There Is No Special Problem About Scientific Representation

In recent years, philosophers of science have devoted considerable attention to questions about scientific models, and particularly to the issue of how models can represent the world. We propose that scientific representation is best understood as a special case of a more general notion of representation, and that the relatively well worked-out and plausible philosophical theories of the latter are directly applicable to the scientific special case. Construing scientific representation in this way makes the so-called ``problem of scientific representation'' look much less interesting than it has seemed to many, and also suggests that some of the (hotly contested) debates in the literature are concerned with non-issues

The Normative Standard for Future Discounting

Exponential discounted utility theory provides the normative standard for future discounting as it is employed throughout the social sciences. Tracing the justification for this standard through economics, philosophy and psychology, I’ll make what I believe is the best case one can for it, showing how a non-arbitrariness assumption and a dominance argument together imply that discounting ought to be exponential. Ultimately, however, I don’t find the case compelling, as I believe it is deeply flawed. Non-exponential temporal discounting is often rational–indeed, the paragon of rationality. If this is correct, it’s an important point when considering policy interventions. Instead of trying to “fix” non-exponetial discounting because it is irrational and associated with negative life outcomes, we might instead focus attention on why the conditions obtain that make such discounting rational

Quantum Mechanics: Keeping It Real?

It is well-known that Schrödinger wanted to interpret the quantum wavefunction ψ as representing a continuous distribution of charge traveling through three-dimensional space. What is less appreciated is that Schrödinger also originally desired that his wavefunction be represented by a real-valued function and not a complex one. This paper is an introduction to and advertisement of Schrödinger’s 4th-order real wave equation, the first published time dependent Schrödinger equation. I introduce two ways of interpreting this equation and show how this equation provides insight into quantum time reversal invariance. My hope is that readers will find other examples where “keeping it real” can help

Quantum Mechanics: Keeping It Real?

It is well-known that Schrödinger wanted to interpret the quantum wavefunction ψ as representing a continuous distribution of charge traveling through three-dimensional space. What is less appreciated is that Schrödinger also originally desired that his wavefunction be represented by a real-valued function and not a complex one. This paper is an introduction to and advertisement of Schrödinger’s 4th-order real wave equation, the first published time dependent Schrödinger equation. I introduce two ways of interpreting this equation and show how this equation provides insight into quantum time reversal invariance. My hope is that readers will find other examples where “keeping it real” can help

Can We Quarantine the Quantum Blight?

In the science fiction novel Quarantine, Greg Egan imagines a universe where interactions with human observers collapse quantum wavefunctions. Aliens, unable to collapse wavefunctions, tire of being slaughtered by these collapses. In response they erect an impenetrable shield around the solar system, protecting the rest of the universe from human interference and locking humanity into a starless Bubble. When confronting scientific realism and the quantum, many philosophers try to do the theoretical counterpart of this fictional practical strategy. Quantum mechanics is beset with many hard-to-resolve interpretational challenges. Philosophers — appealing to decoherence and coarse-graining — try to put these in a bubble and hope that they can go about their philosophizing as before. My chapter aims to burst this Bubble

Black Hole Thermodynamics: More Than an Analogy?

Black hole thermodynamics (BHT) is regarded as one of the deepest clues we have to a quantum theory of gravity. It motivates scores of proposals in the field, from the thought that the world is a hologram to calculations in string theory. The rationale for BHT playing this important role, and for much of BHT itself, originates in the analogy between black hole behavior and ordinary thermodynamic systems. Claiming the relationship is “more than a formal analogy,” black holes are said to be governed by deep thermodynamic principles: what causes your tea to come to room temperature is said additionally to cause the area of black holes to increase. Playing the role of philosophical gadfly, we pour a little cold water on the claim that BHT is more than a formal analogy. First, we show that BHT is often based on a kind of caricature of thermodynamics. Second, we point out an important ambiguity in what systems the analogy is supposed to govern, local or global ones. Finally, and perhaps worst, we point out that one of the primary motivations for the theory arises from a terribly controversial understanding of entropy. BHT may be a useful guide to future physics. Only time will tell. But the analogy is not nearly as good as is commonly supposed

Time in Cosmology

Readers familiar with the workhorse of cosmology, the hot big bang model, may think that cosmology raises little of interest about time. As cosmological models are just relativistic spacetimes, time is understood just as it is in relativity theory, and all cosmology adds is a few bells and whistles such as inflation and the big bang and no more. The aim of this chapter is to show that this opinion is not completely right...and may well be dead wrong. In our survey, we show how the hot big bang model invites deep questions about the nature of time, how inflationary cosmology has led to interesting new perspectives on time, and how cosmological speculation continues to entertain dramatically different models of time altogether. Together these issues indicate that the philosopher interested in the nature of time would do well to know a little about modern cosmology

Time in Cosmology

Readers familiar with the workhorse of cosmology, the hot big bang model, may think that cosmology raises little of interest about time. As cosmological models are just relativistic spacetimes, time is understood just as it is in relativity theory, and all cosmology adds is a few bells and whistles such as inflation and the big bang and no more. The aim of this chapter is to show that this opinion is not completely right...and may well be dead wrong. In our survey, we show how the hot big bang model invites deep questions about the nature of time, how inflationary cosmology has led to interesting new perspectives on time, and how cosmological speculation continues to entertain dramatically different models of time altogether. Together these issues indicate that the philosopher interested in the nature of time would do well to know a little about modern cosmology

There Is No Special Problem About Scientific Representation

In recent years, philosophers of science have devoted considerable attention to questions about scientific models, and particularly to the issue of how models can represent the world. We propose that scientific representation is best understood as a special case of a more general notion of representation, and that the relatively well worked-out and plausible philosophical theories of the latter are directly applicable to the scientific special case. Construing scientific representation in this way makes the so-called ``problem of scientific representation'' look much less interesting than it has seemed to many, and also suggests that some of the (hotly contested) debates in the literature are concerned with non-issues

There is no special problem about scientific representation

We propose that scientific representation is a special case of a more general notion of representation, and that the relatively well worked-out and plausible theories of the latter are directly applicable to the scientific special case. Construing scientific representation in this way makes the so-called ¿problem of scientific representation¿ look much less interesting than it has seemed to many, and suggests that some of the (hotly contested) debates in the literature are concerned with non-issues