The octopus mind: Implications for cognitive science

Mather consolidates the case for octopus mind and how it may be structured, shifting the starting point of inquiry from “If octopuses had minds, what would they be like?” to “What is the mind of an octopus like?”

The octopus and the unity of consciousness

If the octopus were conscious, what would its consciousness be like? This paper investigates the structure octopus consciousness, if existent, is likely to exhibit. Presupposing that the configuration of an organism’s consciousness is correlated with that of its nervous system, it is unlikely that the structure of the sort of conscious experience that would arise from the highly decentralized octopus nervous system would bear much resemblance to those of vertebrates. In particular, octopus consciousness may not exhibit unity, which has long been assumed to be the normal or default structure of consciousness. The octopus nervous system is characterized by the following features: its three anatomically distinct components have extensive functional autonomy and little intercommunication; much of the sensory processing and motor control routines—that in vertebrates are localized in the brain—take place within the peripheral arm nervous system; and proprioception and somatotopic representation (point-for-point mapping of the body) are significantly downplayed. In this paper, I present the octopus as a highly successful biological organism in which it is plausible that the unified model of consciousness does not hold

The argument from Evel (Knievel) : daredevils and the free energy principle

Much of the literature on the free energy principle (FEP) has focused on how organisms maintain homeostasis amidst a constantly changing environment. A fun- damental feature of the FEP is that biological entities are “hard-wired” towards self-preservation. However, contrary to this notion, there do exist organisms that appear to seek out rather than avoid conditions that pose an elevated risk of serious injury or death, thereby jeopardizing their physiological integrity. Borrowing a term used in 1990s popular culture to refer to stunt performers like Evel Knievel, these organisms that exhibit such behavioural characteristics can be referred to as daredevils. This paper presents the case of daredevils as a challenge to the FEP’s homeo- stasis- and optimization-based construal of biological systems. It also introduces three possible explanatory strategies by which the FEP can account for daredevils. The broader objective of the paper is to enhance the FEP’s ability to account for a diverse range of complex behaviour.publishe

Plant sentience: Bias and promise

Whichever side of the debate one chooses, plant sentience is a fertile research area that challenges received views and assumptions, generates novel insights, and suggests new ways that felt states might arise. My commentary discusses methodological and philosophical implications

Where Is It Like to Be an Octopus?

The cognitive capacities and behavioural repertoire of octopuses have led to speculation that these animals may possess consciousness. However, the nervous system of octopuses is radically different from those typically associated with conscious experience: rather than being centralised and profoundly integrated, the octopus nervous system is distributed into components with considerable functional autonomy from each other. Of particular note is the arm nervous system: when severed, octopus arms still exhibit behaviours that are nearly identical to those exhibited when the animal is intact. Given these factors, there is reason to speculate that if octopuses do possess consciousness, it may be of a form highly dissimilar to familiar models. In particular, it may be that the octopus arm is capable of supporting an idiosyncratic field of consciousness. As such, in addition to the likelihood that there is something it is like to be an octopus, there may also be something it is like to be an octopus arm. This manuscript explores this possibility.publishe

The octopus mind: Implications for cognitive science

Mather consolidates the case for octopus mind and how it may be structured, shifting the starting point of inquiry from “If octopuses had minds, what would they be like?” to “What is the mind of an octopus like?”

A tractarian approach to non-linguistic representation: Musical notation as picturing

Is Wittgensteins notion of picturing as presented in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus limited to language? Or can the analysis of picturing be applied to non-linguistic systems of representation? Using Tractarian principles, this paper examines the representative function of musical notation in order to demonstrate that the picture theory can account not only for language but for other systems of representation as well. Musical notation is used as an instantiation of non-linguistic systems of representation; hence, if the analysis of language in the Tractatus can account for musical notation, existential generalization allows the inference that the Tractarian analysis holds true for non-linguistic systems of representation. The investigation of this thesis can be divided into three parts. The argument that language is a system of representation and not the unique phenomenon it is commonly viewed to be is the first undertaking. This foundational argument is followed by identification and explanation of the essential features of musical notation and how these contribute to the logical and representative functions of musical notation. Finally, correlations between musical and notational entities and the elements of Tractarian ontology and language, respectively, are established, demonstrating that the propositions of the Tractatus can be used to correctly analyze musical notation. This paper also addresses the corollary issue of whether the whole world can be represented by a single system of representation. The answer is in the negative, as the various aspects of reality have differing modes of existence, thus requiring distinct and unique systems of representation to account for each of them

The octopus and the unity of consciousness

If the octopus were conscious, what would its consciousness be like? This paper investigates the structure octopus consciousness, if existent, is likely to exhibit. Presupposing that the configuration of an organism’s consciousness is correlated with that of its nervous system, it is unlikely that the structure of the sort of conscious experience that would arise from the highly decentralized octopus nervous system would bear much resemblance to those of vertebrates. In particular, octopus consciousness may not exhibit unity, which has long been assumed to be the normal or default structure of consciousness. The octopus nervous system is characterized by the following features: its three anatomically distinct components have extensive functional autonomy and little intercommunication; much of the sensory processing and motor control routines—that in vertebrates are localized in the brain—take place within the peripheral arm nervous system; and proprioception and somatotopic representation (point-for-point mapping of the body) are significantly downplayed. In this paper, I present the octopus as a highly successful biological organism in which it is plausible that the unified model of consciousness does not hold

Neurodiversity and anthropomorphism in social insect research

When researching social insects, interpretations drawing parallels between behaviours and social systems of humans and animals are particularly prevalent. While these comparisons have value for illustrative purposes, failing to recognize them as metaphors can result in erroneous interpretations of data. Previous studies have found this anthropomorphic bias to be connected to extraversion and sociability. Autistic individuals are overrepresented in the life sciences, may be less prone to cognitive bias, yet still face significant stigma in the workplace. In this interdisciplinary study, we therefore surveyed an international sample of social insect scientists to explore the impact of autistic traits on their research. We herein present the first results of this study, and discuss them from the standpoints of cognitive science, philosophy of psychiatry, and entomology. We thereby hope to elucidate the role of neurodiversity and atypical modes of perception in science, and contribute to creating a more inclusive academic landscape