Status of the low beta 0.07 cryomodules for SPIRAL2

International audienceThe status of the low beta cryomodules for SPIRAL2, supplied by the Irfu institute of CEA Saclay, is reported in this paper. We summarise in three parts the RF tests performed on the cavities in vertical cryostat, the RF power tests of the qualifying cryomodule performed in 2010 and the RF power tests performed in 2011 on the first cryomodule of the serie

Complementary regulation of four Eucalyptus CBF genes under various cold conditions

CBF transcription factors play central roles in the control of freezing tolerance in plants. The isolation of two additional CBF genes, EguCBF1c and EguCBF1d, from E. gunnii, one of the cold-hardiest Eucalyptus species, is described. While the EguCBF1D protein sequence is very similar to the previously characterized EguCBF1A and EguCBF1B sequences, EguCBF1C is more distinctive, in particular in the AP2-DBD (AP2-DNA binding domain). The expression analysis of the four genes by RT-qPCR reveals that none of them is specific to one stress but they are all preferentially induced by cold, except for the EguCBF1c gene which is more responsive to salt. The calculation of the transcript copy number enables the quantification of constitutive CBF gene expression. This basal level, significant for the four genes, greatly influences the final EguCBF1 transcript level in the cold. A cold shock at 4 °C, as well as a progressive freezing which mimics a natural frost episode, trigger a fast and strong response of the EguCBF1 genes, while growth at acclimating temperatures results in a lower but more durable induction. The differential expression of the four EguCBF1 genes under these cold regimes suggests that there is a complementary regulation. The high accumulation of the CBF transcript, observed in response to the different types of cold conditions, might be a key for the winter survival of this evergreen broad-leaved tree

Fashioning Entitlements: A Comparative Law and Economic Analysis of the Judicial Role in Environmental Centralization in the U.S. and Europe

This paper identifies and evaluates, from an economic point of view, the role of the judiciary the steady shift of environmental regulatory authority to higher, more centralized levels of government in both the U.S. and Europe. We supply both a positive analysis of how the decisions made by judges have affected the incentives of both private and public actors to pollute the natural environment, and normative answers to the question of whether judges have acted so as to create incentives that move levels of pollution in an efficient direction, toward their optimal, cost-minimizing (or net-benefit-maximizing) levels. Highlights of the analysis include the following points: 1) Industrial-era local (state or national) legislation awarding entitlements to pollute was almost certainly inefficient due to a fundamental economic obstacle faced by those who suffer harm from the over-pollution of publicly owned natural resources: the inability to monetize and credibly commit to repay the future economic value of reducing pollution. 2) When industrial era pollution spilled across state lines in the US, the federal courts, in particular the Supreme Court, fashioned a federal common law of interstate nuisance that set up essentially the same sort of blurry, uncertain entitlements to pollute or be free of pollution that had been created by the state courts in resolving local pollution disputes. We argue that for the typical pollution problem, a legal regime of blurry interstate entitlements - with neither jurisdiction having a clear right either to pollute or be free of pollution from the other - is likely to generate efficient incentives for interjursidictional bargaining, even despite the public choice problems besetting majority-rule government. Interestingly, a very similar system of de facto entitlements arose and often stimulated interjursidictional bargaining in Europe as well as in the U.S. 3) The US federal courts have generally interpreted the federal environmental statutes in ways that give clear primacy to federal regulators. Through such judicial interpretation, state and local regulators face a continuing risk of having their decisions overridden by federal regulators. This reduces the incentives for regulatory innovation at the state and local level. Judicial authorization of federal overrides has thus weakened the economic rationale for cooperative federalism suggested by economic models of principal-agent relationships. As a result of the principle of attribution, there is less risk in Europe that (like in the US) courts would enlarge the federal purview and thereby limit the powers of the Member States. Despite this principle, the power of the European bureaucracy (that is, the European Commission) has steadily increased and led to a steady shift of environmental regulatory competencies to the European level. This shift is only sometimes normatively desirable, and yet there is little that the ECJ can or will do to slow it

Firm Types, Price-setting Strategies, and Consumption-tax Incidence

Studying very detailed micro data collected around two different VAT reforms in Europe, we show that tax incidence is heavily dependent on the characteristics of the price-setting firms. The reforms generated bimodal price-change distributions; nearly all independent restaurants left prices unchanged whereas a substantial fraction of restaurants belonging to chains chose a complete pass-through. These differences cannot be explained by location, initial prices or other market-segment indicators. Instead, differences appear to arise because independent restaurants aim for (very) crude price ranges rather than fine-tuned optimized prices, whereas chains use more elaborate, coordinated pricing strategies

The Efficiency and Equity of the Tax and Transfer System in France

Taxes and cash transfers reduce income inequality more in France than elsewhere in the OECD, because of the large size of the flows involved. But the system is complex overall. Its effectiveness could be enhanced in many ways, for example so as to achieve the same amount of redistribution at lower cost. This Working Paper relates to the 2013 OECD Economic Review of France (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/France).http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/133065/1/wp1047.pd

Global energy governance : a review and research agenda

Over the past few years, global energy governance (GEG) has emerged as a major new field of enquiry in international studies. Scholars engaged in this field seek to understand how the energy sector is governed at the global level, by whom and with what consequences. By focusing on governance, they broaden and enrich the geopolitical and hard-nosed security perspectives that have long been, and still are, the dominant perspectives through which energy is analysed. Though still a nascent field, the literature on GEG is thriving and continues to attract the attention of a growing number of researchers. This article reviews the GEG literature as it has developed over the past 10 years. Our aim is to highlight both the progress and limitations of the field, and to identify some opportunities for future research. The article proceeds as follows. First, it traces the origins of the GEG literature (section “Origins and roots of GEG research”). The subsequent sections deal with the two topics that have received the most attention in the GEG literature: Why does energy need global governance (section “The goals and rationale of global energy governance”)? And, who governs energy (section “Mapping the global energy architecture”)? We then address a third question that has received far less attention: How well or poor is energy governed (section “Evaluating global energy governance”)? In our conclusions (section “Conclusions and outlook”), we reflect on the current state of GEG, review recent trends and innovations, and identify some questions that warrant future consideration by scholars. This article is published as part of a thematic collection on global governance