We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n alternatives. An individual preference is of refinement lindividual preferences; voting rules; aggregation

Hervé, CRES

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Research Papers in Economics

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Condorcet Eﬃciency: A preference for indiﬀerence. Mimeo. Universit´ ed eC a e n .

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Les th´ eories de l’int´ erˆ et g´ en´ eral et le probl` eme logique de l’agr´ egation.

On 64% majority rule.

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On a class of rational decision procedures.

On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules.

Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules.

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The probability of a cyclical majority.

The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings,

The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution.

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Voting anomalies, the number of voters, and the number of alternatives.

Aggregation of Coarse Preferences

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Aggregation of Coarse Preferences

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