Opening the Black Box of Administrative Reform: A Strategic-Relational Analysis of Agency Responses to Termination Threats

How do public agencies respond when reform proposals threaten downsizing, reduction in functions, or termination? Agency survival during administrative reform is conventionally explained by structural characteristics, informed by the hardwiring thesis derived from the politics of the U.S. federal government. Parliamentary systems provide greater opportunity for agency reform, but there is little evidence of how agencies respond to such proposals or how proposals are altered prior to decision. We consider agencies as active participants in the reform processes, using strategic-relational theory to analyse their strategizing. The article employs detailed empirical evidence on 12 agencies subject to reform by the UK government between 2010 and 2013. We identify three archetypical defence strategies—technical expert, network node, and marginal adaptor—and argue that coding agency strategies alongside structural analysis can help better explain reform outcomes

The end of the beginning? Taking forward local democratic renewal in the post-referendum North East.

This article draws upon the author’s commissioned research on the nature of regional governance following the 2004 Referendum in the North East on elected regional assemblies. The article aimed to both capture these views and to assess how the ‘No vote in the referendum has impacted on subsequent developments in sub-national governance. The article provides both an empirical overview of recent developments and engages with the wider conceptual debates on democratic renewal. The arguments covered in this output are aimed at both academic and practitioner audiences, and have been also disseminated at regional and national conferences

Mind the Costs: Rescaling and Multi-Level Environmental Governance in Venice Lagoon

Competences over environmental matters are distributed across agencies at different scales on a national-to-local continuum. This article adopts a transaction costs economics perspective in order to explore the question whether, in the light of a particular problem, the scale at which a certain competence is attributed can be reconsidered. Specifically, it tests whether a presumption of least-cost operation concerning an agency at a given scale can hold. By doing so, it investigates whether the rescaling of certain tasks, aiming at solving a scale-related problem, is likely to produce an increase in costs for day-to-day agency operations as compared to the status quo. The article explores such a perspective for the case of Venice Lagoon. The negative aspects of the present arrangement concerning fishery management and morphological remediation are directly linked to the scale of the agencies involved. The analysis suggests that scales have been chosen correctly, at least from the point of view of the costs incurred to the agencies involved. Consequently, a rescaling of those agencies does not represent a viable option

The governance of co-operatives and mutual associations: a paradox perspective

This paper presents a new theoretical framework for understanding the governance of co-operative and mutual organisations. The theoretical literature on the governance of co-operatives is relatively undeveloped in comparison with that on corporate governance. The paper briefly reviews some of the main theoretical perspectives on corporate governance and discusses how they can be usefully extended to throw light on the governance of co-operatives and mutuals. However, taken individually these different theories are rather one dimensional, only illuminating a particular aspect of the board's role. This has lead to calls for a new conceptual framework that can help integrate the insights of these different theories. The paper argues that a paradox perspective offers a promising way forward. Contrasting the different theoretical perspectives highlights some of the important paradoxes, ambiguities and tensions that boards face

Turnout, Information and Heuristics in the Scottish Health Board Elections: ‘Getting a CV with No Job Description’

British public services have traditionally been overseen by appointees. The idea that many of these posts should be filled by direct election, as a means of increasing engagement with local communities and accountability to them, appears to be gaining traction. In Health Board election pilots in 2010, the Scottish government replaced appointees to regional Health Boards (serving six-figure populations) with popularly elected members. The government attempted to maintain the insulation of Health Boards from party politics by restricting the use of partisan labels. Voters were deprived of a heuristic that usually helps them to decide how to cast their votes. Many electors did not vote, while others sought alternative heuristics. Interviewees simultaneously decried partisan politics, lack of information and low turnout by the rest of the population. These dislikes seem to conflict with each other. Moreover, the experience shows how the heuristics available to voters can shape democratic governance.</p

Measuring the Potential Power Elite in the UK and Sweden

This paper proposes a methodology for using survey data to understand the composition of elites, through analysing the pool of potential members. An occupational-based measure of &lsquo;potential power elite' (PPE) is created and compared with other measures of occupational advantage. It is argued that this measure can be utilised to explore if the processes causing certain social groups to be under-represented in elite positions are around selection or the population recruited from. We provide analysis of elite positions in the UK and Sweden, demonstrating differences in terms of the potential pool of elite members and the occupational histories of people of those employed in roles associated with elite recruitment. We argue that understanding the composition of the PPE provides a more nuanced analysis of the processes of meritocracy in accessing positions of power and social influence

Abolishing the Audit Commission:framing, discourse coalitions and administrative reform

The abolition of the Audit Commission in England raises questions about how a major reform was achieved with so little controversy, why the agency lacked the institutional stickiness commonly described in the literature on organisational reform and why it did not strategise to survive. In this paper, we apply argumentative discourse analysis to rich empirical data to reveal the pattern and evolution of storylines and discourse coalitions, and the ways in which these interact with and affect the practices of Parliament, the media and the Audit Commission itself. Our analysis shows that the politics of administrative reform are as much about discursive framing and the ability of pro-reformers to gain discursive structuration and institutionalisation as they are about the material resources available to a newly elected government and its ministers. Questions of technical feasibility are unlikely to derail a reform initiative once its promoters gain discursive ascendency