Bunge’s Mathematical Structuralism Is Not a Fiction

In this paper, I explore Bunge’s fictionism in philosophy of mathematics. After an overview of Bunge’s views, in particular his mathematical structuralism, I argue that the comparison between mathematical objects and fictions ultimately fails. I then sketch a different ontology for mathematics, based on Thomasson’s metaphysical work. I conclude that mathematics deserves its own ontology, and that, in the end, much work remains to be done to clarify the various forms of dependence that are involved in mathematical knowledge, in particular its dependence on mental/brain states and material objects

Tomographic filtering of high‐resolution mantle circulation models: Can seismic heterogeneity be explained by temperature alone?

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/95052/1/ggge1509.pd

Parmenides reloaded

I argue for a four dimensional, non-dynamical view of space-time, where becoming is not an intrinsic property of reality. This view has many features in common with the Parmenidean conception of the universe. I discuss some recent objections to this position and I offer a comparison of the Parmenidean space-time with an interpretation of Heraclitus' thought that presents no major antagonism.Comment: 11 pages, accepted for publication in Foundations of Scienc

Parameterized optimized effective potential for atoms

The optimized effective potential equations for atoms have been solved by parameterizing the potential. The expansion is tailored to fulfill the known asymptotic behavior of the effective potential at both short and long distances. Both single configuration and multi configuration trial wave functions are implemented. Applications to several atomic systems are presented improving previous works. The results here obtained are very close to those calculated in either the Hartree-Fock and the multi configurational Hartree-Fock framework.Comment: 8 pages, 3 figure

Inconsistent boundaries

Research on this paper was supported by a grant from the Marsden Fund, Royal Society of New Zealand.Mereotopology is a theory of connected parts. The existence of boundaries, as parts of everyday objects, is basic to any such theory; but in classical mereotopology, there is a problem: if boundaries exist, then either distinct entities cannot be in contact, or else space is not topologically connected (Varzi in Noûs 31:26–58, 1997). In this paper we urge that this problem can be met with a paraconsistent mereotopology, and sketch the details of one such approach. The resulting theory focuses attention on the role of empty parts, in delivering a balanced and bounded metaphysics of naive space.PostprintPeer reviewe