Constructing Confidence Intervals For Flexible Budget Cost Estimates

A multiple-cost flexible budget can be constructed using either the Aggregate Cost Analysis Method or the Component Flexible Budget Method.  This paper derives and illustrates the use of a confidence interval formula for an annual cost estimate that is developed by summing 12 monthly flexible budget estimates

Accounting fraud, business failure and creative auditing: A microanalysis of the strange case of the Sunbeam Corporation

This article closely examines the Sunbeam Corporation’s path to failure and explores the reasons for its singularity. From the analysis of US fraud cases included in the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, this corporate case appears as an outlier. For Sunbeam, the time-lapse between fraud disclosure and its final bankruptcy is the longest of the entire sample; it is unique because of its length. This article uses a historical microanalysis to evaluate different hypotheses about the Sunbeam Corporation’s path to failure. The relationships between acquisitions and fraud, ‘scapegoat dynamics’ and ‘creative auditing’ are identified as the most relevant issues to be examined against a changing institutional context. The resulting reconstruction of the events provides unexpected insights and recommendations for future research on auditing and accounting fraud

Blockchain: The Introduction and Its Application in Financial Accounting

Blockchain, as a decentralized ledger technology with characteristics of transparent, secure, permanent and immutable, has been applied in many fields such as cryptocurrency, equity financing, and corporate governance. However, the blockchain technology is in the experimental stage and has several problems to be solved including limited data processing capacity, information confidentiality, and regulatory difficulties. This study sheds light on the potential application of blockchain technology in financial accounting and its possible impacts. We argue that in the short run the public blockchain could be used as a platform for firms to voluntarily disclose information. In the long run, the application could effectively reduce errors in disclosure and earnings management, increase the quality of accounting information and mitigate information asymmetry. We also discuss potential impacts that the application will have on independent auditors and financial accountants

A Commentary on 'The Order of Teaching Accounting Topics-Why do Most Textbooks End with the Beginning?'

This paper deals with an issue of relevance to all those involved in teaching accounting from a student-centred perspective – the order in which topics should be introduced to students in an introductory accounting subject. The stated purpose of the paper is “to stimulate debate” (p. 9). In order to do this, the author presents an argument for her proposed ordering for the introduction of topics and then reports the results of her analysis of the sequencing of chapters in twenty three selected textbooks. These two distinct sections of the paper will be discussed first separately and then drawn together in the concluding remarks

Figureheads or potentates? CEO power and board oversight in the context of Sarbanes Oxley

Research question/issue We depart from studies that separately explore chief executive officers' (CEOs') and boards' effects on firm performance. Instead, we examine the direct relationship between CEO power and firm performance, and how board monitoring, and most importantly, a change in the regulatory environment alter the relationship. As such, our study jointly examines the role of both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between CEO power and firm performance. Research findings/insights Our findings indicate that the negative main effect of a powerful CEO on firm performance is reduced by board monitoring and that the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) legislation amplifies board monitoring and reduces the negative effects of CEO power. Theoretical/academic implications Our study shows that agency relationships are grounded in social and institutional contexts. More precisely, our results suggest that CEO power is a function of CEO's relationship with the board, as CEO power and board monitoring interactions affect firm performance. Furthermore, they indicate that the CEO-board relationship is constructed within the legal institutional context, as the shock of SOX alters the effects that different combinations of CEO power and board monitoring have on firm performance. Practitioner/policy implications Our results highlight to investors and directors that corporate boards should be designed in relation to the power of CEOs. In addition, they provide valuable guidance for policy-makers, suggesting that tight regulations may represent effective deterrents for some CEOs' misbehaviors and favor the alignment of interests with those of company owners