Immiserizing growth and the Metzler Paradox in the Ricardian Model

Conditions for the occurrence of immiserizing growth and the Metzler paradox are analysed in the Ricardian model when consumers in the foreign country have Leontief preferences while consumers in the home country have Cobb-Douglas preferences. By using specific functional forms, the conditions for the occurrence of the two paradoxes are defined in terms of the exogenous parameters of the model rather than endogenous variables such as the elasticity of demand for exports in the conditions of Bhagwati (1958) and Metzler (1949a and b). It is shown that the simultaneous occurrence of both paradoxical results is possible for some parameter values

Multilateral trade liberalisation, foreign direct investment and the volume of world trade

A paradox in international trade is that multilateral trade liberalisation has resulted in increases in both the volume of world trade and the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI). This note presents a Cournot duopoly model with two regions, each consisting of two countries, and with an inter-regional transport cost. It is shown that multilateral trade liberalisation may lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking export-platform FDI when the interregional transport cost is high. Also, when the inter-regional transport cost is high, the switch to FDI leads to an increase in the volume of world trade in this industry

Product differentiation, the volume of trade and profits under Cournot and Bertrand duopoly

This paper analyses how product differentiation affects the volume of trade under duopoly using Shubik-Levitan demand functions rather than the Bowley demand functions used by Bernhofen (2001). The Shubik-Levitan demand functions have the advantage that an increase in product differentiation does not increase the size of the market as happens with the Bowley demand functions. It is shown that the volume of trade in terms of quantities is decreasing in the degree of product differentiation when the trade cost is relatively low, but increasing in the degree of product differentiation when the trade cost is relatively high

Implementation of an Online Database for Chemical Propulsion Systems

The Johns Hopkins University, Chemical Propulsion Information Analysis Center (CPIAC) has been working closely with NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC); NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC); the University of Alabama at Huntsville (UAH); The Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Laboratory (APL); and NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to capture satellite and spacecraft propulsion system information for an online database tool. The Spacecraft Chemical Propulsion Database (SCPD) is a new online central repository containing general and detailed system and component information on a variety of spacecraft propulsion systems. This paper only uses data that have been approved for public release with unlimited distribution. The data, supporting documentation, and ability to produce reports on demand, enable a researcher using SCPD to compare spacecraft easily, generate information for trade studies and mass estimates, and learn from the experiences of others through what has already been done. This paper outlines the layout and advantages of SCPD, including a simple example application with a few chemical propulsion systems from various NASA spacecraft

Tacit collusion over Foreign Direct Investment under oligopoly

A two-country model of the FDI versus export decisions of firms is analysed. The analysis considers both the Cournot duopoly and the Bertrand duopoly models with differentiated products. It is shown that the static game is often a prisoners' dilemma where both firms are worse off when they both undertake FDI. To avoid the prisoners' dilemma, in an infinitely-repeated game, the firms can collude over their FDI versus export decisions. Then, a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI when trade costs are relatively high. Also, collusion over FDI may increase welfar

Auctioning immigration visas

Freeman (2006) suggested that auctioning immigration visas and redistributing the revenue to native residents in the host country would increase migration from low-income to high-income countries. The effect of the auctioning of immigration visas, in the Ricardian model from Findlay (1982), on the optimal level of immigration for the host country is considered. It is shown that auctioning immigration visas will lead to a positive level of immigration only if the initial wage difference between the host country and the source country is substantial. The cost of the immigration visa is more than half the earnings of the immigrant worker

Migration and trade with external economies of scale

The analysis of migration in Findlay (1982) is extended by adding external economies of scale to the Ricardian model as in Ethier (1982). With external economies, the larger country always gains from trade but the smaller country may lose from trade unless the external economies of scale are sufficiently strong. The smaller country will always gain from emigration but the larger country may lose from immigration unless the external economies of scale are sufficiently strong. Both countries gain from complete economic integration (free labour migration with free trade). Finally, the optimal migration policies of the two countries are derived