The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.[eng] We study a cooperative problem where agents contribute a certain amount of money or capital in order to obtain a surplus. The proportional distribution with respect to the contributions of players is a core element of the cooperative game associated. Within this basic model, an external agent is introduced in order to evaluate the potential profit of every subcoalition of agents in the case this new agent enters. This analysis can produce that the relative bargaining power of agents may be modified. In particular, we evaluate whether the proportional distribution is still a robust proposal from the point of view of the bargaining set of a cooperative game with coalition structure (Davis and Maschler, 1963). Since, in general, the proportional distribution fails to be a bargaining set element of this game, a sufficient condition for the proportional allocation to belong to the bargaining is stated. A necessary condition is also analysed. Finally, we state a sufficient condition that guarantees the proportional distribution to be the unique element of the bargaining set of the associated game with coalition structure

Solitude and Sensibility: Female Identities in the Spanish Enlightenment

Introduction What did solitude mean to the men and women of the eighteenth century? To newly enlightened minds, the idea that anyone might withdraw from his or her fellows, whether physically or mentally, was anything but desirable. Nor could voluntary isolation any more be construed as a sign of nearness to God. Individuals were expected to spend their time neither searching for heaven on earth nor preparing their souls for the afterlife, but working towards the common good in the here and now. Personal interests and desires were seen as secondary to the needs of society and therefore great importance was attributed to the exchange of ideas, dialogue, cooperation, philanthropic urges and a sense of sympathy for humanity as a whole. In a reversal of the ascetic vision of the Baroque, those who opted for a life of seclusion were no longer viewed as hermits, holy men or sages, but instead seen as marginalised, anti-social, eccentric and, above all, misanthropic (Minois 297)

Implementation of a multi-scale predictive system of the degradation of the urban front in Brno, Czech Republic

The unavoidable deterioration of the built urban front in the cities has been increasingly generating a huge environmental impact. From this perspective, it is necessary to develop systematized methods that facilitate strategic maintenance of the facades and which study the variables that can potentially play a significant role in the damage occurrence. Therefore it is convenient to implement analytical methodologies to the decision making process on conservation and sustainability of the built urban front with a macro-scale approach. The BRAIN platform (Building Research Analysis and Information Network) is a Multi-scale Predictive System of the Degradation of the Urban Front. By means of periodic inspections, BRAIN allows analyses of damage progression and prediction of the future affectation, based on survival/reliability statistical models. The aim of this paper is to introduce a preliminary study on the implementation of the Urban Laboratory in the city of Brno, Czech Republic. Results of this primary approach have been displayed and discussed.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Diabetes: A Multifaceted Disorder

Diabetes is a chronic disease associated with increased morbidity and mortality from cardiovascular diseases cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and kidney or liver disease. Despite the fact that aging is the main risk factor for the onset and progressionof type 2 diabetes mellitus (the most common type of diabetes), in recent decades, age-standardized all-cause mortality in the population with type 2 diabetes has fallen morethan in the general population. However, age-specific data indicate that this trend in the total diabetes population is predominantly influenced by trends in those aged 80 or more years. The figures observed in those younger than 80 years indicate that improvements in the management of diabetes and its complications may not have translated into a direct prevention of premature deaths related to type 2 diabetes

The incentive core in co-investment problems

We study resource-monotonicity properties of core allocations in coinvestment problems: those where a set of agents pool their endowments of a certain resource or input in order to obtain a joint surplus or output that must be allocated among the agents. We analyze whether agents have incentives to raise their initial contribution (resource-monotonicity). We focus not only on looking for potential incentives to agents who raise their contributions, but also in not harming the payoffs to the rest of agents (strong monotonicity property). A necessary and suficient condition to fulfill this property is stated and proved. We also provide a subclass of coinvestment problems for which any core allocation satisfies the aforementioned strong resource-monotonicity property. Moreover, we introduce the subset of core allocations satisfying this condition, namely the incentive core

Mineralización estratiforme de Pb-Zn-Cu en el Paleozoico de Bassegoda (Pirineo Oriental)

Al Sur del pico de Bassegoda existe una mineralización estratiforme de galena, esfalerita y pirita con calcopirita y arsenopirita, en forma de diseminaciones y lentejones masivos, situadas dentro de un tramo de 10 metros de micaesquistos y dolomias negras. Estos niveles mineralizados se hallan en el contacto entre micaesquistos y dolomias masivas que contienen piroclastos ácidos. Tanto el tipo de depósito como la litologia encajante, permiten correlacionar esta mineralización con un conjunto de concentraciones metalicas estratiformes y estratoligadas del Cambro-Ordovicico del NE de Cataluñ

Estudi microtermomètric dels filons de quars de les Esquerdes de Rojà, Massís de Canigó, Pirineu Oriental

Els materials pre-hercinians i el granit de Costabona estan travessats per un conjunt de filons de quars de fms a 15 km de longitud, coneguts com a "Esquerdes de Roja". Aquests filons estan localment afectats per un sistema de bandes milonítiques i per un altre posterior de fractures. A partir de l'anilisi microtermometrica de les inclusions fluides prirniries en quars, ha estat obtinguda una temperatura de formació de l'ordre de + 280° C per la major part del quars, i una temperatura de + 250° C per als monocristaüs que omplen esquerdes i cavitats. Els filons s'haurien format a partir de solucions mineralitzants que contenien Na+Ca++, K+ i, en menor proporció, Mg++.fins una salinitat total de l'ordre del 20°/en pes de la Na C