Modus Vivendi Beyond the Social Contract: Peace, Justice, and Survival in Realist Political Theory

This essay examines the promise of the notion of modus vivendi for realist political theory. I interpret recent theories of modus vivendi as affirming the priority of peace over justice, and explore several ways of making sense of this idea. I proceed to identify two key problems for modus vivendi theory, so conceived. Normatively speaking, it remains unclear how this approach can sustain a realist critique of Rawlsian theorizing about justice while avoiding a Hobbesian endorsement of absolutism. And conceptually, the theory remains wedded to a key feature of social contract theory: political order is conceived as based on agreement. This construes the horizontal tensions among individual or group agents in society as prior to the vertical, authoritative relations between authorities and their subjects. Political authority thereby appears from the start as a solution to societal conflict, rather than a problem in itself. I argue that this way of framing the issue abstracts from political experience. Instead I attempt to rethink the notion of modus vivendi from within the lived experience of political conflict, as oriented not primarily toward peace, but political survival. With this shift of perspective, the idea of modus vivendi shows us, pace Bernard Williams, that the “first political question” is not how to achieve order and stability, but rather: what can I live with

Reducing Asymmetries in Intergenerational Justice: Descent from Modernity or Space Industrialization?

Normally, contractual conceptions of intergenerational justice regard the responsibility held by each generation as symmetrical. This article argues that the late modern society has created an asymmetry because of its unprecendented instrumental and destructive capacity. Historically unique risks such as thermonuclear destruction, global ecological deprivation, and resource depletion all point at this asymmetry and unequal distribution of responsibility between generations. Extending one contractual device used by John Rawls in line with what Brian Barry has suggested, this article analyzes the roots of the asymmetry and presents two political strategies to end it. The first strategy resembles the traditional deep ecological programme whereas the second holds an imaginative vision of a human future in space. Both strategies seek to reduce the influence present generations exercise on the level of opportunity available to future generations. The key normative argument is that intergenerational justice requires spatial and temporal limits on political action

Liberal Neutrality and Charitable Purposes

Under UK charity law, organisations seeking charitable status must demonstrate, inter alia, that they will pursue a purpose the state deems ‘charitable’. Such purposes inevitably reflect conceptions of the good, thus it is argued here that the state, in granting charitable status, affirms the value of ideas about the good; it indicates that a set of conceptions of the good are worthy of special advantages that are not provided for the pursuit of other conceptions. The designation of charitable status appears to be at odds with liberal neutrality, which argues that the state should not pursue, promote or pass judgement on particular conceptions of the good. In short, there is a prima facie tension between the general liberal neutrality doctrine and charity law. Yet liberal neutralists have not addressed this policy area. This article surveys the grounds for reconciliation between some conceptions of liberal neutrality and the present charity law. ‘Neutrality of effect’ addresses some concerns but its implications for charity law are not in accord with the general practice and principles regarding charities. Barry's process of abstraction is argued to be untenable as a policy option for charities. The article concludes that in so far as one is neutralist, ‘neutrality of justification’ in the form of neutral goods provides the most plausible account of charity law. However, such an account entails alterations to the existing legislation that one may view as a failure to account for well-established, legitimate principles and traditions in charity law. </jats:p