Course notes on finite games and rational choice

This book collects notes that were prepared for a university course taught in the Spring of 2018, and delivered to an audience of students enrolled in the Master course in Logic, philosophy and history of science of the University of Florence. The goal of the course was to introduce students to some basic concepts from the area of research generally known as decision theory. This is done by focussing on the concept of ‘rational choice’, which is analyzed, methodologically speaking, by the means of the theory of games. To minimize prerequisites it was decided to restrict the attention to the theory of finite games in particular. The topics treated are vary, and belongs to both the theory of games ‘in normal form’ as well as that of games ‘in extensive form’, as they are usually referred to. The classical issues in both fields, such as the theory of ‘equilibria’ and the study of properties such as determinacy, are carefully discussed to make them clear to beginners and are addressed from a novel perspective which makes use of formal methods that are typical of researches connected with the study of logic

In-group bias in preferences for redistribution: a survey experiment in Italy

Using a new survey and experimental data, we investigate how information on inequality and immigration affect preferences for redistribution in Italy. Our randomized treatments show that preferences for redistribution are often inelastic to information. However, we find that provision of information on poverty statistics related to the native-immigrant composition of poverty reduces economic in-group bias by affecting exclusionary redistributive preferences: respondents are less likely to support policies which exclude immigrants from access to the welfare state once they learn that immigrants are less represented among the poor and natives are not as poor as they used to believe. Finally, we find some evidence of in-group bias by investigating the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects across groups

Su alcune ricadute concettuali dei teoremi di incompletezza di Kurt Gödel

The present paper deals with two distinct but related purposes: (i) to shed light on certain controversial aspects of Gödel’s view toward mathematics by referring to that part of Gödel’s writings belonging to his Nachlass (namely, unpublished essays and lectures, and correspondence material); (ii) to discuss recent developments of the debate concerning some implications of Gödel’s well known incompleteness theorems, which have been looked by someone as a tool to ‘disprove’ (a formulation of) the mechanistic view of human mind. We emphasize an ‘epistemological flavour’ of Gödel’s view which usually remains unnoticed (contrary to what happens to his overemphasized ‘platonistic’ convictions) on one side. On the other, we try to introduce new topics in the debate by making reference to less conventional sources

Dialogare: compendio di logica

“Logic”, as understood in this volume, is the set of knowledge at the basis of man’s reasoning faculties: understanding, analysing, arguing. The text presents a review of topics which are useful to strengthen the skills related to reasoning faculties through a brief introduction to the theoretical aspects and exercises intended to assess the understanding. The volume is divided into parts, which are organised in teaching units. The parts and units are presented in such a way that, following the thread in the order in which they are proposed, we move from one topic to the next, acquiring the prerequisites necessary for to what comes after. The text therefore lends itself to a “systematic” use, aimed at an extensive study. However, nothing prevents the reader from adapting the material to other needs, choosing only a few topics that they consider useful to integrate their knowledge, to do a “review” or to further practice on already known topics

On some recently debated issues in the theory of formal truth

As the title suggests, this paper aims at surveying some recent advances in the theory of formal truth. It contains an account of the debate concerning the deflationist approach to truth, according to which truth is a ‘thin’ notion in that it should involve no assumption of whatsoever nature. We review here the main issues that were comprised by the discussion accompanying the attempts of translating this idea into logical terms. In the second half of the paper, we focus on a recent theory of truth proposed by Hartry Field, a former ‘champion’ of the deflationary approach. We then discuss it both with respect to the previous conceptual account, and to some further observation concerning the truth–as–revision machinery that this theory can be proved to implicitly make use of