Regional parliaments: Effective Actors in the EU multilevel parliamentary system?

Introduction: The European Communities originally started with a set of institutions and a power balance that was heavily tilted in favour of executives. As the powers of the European level expanded over time, the democratic nature of European decision-making gained increasing importance. This led to a strengthening of the European Parliament, but also to the growing recognition of subnational levels of government, and thus to the gradual emergence of a European system of multi-level governance

How Europe shapes the nature of the Belgian Federation. Differentiated EU impact triggers both cooperation and decentralization

Presentation on department page: http://www.uia.no/no/portaler/om_universitetet/oekonomi_og_samfunnsvitenskap/statsvitenskap_og_ledelsesfag/ forskning_isl/isl_working_papers_seriesAbstract. European integration triggers contrasting views from Belgian political elites. Proponents of con-federalism, further decentralization and separatism point to the decreasing importance of the central government level within a more integrated Europe as well as to the growing relevance of regions within contemporary Europe. Opponents of separatism generally favor a strong central government arguing that Europe will not easily accept separatism and that further decentralization may substantially weaken the European position of Belgium and its regions. This paper aims to clarify the European factor in the ‘Belgian Question’. Our argument consists of two parts. First, we discuss the political-administrative consequences of the institutional interpenetration of the Belgian federation within the EU polity. Second, we explore how European economic integration impacts upon politics within the Belgian federation. Our main conclusion is that both aspects of European integration entail a differentiated outcome; while the first triggers cooperation, the second stimulates ongoing decentralization pressures.

Regional Parliaments in the EU Multilevel Parliamentary System

European integration has created a multilevel political system that is dominated by executive actors. Despite the increasing competences of the European Parliament, a growing EU-awareness of national assemblies and an emerging attention of regional parliaments for EU affairs, the EU polity still lacks a sound parliamentary representation. As the EU presents itself as a representative democracy, the current set-up raises questions from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. The establishment of multilevel parliamentarianism may be part of the remedy. This introduction focuses on the position that regional parliaments take in such a European multilevel parliamentary system. The authors address three relevant questions: what roles do regional parliaments take up in terms of legislation, scrutiny and networking? To what extent are they empowered by the Lisbon Treaty? And what explains the variation in their activities? The authors develop hypotheses that are, to varying degree, addressed by the contributions in this special issue

"Multilevel Simulation Games in EU Studies: Powerful Learning Environments in Political Science?"

[From the introduction]. In this paper we present the introduction of a multi-level simulation game in a political science curriculum. We aim to assess this innovation in teaching and evaluating by means of the criteria of the powerful learning environment. The multi-level simulation game was developed for an MA course entitled Multi-level Governance. This course final aims are ‘to gain knowledge of the origins, meaning and functioning of multilevel governance, to develop a critical attitude towards the complexity of decision-making and to develop negotiation and representation skills’. This course (6 ECTS-credits) is part of the MA Program Political Science at the University of Antwerp (Belgium). As from 2007-2008, the simulation game will become part of a new course ‘Europeanization’ in a new MA, with similar aims in terms of generating knowledge, attitudes and skills, but more narrowly focused on the adaptation of member states to European integration. In this paper, however, the simulation game is treated as part of the existing Multi-level Governance course. In the next paragraphs, we briefly describe the multi-level governance approach and present a short introduction in simulations in political science. The core part of the paper discusses the extent to which introduction of the simulation lives up to criteria that have been operationalized by De Corte (1996, 2000) and Snyder (2003). The central question of the paper therefore is: ‘Does our simulation correspond with Corte’s principles of a powerful learning environment and with Snyder’s characteristics of active learning?’ Both teaching methods and assessment will be dealt with

Europeanization of subnational polities: the impact of domestic factors on regional adaptation

[From the introduction]. The purpose of this contribution is to test whether hypotheses derived from rational choice and sociological institutionalism can predict the way subnational authorities adapt to specific European policy initiatives. In order to do so, the paper uses the classic three step model of Europeanization research (cf Risse et alii 2001, Caporaso 2007). This model starts from the observation that the European integration process delivers a substantial amount of policy output at the European Union level. Especially within the supranational policy areas, EU output generates pressure upon the member states to respond to European policy initiatives. Put differently, in a second stage this pressure creates a degree of fit or misfit between the European and the national level. There is, however, no linear relation assumed between the European and the national level. In a third step, several intervening or mediating variables shape the eventual way the domestic level adapts to the European pressure. Although there’s much criticism to putting the goodness of fit concept central to a Europeanization research design (Heritier and Knill 2001; Haverland 2000), we argue that its use is justified in our particular design because we are dealing with two binding European policies that clearly require the domestic (including the subnational) level to adapt in terms of policy-making and policy-content (Börzel 2005: 51-52; Bulmer 2007: 52). The degree of fit or misfit defines the adaptation pressure and ultimately the way domestic politics responds. Institutional theory becomes relevant with respect to the mechanisms through which the domestic factors shape the adaptation. Based on an institutional framework, hypotheses can be formulated as to how domestic variables influence the adaptation process. In the next paragraph we will formulate such hypotheses with respect to how the Flemish Region responds to pressure from EU environmental and agriculture laws

"The OMC, a legitimate mode of governance?"

[Introduction]. For a long time, European integration has been associated with the so-called Community method. This method implied the transfer of powers from the Member States to the EU level, the central role of a supranational organ in the preparation of EU policies, the possibility of QMV and the adoption of binding rules (Dehousse 2002). However, new evolutions and the expanded scope of European integration enforced more flexibility upon European decision-making. The quest for new possible governance modes besides the traditional Community method included the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Referring to ‘new governance architecture’ (Radaelli 2003) or ‘new mode of governance’ (Scott 2002) OMC is hoped to realise further European integration. Several events gave rise to the creation of the OMC. Firstly Member States recognised the importance of European action in certain policy fields (employment, social policy, migration, criminal prosecution, education). However political support for the classical transfer of competences to the EU level and thus for harmonisation through traditional European legislation was difficult to gain with regard to these policy fields. Therefore a new approach of flexible and open coordination was to overcome this dilemma. (Scott 2002, 2; Heritier 2003, 105-106; Radaelli 2003, 21-22; Scharpf 2003, 99; Borras and Jacobsson 2004, 186). In addition, the ‘Social Europe’ as agreed upon in the Maastricht Social Agreement dropped behind in comparison with the ‘Monetary Europe’. Because of the complex nature of social problems, the traditional regulatory methods to compensate the loss of Member States’ autonomy were deficient to link economic and social/employment dimensions of EU policy. The introduction of the OMC was to be the solution to the imbalance between EU economic integration over social integration. (Goetschy 2003, 7; Radaelli 2003, 21; Scharpf 2003,111-115; Borras and Jacobsson 2004, 186). Finally the legitimacy crisis in the Union generated the opportunity to create a new governance tool by which the input of the decision-making process was ascertained by more and democratic actors. In addition, the output of the decision-making system was to be much more effective and efficient, by realising a European model of social policy. (Commissie 2001; Goetschy 2003, 10; Radaelli 2003, 7; Borras and Jacobsson 2004, 186-187; Schäfer 2004) Particularly, the legitimacy angle will be the focus of this article. OMC as a new governance instrument should be considered legitimate and can therefore possible contribute to the overall legitimacy of the EU. In other words, arising from a EU legitimacy crisis, is the OMC really the expected legitimacy enhancing instrument? Or is it a legitimacy problem in itself? In the following paragraphs, the concepts of input and output legitimacy are elaborated upon and OMC, specifically EES, is assessed for both its input and output legitimacy and for its possible contributions to the overall legitimacy of the EU

Vlaams milieubeleid steekt de grenzen over - de Vlaamse betrokkenheid bij de totstandkoming van Europees en multilateraal beleid

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