A Commentary on 'The Order of Teaching Accounting Topics-Why do Most Textbooks End with the Beginning?'

This paper deals with an issue of relevance to all those involved in teaching accounting from a student-centred perspective – the order in which topics should be introduced to students in an introductory accounting subject. The stated purpose of the paper is “to stimulate debate” (p. 9). In order to do this, the author presents an argument for her proposed ordering for the introduction of topics and then reports the results of her analysis of the sequencing of chapters in twenty three selected textbooks. These two distinct sections of the paper will be discussed first separately and then drawn together in the concluding remarks

Blockchain: The Introduction and Its Application in Financial Accounting

Blockchain, as a decentralized ledger technology with characteristics of transparent, secure, permanent and immutable, has been applied in many fields such as cryptocurrency, equity financing, and corporate governance. However, the blockchain technology is in the experimental stage and has several problems to be solved including limited data processing capacity, information confidentiality, and regulatory difficulties. This study sheds light on the potential application of blockchain technology in financial accounting and its possible impacts. We argue that in the short run the public blockchain could be used as a platform for firms to voluntarily disclose information. In the long run, the application could effectively reduce errors in disclosure and earnings management, increase the quality of accounting information and mitigate information asymmetry. We also discuss potential impacts that the application will have on independent auditors and financial accountants

Figureheads or potentates? CEO power and board oversight in the context of Sarbanes Oxley

Research question/issue We depart from studies that separately explore chief executive officers' (CEOs') and boards' effects on firm performance. Instead, we examine the direct relationship between CEO power and firm performance, and how board monitoring, and most importantly, a change in the regulatory environment alter the relationship. As such, our study jointly examines the role of both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between CEO power and firm performance. Research findings/insights Our findings indicate that the negative main effect of a powerful CEO on firm performance is reduced by board monitoring and that the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) legislation amplifies board monitoring and reduces the negative effects of CEO power. Theoretical/academic implications Our study shows that agency relationships are grounded in social and institutional contexts. More precisely, our results suggest that CEO power is a function of CEO's relationship with the board, as CEO power and board monitoring interactions affect firm performance. Furthermore, they indicate that the CEO-board relationship is constructed within the legal institutional context, as the shock of SOX alters the effects that different combinations of CEO power and board monitoring have on firm performance. Practitioner/policy implications Our results highlight to investors and directors that corporate boards should be designed in relation to the power of CEOs. In addition, they provide valuable guidance for policy-makers, suggesting that tight regulations may represent effective deterrents for some CEOs' misbehaviors and favor the alignment of interests with those of company owners

The influence of transverse CSR structure on headquarters/subsidiary integration

Some studies have already highlighted the effects of the introduction of Corporate Social Responsibility [CSR] projects into Multinational Corporations’ [MNC] strategies. However, little attention has been paid to the influence of transverse CSR structure on headquarters/subsidiary integration. In this article, we begin with the following question: What is the influence of the introduction of a centralized/decentralized structure on conducting a CSR strategy in a MNC? Our main objective is to identify conditions through which the structure of the CSR department influences the CSR strategy of the MNC. We define transverse CSR structure as: (1) the existence of a CSR directory at the headquarters level and a CSR representative at the subsidiary level, and (2) the existence of representatives from different areas who participate in meetings or committees to make decisions about CSR strategy. We argue that a transverse CSR structure favors consideration of global and local CSR demands by headquarters and subsidiaries. This process takes place through the mediation of three main elements: information exchange, awareness activities and definition of objectives