Retroactive causation and the temporal construction of news: contingency and necessity, content and form

This article affords particular attention to the relationship between memory, the narrativization of news and its linear construction, conceived as journalism’s ‘memory- work’. In elaborating upon this ‘work’, it is proposed that the Hegelian notion of retroactive causation (as used by Slavoj Žižek) can examine how analyses of news journalists ‘retroactively’ employ the past in the temporal construction of news. In fact, such retroactive (re)ordering directs attention to the ways in which journalists contingently select ‘a past’ to confer meaning on the present. With regard to current literature, it is noted that a retroactive analysis can highlight two important dialectics within the practice of news journalism: 1) the relation between contingency and necessity; and, 2) the relation between content and form. Indeed, it is argued that this theoretical account offers a novel approach to examining the significance of memory in news journalism as well as the inconsistencies which underscore journalism’s memory-work. It is in accordance with such inconsistency that broader reflections on time, temporality and our relations to the past can be made

When do past events require explanation? Insights from social psychology

Some past events incite more wonder about their causes than do others. For example, negative events require explanation more than positive events. We review social psychologists’ theoretical and empirical insights on what kinds of past events “beg explanation.” We draw on attribution theory that became popular among psychologists from the 1960s onward, on research on counterfactual reasoning, and on conversational and discursive critiques of attribution theory. We argue that factors predicting what is or is not perceived as requiring explanation are culturally and historically grounded, and that accordingly, what begs explanation varies between contexts and can change over time. Yet, drawing on the distinction between content and process, we argue that there are recognizable patterns across time and space. Specifically, we propose the relationship between events and background expectations as a rather stable predictor of what begs explanation—and as a level of analysis that can unite seemingly disparate approaches

From serial reproduction to serial communication: transmission of the focus of comparison in lay communication about gender inequality

We introduce and explore the potential of the serial communication method, a modification of the serial reproduction paradigm in which participants communicate their own thoughts. It affords participants more agency, more closely simulating real communication. We specifically examined the transmission of the focus of comparison in explanations of gender inequality, a consequential form of equivalency framing. Participants in Wave 1 (n = 86) read about women being underrepresented (focus on women) or men being overrepresented in leadership (focus on men), then explained this difference. Participants in Wave 2 (n = 208) and Wave 3 (n = 199) then read randomly selected explanations from the preceding wave before giving their own explanations. The initial focus affected subsequent communication and was partially transmitted to Wave 2, but not Wave 3. We discuss implications and the value of the method for research on the framing of inequality, cultural transmission, and competing frames

Comparison Focus in Intergroup Comparisons: Who We Compare to Whom Influences Who We See as Powerful and Agentic

In intergroup comparisons one group usually becomes the implicit norm that other groups are compared to. Three studies address the consequences that the direction of the comparison has for perceptions of the compared groups. For real groups (Experiment 1) and fictitious groups (Experiments 2 and 3) participants perceived a group as more powerful and higher in status when it had been the norm rather than the effect to be explained in a text comparing two groups. Moreover, norm groups and their “typical” members were perceived as more agentic and less communal than comparison groups, and these attributions were mediated by the ascription of power. The authors conclude that systematic ways of explaining one group rather than another could serve as a subtle tool to perpetuate the status quo of intergroup power relations

You are so kind – and I am kind and smart: Actor – Observer Differences in the Interpretation of On-going Behavior

: The dual perspective model of agency and communion predicts that observers tend to interpret a target’s behavior more in terms of communion than agency, whereas actors interpret their behavior more in terms of agency. The present research for the first time tests this model in real interactions. Previously unacquainted participants had a short conversation and afterwards rated their own behavior (actor perspective) and their interaction partner’s behavior (observer perspective) in terms of agency(self-confident, assertive) and communion(trustworthy, empathic). Supporting the dual perspective model, observers rated the actor’s behavior higher on communion than on agency, and higher on communion than actors themselves did. Findings for actors were more complex: Actors rated their own behavior as more agentic than observers did. However, they also rated their behavior high on communion. We discuss implications for the dual perspective model as well as for (mis)understandings in social interactions

Justice in the Eye of the Beholder: How Comparison Framing Affects the Perception of Global Inequality Through Social Emotions and Justice Sensitivity

Global inequality is one of today’s major challenges. How people mentally represent inequality is often determined by the way it is framed. In the present work, we seek to analyze whether putting the comparative focus on the disadvantaged or on the advantaged group affects legitimacy perceptions of, and action intentions against global inequality. Results of two preliminary studies indicated that global inequality is perceived as less legitimate and action intentions are increased when the disadvantaged group is the grammatical subject of the comparison, but only when the size of the economic inequality is perceived to be large (vs. small). In addition, social emotions mediated the relationship between comparative framing and legitimacy perceptions. Building on these preliminary studies, we present a planned large-scale study in which we aim to replicate these effects and to additionally test whether the strength of individuals’ emotional responses to comparative framing is moderated by different dimensions of justice sensitivity. We will discuss findings with regard to the role of how framing elicits certain mental representations of justice