435 research outputs found
Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography
Several attacks have been proposed on quantum key distribution systems with
gated single-photon detectors. The attacks involve triggering the detectors
outside the center of the detector gate, and/or using bright illumination to
exploit classical photodiode mode of the detectors. Hence a secure detection
scheme requires two features: The detection events must take place in the
middle of the gate, and the detector must be single-photon sensitive. Here we
present a technique called bit-mapped gating, which is an elegant way to force
the detections in the middle of the detector gate by coupling detection time
and quantum bit error rate. We also discuss how to guarantee single-photon
sensitivity by directly measuring detector parameters. Bit-mapped gating also
provides a simple way to measure the detector blinding parameter in security
proofs for quantum key distribution systems with detector efficiency mismatch,
which up until now has remained a theoretical, unmeasurable quantity. Thus if
single-photon sensitivity can be guaranteed within the gates, a detection
scheme with bit-mapped gating satisfies the assumptions of the current security
proofs.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figure
Comment on "Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography"
This is a comment on the publication by Yuan et al. [Appl. Phys. Lett. 98,
231104 (2011); arXiv:1106.2675v1 [quant-ph]].Comment: 2 page
Feeding kinematics, suction and hydraulic jetting capabilities in bearded seals (Erignathus barbatus)
Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution
Characterizing the physical channel and calibrating the cryptosystem hardware
are prerequisites for establishing a quantum channel for quantum key
distribution (QKD). Moreover, an inappropriately implemented calibration
routine can open a fatal security loophole. We propose and experimentally
demonstrate a method to induce a large temporal detector efficiency mismatch in
a commercial QKD system by deceiving a channel length calibration routine. We
then devise an optimal and realistic strategy using faked states to break the
security of the cryptosystem. A fix for this loophole is also suggested.Comment: 4 pages + 1 page of supplementary information. Considerable
modification of Eve's attack strategy and QBER minimization technique. All
figures have also been improve
Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography
We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be
ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly
ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only
successful if a redundant resistor is included in series with the APD, or if
the detector discrimination levels are set inappropriately
Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote parties to grow a shared
secret key. Its security is founded on the principles of quantum mechanics, but
in reality it significantly relies on the physical implementation.
Technological imperfections of QKD systems have been previously explored, but
no attack on an established QKD connection has been realized so far. Here we
show the first full-field implementation of a complete attack on a running QKD
connection. An installed eavesdropper obtains the entire 'secret' key, while
none of the parameters monitored by the legitimate parties indicate a security
breach. This confirms that non-idealities in physical implementations of QKD
can be fully practically exploitable, and must be given increased scrutiny if
quantum cryptography is to become highly secure.Comment: Revised after editorial and peer-review feedback. This version is
published in Nat. Commun. 8 pages, 6 figures, 1 tabl
Male Antarctic fur seals: neglected food competitors of bioindicator species in the context of an increasing Antarctic krill fishery.
The fishery for Antarctic krill is currently managed using a precautionary, ecosystem-based approach to limiting catch, with performance indices from a long-term monitoring program focused on several krill-dependent predators that are used to track ecosystem health. Concerns over increased fishing in concentrated areas and ongoing efforts to establish a Marine Protected Area along the Peninsula, a key fishing region, is driving the development of an adaptive management system for the fishery. The cumulative effects of fishing effort and interactions among krill-dependent predators and their performance is at present neglected in the CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program. However, we show considerable overlap between male Antarctic fur seals and the krill fishery in a complex mosaic, suggesting potential for cumulative impacts on other krill dependent predators. A holistic view is required as part of future efforts to manage the krill fishery that incorporates various sources of potential impacts on the performance of bioindicator species, including the fishery and its interactions with various krill dependent predators. © 2020, The Author(s)
Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme
Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1) argued that thermodynamics is not essential in the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical physical cryptographic exchange method in an effort to disprove the security of the KLJN scheme. They attempted to demonstrate this by introducing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with two batteries and two switches. In the present paper, we first show that BR's scheme is unphysical and that some elements of its assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communication. All our analyses are based on a technically unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measurements limited only by the laws of physics and statistics. For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the uncertainly principle between measurement duration and statistical errors makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the accuracy or speed of her measurements. To show that thermodynamics and noise are essential for the security, we crack the BR system with 100% success via passive attacks, in ten different ways, and demonstrate that the same cracking methods do not function for the KLJN scheme that employs Johnson noise to provide security underpinned by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. We also present a critical analysis of some other claims by BR; for example, we prove that their equations for describing zero security do not apply to the KLJN scheme. Finally we give mathematical security proofs for each BR-attack against the KLJN scheme and conclude that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not been successfully challenged.Laszlo B. Kish, Derek Abbott, Claes G. Granqvis
Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to
communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the
laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations
always rely on detectors to measure the relevant quantum property of single
photons. Here we demonstrate experimentally that the detectors in two
commercially available QKD systems can be fully remote-controlled using
specially tailored bright illumination. This makes it possible to tracelessly
acquire the full secret key; we propose an eavesdropping apparatus built of
off-the-shelf components. The loophole is likely to be present in most QKD
systems using avalanche photodiodes to detect single photons. We believe that
our findings are crucial for strengthening the security of practical QKD, by
identifying and patching technological deficiencies.Comment: Revised version, rewritten for clarity. 5 pages, 5 figures. To
download the Supplementary information (which is in open access), go to the
journal web site at http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nphoton.2010.21
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