Strategic equilibrium in economies with a continuum of agents

In this note, a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents who behave strategically in endowments and preferences is considered. A notion of equilibrium, namely, strategic equilibrium is defined. It is shown that price-taking and strategic behavior leads to identical results

A discrete approach to continuum economies

We consider a perfectly competitive economy in which only a finite number of different agents' characteristics can be distinguished. We associate this economy with an n-agents' economy with an ordered Banach commodity space, and we prove that the continuum and the discrete approach to the equilibrium problem can be considered equivalent

A discrete approach to continuum economies.

We consider a perfectly competitive economy in which only a finite number of different agents' characteristics can be distinguished. We associate this economy with an n-agents' economy with an ordered Banach commodity space, and we prove that the continuum and the discrete approach to the equilibrium problem can be considered equivalent.Continuum economies; core; Walrasian equilibrium;

Existence, continuity and utility representation of strictly monotonic preferences on continuum of goods commodity spaces

It is an easy task for most commodity spaces, to find examples of strictly monotonic preference relations. For example, in the space of bounded sequences of real numbers.. However, it is not easy for spaces like the space of bounded functions defined in the real interval [0, 1]. In this note we investigate the roots of this difficulty. We show that strictly monotonic preferences on the space of bounded function on any set K always exist. However, if K is uncountable no such preference is continuous and none of them have a utility representation.utility representation/ strictly monotonic preferences

Walrasian prices in a market with consumption rights

In this paper we consider an exchange economy where there is an external restriction for the consumption of goods. This restriction is defined by both a cap on consumption of certain commodities and the requirement of an amount of rights for the consumption of these commodities. The caps for consumption are imposed exogenously due to the negative effects that the consumption may produce. The consumption rights are distributed among the agents. This fact leads to the possibility of establishing licence or consumption rights markets. These consumption rights do not participate in agents' preferences, however the individual's budgetary constraint may be modified, leading to a reassignment of resources. The aim of this paper is to show the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium price system linking tradable rights prices with commodity prices.competitive equilibrium, quotas, consumption rights, cap-and-trade program.

Existence and generic efficiency of equilibrium in two-period economies with private state-verification

Private state-verification is introduced in a two-period economy with spot markets in both periods and complete futures markets for contingent delivery in the second period. Existence of equilibrium is established, under standard assumptions. The equilibrium allocation is shown to be generically efficient if the number of states is not greater than the number of goods.General equilibrium, Differential information, Private state-verification, Two-period economies, Existence of equilibrium, Generic efficiency

Strategic equilibrium in economies with a continuum of agents.

In this note, a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents who behave strategically in endowments and preferences is considered. A notion of equilibrium, namely, strategic equilibrium is defined. It is shown that price-taking and strategic behavior leads to identical results.Strategic equilibrium; Pure exchange economy; Continuum economy;

Private Information: Similarity as Compatibility

We investigate the continuity of equilibrium in differential information economies with a finite number of agents. In this setting, agents can make contingent contracts based on events that are commonly observed. With private information modelled as finite partitions of a compact and metrizable space of states of nature, we introduce a topology on information that takes into account the compatibility of information fields in assessing similarity between private information fields. This topology allows us to establish upper semicontinuity of the private core correspondence.Differential Information Economy, Asymmetric Information, Radner Equilibrium, Private Core, Topologies on Information.

General equilibrium with private state verification

We study general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. Trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. It is useful to define a list of bundles as a derivative good that gives an agent the right to receive one of the bundles in the list. Enforceable trade agreements can be described by Pi-measurable plans of lists of bundles, instead of Pi-measurable plans of bundles as in Radner (1968). In equilibrium, the price of a list coincides with the price of the cheapest bundle in the list, and it is always the cheapest bundle of the list that is delivered. This property leads to a system of linear inequalities which are deliverability constraints on the choice set. We investigate existence of equilibrium in the case in which preferences are Pi-measurable. If there is a perfectly informed trader in the economy, existence of equilibrium is guaranteed.General equilibrium, Differential information, Verifiability, Uncertain delivery, Lists of bundles, Rational expectations