-based models of cognition and behaviour cannot always be successfully applied to octopuses, due to the structural and functional characteristics that have evolved in their nervous system in response to the unique challenges posed by octopus morphology. For instance, the octopus brain does not support a somatotopic or point-for-point spatial map of the body—an important feature of vertebrate nervous systems. Thus, while octopuses are capable of motor tasks whose vertebrate counterparts require detailed interoceptive monitoring, these movements may not be explainable using motor control frameworks premised on internal spatial representation. One such motor task is the extension of a single arm. The ability of octopuses to select and use a single arm without the guidance of a somatotopic map has been regarded as a motor control puzzle. In an attempt at a solution, this paper develops a predictive processing account of single-arm extension in octopuses.publishe

The octopus and the unity of consciousness

If the octopus were conscious, what would its consciousness be like? This paper investigates the structure octopus consciousness, if existent, is likely to exhibit. Presupposing that the configuration of an organism’s consciousness is correlated with that of its nervous system, it is unlikely that the structure of the sort of conscious experience that would arise from the highly decentralized octopus nervous system would bear much resemblance to those of vertebrates. In particular, octopus consciousness may not exhibit unity, which has long been assumed to be the normal or default structure of consciousness. The octopus nervous system is characterized by the following features: its three anatomically distinct components have extensive functional autonomy and little intercommunication; much of the sensory processing and motor control routines—that in vertebrates are localized in the brain—take place within the peripheral arm nervous system; and proprioception and somatotopic representation (point-for-point mapping of the body) are significantly downplayed. In this paper, I present the octopus as a highly successful biological organism in which it is plausible that the unified model of consciousness does not hold

The argument from Evel (Knievel) : daredevils and the free energy principle

Much of the literature on the free energy principle (FEP) has focused on how organisms maintain homeostasis amidst a constantly changing environment. A fun- damental feature of the FEP is that biological entities are “hard-wired” towards self-preservation. However, contrary to this notion, there do exist organisms that appear to seek out rather than avoid conditions that pose an elevated risk of serious injury or death, thereby jeopardizing their physiological integrity. Borrowing a term used in 1990s popular culture to refer to stunt performers like Evel Knievel, these organisms that exhibit such behavioural characteristics can be referred to as daredevils. This paper presents the case of daredevils as a challenge to the FEP’s homeo- stasis- and optimization-based construal of biological systems. It also introduces three possible explanatory strategies by which the FEP can account for daredevils. The broader objective of the paper is to enhance the FEP’s ability to account for a diverse range of complex behaviour.publishe

Plant sentience: Bias and promise

Whichever side of the debate one chooses, plant sentience is a fertile research area that challenges received views and assumptions, generates novel insights, and suggests new ways that felt states might arise. My commentary discusses methodological and philosophical implications

Where Is It Like to Be an Octopus?

The cognitive capacities and behavioural repertoire of octopuses have led to speculation that these animals may possess consciousness. However, the nervous system of octopuses is radically different from those typically associated with conscious experience: rather than being centralised and profoundly integrated, the octopus nervous system is distributed into components with considerable functional autonomy from each other. Of particular note is the arm nervous system: when severed, octopus arms still exhibit behaviours that are nearly identical to those exhibited when the animal is intact. Given these factors, there is reason to speculate that if octopuses do possess consciousness, it may be of a form highly dissimilar to familiar models. In particular, it may be that the octopus arm is capable of supporting an idiosyncratic field of consciousness. As such, in addition to the likelihood that there is something it is like to be an octopus, there may also be something it is like to be an octopus arm. This manuscript explores this possibility.publishe

The octopus mind: Implications for cognitive science

Mather consolidates the case for octopus mind and how it may be structured, shifting the starting point of inquiry from “If octopuses had minds, what would they be like?” to “What is the mind of an octopus like?”

A tractarian approach to non-linguistic representation: Musical notation as picturing

Is Wittgensteins notion of picturing as presented in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus limited to language? Or can the analysis of picturing be applied to non-linguistic systems of representation? Using Tractarian principles, this paper examines the representative function of musical notation in order to demonstrate that the picture theory can account not only for language but for other systems of representation as well. Musical notation is used as an instantiation of non-linguistic systems of representation; hence, if the analysis of language in the Tractatus can account for musical notation, existential generalization allows the inference that the Tractarian analysis holds true for non-linguistic systems of representation. The investigation of this thesis can be divided into three parts. The argument that language is a system of representation and not the unique phenomenon it is commonly viewed to be is the first undertaking. This foundational argument is followed by identification and explanation of the essential features of musical notation and how these contribute to the logical and representative functions of musical notation. Finally, correlations between musical and notational entities and the elements of Tractarian ontology and language, respectively, are established, demonstrating that the propositions of the Tractatus can be used to correctly analyze musical notation. This paper also addresses the corollary issue of whether the whole world can be represented by a single system of representation. The answer is in the negative, as the various aspects of reality have differing modes of existence, thus requiring distinct and unique systems of representation to account for each of them

The Octopus: Implications for Cognitive Science

Octopuses challenge many common assumptions and received views about the relationship between the nervous system, cognition, and the mind. Despite the major anatomical and functional differences between the octopus and vertebrate neurocognitive systems—as well as the divergent evolutionary histories of these clades—octopuses have vertebrate-like cognitive and behavioural capacities and even display aspects of putative “mentality” previously thought to be applicable (if at all) only to vertebrates. Octopuses thus raise significant implications for scientific and philosophical studies of the mind, brain, and cognition, e.g., regarding the mechanisms and substrates of cognition, the functions and structure of consciousness, and the implementation of various cognitive routines. Furthermore, the evolutionary and ecological factors that influenced the development of octopus cognition and behaviour warrant a reexamination of presuppositions about how intelligence arises. This presentation provides an overview of some of the implications octopuses raise for cognitive science