Majority stable production equilibria : a multivariate mean shareholders theorem

In a simple parametric general equilibrium model with S states of nature and K S/2. Finally, through parametric examples, these rates are shown to decrease with the homogeneity of the shareholders' beliefs on the probabilities of the states of nature, and to increase with the shareholders' pessimism.Shareholder's vote; general equilibrium; incomplete markets; super majority

Aggregation of Coarse Preferences

We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n alternatives. An individual preference is of refinement lindividual preferences; voting rules; aggregation

Ordering Pareto-Optima Through Majority Voting

A commodity is shared between some individuals; some selection procedure is used to choose allocations. In order to reflect that laws and rules rather than allocations are implemented and that they involve an element of randomness because of incomplete information, selection procedures are taken to be probability measures over the set of allocations. Illustrations and interpretations of the selection procedures are given.Pareto-optimal allocations; infra-majority voting

Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

An economy with two dates is considered, on state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans b voting -one share, one vote- and at r-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most rx100 percent of the shareholders.general equilibrium; incomplete markets; firms; voting

Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models

When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the `worst-case' scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1-1/n is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d smaller than n) linear map spans the possible candidates' platforms. These d `ideological' dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to infinity. Moreover the equilibrium is the mean voter. The speed of convergence (toward 50%) of the super majority rate guaranteeing existence of equilibrium is computed for d=1 and 2.

Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority

In a scheduling problem where agents can opt out, we show that the familiar Random Priority (RP) a rule can be improved upon by another mechanism dubbed Probabilistic Serial (PS). Both mechanisms are nonmanipulable in a strong sense, but the latter is Pareto superior to the former and serves a larger (expected number of agents. The PS equilibrium outcome is easier to compute than the RP outcome; on the other hand RP is easier to implement than PS. We show that the improvement of PS over RP is significant but small: at most a couple of percentage points in the relative welfare gain and the relative difference in quantity served. We conjecture that the latter never exceeds 8.33 %. Both gains vanish when the number of agents is large.

Commons with Increasing Marginal Costs: Random Priority versus Average Cost

Indivisible units are produced with increasing marginal costs. Under average cost, each user pays average cost. Under random priority, users are randomly ordered (without bias) and successively offered to buy at the true marginal cost. Both average cost (AC) and random priority (RP) inefficiently overproduce. RP tends to overproduce less, but which game collects more surplus depends much on the demand configuration. We show that a key to compare the welfare properties of the two mechanisms is the crowding factor, i.e., the number of potential users over the number of units of output users can afford: The more crowded the commons, the more RP outperforms AC. In the quadratic cost case, beyond the threshold value of 2.4 for the crowding factor, RP strongly outperforms AC; beneath it AC only mildly outperforms RP. Thus the RP mechanism manages crowded commons better than AC.

Profile of the Ivory Coast on tabacco : adopt a more effective and better inform about the prevalence of tobacco products

This policy brief provides facts obtained from Ivory Coast’s country profile (2011 – 2016). The prevalence of smoking was estimated at 14.6% for both sexes. The tobacco industry is exempt from anti-advertising legislation. The Ivory Coast is the third largest producer of cigarettes in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The tax base for tobacco products is the ex-factory price and represents less than half of the selling price. Recommendations include: a survey on the consumption of tobacco products by adults; change the tax base ex-factory price; apply an ad valorem tax rate of at least 50%