Does Virtual Haptic Dissection Improve Student Learning? A Multi-Year Comparative Study.

This study investigated the haptic 'dissection' of a digital model of the hand and wrist in anatomy education at both undergraduate (UG) and postgraduate (PG) levels. The study ran over five successive years and was split into three discreet phases. Phase one compared the results of PG students across control, non-haptic and haptic groups. Phase two compared the results of UG students between control and haptic groups. Phase three compared the results of UG students across control, non-haptic and haptic groups. Results for all phases indicate that use of the model, both through haptic and non-haptic interfaces produced some significantly improved test results. The non-haptic group performing the strongest overall indicating that the addition of haptic feedback may not be beneficial to student learning

Electronically delivered, multicomponent intervention to reduce unnecessary antibiotic prescribing for respiratory infections in primary care: a cluster randomised trial using electronic health records—REDUCE Trial study original protocol

Introduction Respiratory tract infections (RTIs) account for about 60% of antibiotics prescribed in primary care. This study aims to test the effectiveness, in a cluster randomised controlled trial, of electronically delivered, multicomponent interventions to reduce unnecessary antibiotic prescribing when patients consult for RTIs in primary care. The research will specifically evaluate the effectiveness of feeding back electronic health records (EHRs) data to general practices. Methods and analysis 2-arm cluster randomised trial using the EHRs of the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD). General practices in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are being recruited and the general population of all ages represents the target population. Control trial arm practices will continue with usual care. Practices in the intervention arm will receive complex multicomponent interventions, delivered remotely to information systems, including (1) feedback of each practice's antibiotic prescribing through monthly antibiotic prescribing reports estimated from CPRD data; (2) delivery of educational and decision support tools; (3) a webinar to explain and promote effective usage of the intervention. The intervention will continue for 12?months. Outcomes will be evaluated from CPRD EHRs. The primary outcome will be the number of antibiotic prescriptions for RTIs per 1000 patient years. Secondary outcomes will be: the RTI consultation rate; the proportion of consultations for RTI with an antibiotic prescribed; subgroups of age; different categories of RTI and quartiles of intervention usage. There will be more than 80% power to detect an absolute reduction in antibiotic prescription for RTI of 12 per 1000 registered patient years. Total healthcare usage will be estimated from CPRD data and compared between trial arms. Ethics and dissemination Trial protocol was approved by the National Research Ethics Service Committee (14/LO/1730). The pragmatic design of the trial will enable subsequent translation of effective interventions at scale in order to achieve population impact. <br/

Unity through truth

Renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block for any traditional conception of propositions. These worries are often framed in terms of how entities independent of mind and language can have truth conditions: why is the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio true if and only if she loves him? I argue that the best understanding of these worries shows that they should be solved by our theory of truth and not our theory of content. Specifically, I propose a version of the redundancy theory according to which ‘it is true that Desdemona loves Cassio’ expresses the same proposition as ‘Desdemona loves Cassio’. Surprisingly, this variant of the redundancy theory treats ‘is true’ as an ordinary predicate of the language, thereby defusing many standard criticisms of the redundancy theory

Plucked human hair as a tissue in which to assess pharmacodynamic end points during drug development studies

We have demonstrated the feasibility of detecting and quantifying six cell-cycle-related nuclear markers (Ki67, pRb, p27, phospho-p27 (phosphorylated p27), phospho-pRb (phosphorylated pRb), phospho-HH3 (phosphorylated histone H3)) in plucked human scalp and eyebrow hair. Estimates of the proportion of plucked hairs that are lost or damaged during processing plus the intra- and intersubject variability of each nuclear marker with these techniques are provided to inform sizing decisions for intervention studies with drugs potentially impacting on these markers in the future

The Prenective View of Propositional Content

Beliefs have what I will call ‘propositional content’. A belief is always a belief that so-and-so: a belief that grass is green, or a belief that snow is white, or whatever. Other things have propositional content too, such as sentences, judgments and assertions. The Standard View amongst philosophers is that what it is to have a propositional content is to stand in an appropriate relation to a proposition. Moreover, on this view, propositions are objects, i.e. the kind of thing you can refer to with singular terms. For example, on the Standard View, we should parse the sentence ‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’ as: [Simon] believes [that Sharon is funny]; ‘Simon’ is a term referring to a thinking subject, ‘that Sharon is funny’ is a term referring to a proposition, and ‘x believes y’ is a dyadic predicate expressing the believing relation. In this paper, I argue against the Standard View. This is how I think we should parse ‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’: [Simon] believes that [Sharon is funny]; here we have a singular term, ‘Simon’, a sentence ‘Sharon is funny’, and a ‘prenective’ joining them together, ‘x believes that p’. On this Prenective View, we do not get at the propositional content of someone’s belief by referring to a reified proposition with a singular term; we simply use the sentence ‘Sharon is funny’ to express that content for ourselves. I argue for the Prenective View in large part by showing that an initially attractive version of the Standard View is actually vulnerable to the same objection that Wittgenstein used against Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment

Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?

The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others

Propositions on the cheap

According to the classical account, propositions are sui generis, abstract, intrinsically-representational entities and our cognitive attitudes, and the token states within us that realize those attitudes, represent as they do in virtue of their propositional objects. In light of a desire to explain how it could be that propositions represent, much of the recent literature on propositions has pressured various aspects of this account. In place of the classical account, revisionists have aimed to understand propositions in terms of more familiar entities such as facts, types of mental or linguistic acts, and even properties. But we think that the metaphysical story about propositions is much simpler than either the classical theorist or the revisionist would have you believe. In what follows, we argue that a proper understanding of the nature of our cognitive relations to propositions shows that the question of whether propositions themselves represent is, at best, a distraction. We will argue that once this distraction is removed, the possibility of a very pleasing, minimalist story of propositions emerges; a story that appeals only to assumptions that are (or, at least ought to be) shared by all theorists in the relevant debate