Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography

Several attacks have been proposed on quantum key distribution systems with gated single-photon detectors. The attacks involve triggering the detectors outside the center of the detector gate, and/or using bright illumination to exploit classical photodiode mode of the detectors. Hence a secure detection scheme requires two features: The detection events must take place in the middle of the gate, and the detector must be single-photon sensitive. Here we present a technique called bit-mapped gating, which is an elegant way to force the detections in the middle of the detector gate by coupling detection time and quantum bit error rate. We also discuss how to guarantee single-photon sensitivity by directly measuring detector parameters. Bit-mapped gating also provides a simple way to measure the detector blinding parameter in security proofs for quantum key distribution systems with detector efficiency mismatch, which up until now has remained a theoretical, unmeasurable quantity. Thus if single-photon sensitivity can be guaranteed within the gates, a detection scheme with bit-mapped gating satisfies the assumptions of the current security proofs.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figure

Comment on "Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography"

This is a comment on the publication by Yuan et al. [Appl. Phys. Lett. 98, 231104 (2011); arXiv:1106.2675v1 [quant-ph]].Comment: 2 page

Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution

Characterizing the physical channel and calibrating the cryptosystem hardware are prerequisites for establishing a quantum channel for quantum key distribution (QKD). Moreover, an inappropriately implemented calibration routine can open a fatal security loophole. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a method to induce a large temporal detector efficiency mismatch in a commercial QKD system by deceiving a channel length calibration routine. We then devise an optimal and realistic strategy using faked states to break the security of the cryptosystem. A fix for this loophole is also suggested.Comment: 4 pages + 1 page of supplementary information. Considerable modification of Eve's attack strategy and QBER minimization technique. All figures have also been improve

Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography

We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a redundant resistor is included in series with the APD, or if the detector discrimination levels are set inappropriately

Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote parties to grow a shared secret key. Its security is founded on the principles of quantum mechanics, but in reality it significantly relies on the physical implementation. Technological imperfections of QKD systems have been previously explored, but no attack on an established QKD connection has been realized so far. Here we show the first full-field implementation of a complete attack on a running QKD connection. An installed eavesdropper obtains the entire 'secret' key, while none of the parameters monitored by the legitimate parties indicate a security breach. This confirms that non-idealities in physical implementations of QKD can be fully practically exploitable, and must be given increased scrutiny if quantum cryptography is to become highly secure.Comment: Revised after editorial and peer-review feedback. This version is published in Nat. Commun. 8 pages, 6 figures, 1 tabl

Male Antarctic fur seals: neglected food competitors of bioindicator species in the context of an increasing Antarctic krill fishery.

The fishery for Antarctic krill is currently managed using a precautionary, ecosystem-based approach to limiting catch, with performance indices from a long-term monitoring program focused on several krill-dependent predators that are used to track ecosystem health. Concerns over increased fishing in concentrated areas and ongoing efforts to establish a Marine Protected Area along the Peninsula, a key fishing region, is driving the development of an adaptive management system for the fishery. The cumulative effects of fishing effort and interactions among krill-dependent predators and their performance is at present neglected in the CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program. However, we show considerable overlap between male Antarctic fur seals and the krill fishery in a complex mosaic, suggesting potential for cumulative impacts on other krill dependent predators. A holistic view is required as part of future efforts to manage the krill fishery that incorporates various sources of potential impacts on the performance of bioindicator species, including the fishery and its interactions with various krill dependent predators. © 2020, The Author(s)

Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme

Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1) argued that thermodynamics is not essential in the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical physical cryptographic exchange method in an effort to disprove the security of the KLJN scheme. They attempted to demonstrate this by introducing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with two batteries and two switches. In the present paper, we first show that BR's scheme is unphysical and that some elements of its assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communication. All our analyses are based on a technically unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measurements limited only by the laws of physics and statistics. For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the uncertainly principle between measurement duration and statistical errors makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the accuracy or speed of her measurements. To show that thermodynamics and noise are essential for the security, we crack the BR system with 100% success via passive attacks, in ten different ways, and demonstrate that the same cracking methods do not function for the KLJN scheme that employs Johnson noise to provide security underpinned by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. We also present a critical analysis of some other claims by BR; for example, we prove that their equations for describing zero security do not apply to the KLJN scheme. Finally we give mathematical security proofs for each BR-attack against the KLJN scheme and conclude that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not been successfully challenged.Laszlo B. Kish, Derek Abbott, Claes G. Granqvis

Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination

The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely on detectors to measure the relevant quantum property of single photons. Here we demonstrate experimentally that the detectors in two commercially available QKD systems can be fully remote-controlled using specially tailored bright illumination. This makes it possible to tracelessly acquire the full secret key; we propose an eavesdropping apparatus built of off-the-shelf components. The loophole is likely to be present in most QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes to detect single photons. We believe that our findings are crucial for strengthening the security of practical QKD, by identifying and patching technological deficiencies.Comment: Revised version, rewritten for clarity. 5 pages, 5 figures. To download the Supplementary information (which is in open access), go to the journal web site at http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nphoton.2010.21