Business interest representation and European Commission fora: A game theoretic investigation

The relationship between business and the EU institutions has evolved from its corporatist origins into a complex elite pluralist arrangement centered around industrial fora and policy committees. We view the growth of forum politics as the direct consequence of the unprecedented boom in economic and public interest lobbying in the early 1990s: While the increase in European interest representation provided greater legitimacy for the European integration program, it put a strain on the existing open pluralist European business-government relationship. One of the European Commission's (EC) informal solutions was to create restricted-entry policy fora and select committees, which it hoped would provide fast and reliable decisionmaking. Employing a formal model of industrial fora and committees, we specify the mechanisms that we believe caused the establishment of the current elite pluralist system of interest representation in the EU. We argue that in the process of establishing selective-entry fora for interest representation, the European Commission acted not only as policy entrepreneur, but also as a political entrepreneur, fostering collective action. -- Die Beziehungen zwischen Wirtschaft und EU-Institutionen hat sich aus korporatistischen Anfängen zu einem komplexen Arrangement elitenpluralistischer Strukturen entwickelt, in dessen Mittelpunkt Industrieforen und Policy-Komittees stehen. Wir analysieren die wachsende Bedeutung dieser Forum Politics als direkte Folge des (wirtschaftlichen und zivilgesellschaftlichen) Lobbying-Booms der frühen 90er-Jahre. Obschon die vermehrte europäische Interessenvertretung die Legitimtät des europäischen Integrationsprogramms erhöhte, setzte sie zugleich das bestehende System offener pluralistischer Beziehungen zwischen Wirtschaft und europäischen Institutionen unter Druck. Als eine informelle Lösung dieses Problems etablierte die Europäische Kommission nichtständige Policy-Fora und Ausschüsse, deren Zugang sie kontrollierte. Mit Hilfe eines formalen Modells identifizieren wir die Mechanismen, die unseres Erachtens zu der Entwicklung des gegenwärtigen elitenpluralistischen Systems der EU-Interessenvertretung geführt haben. Wir argumentieren, dass die Europäische Kommission mit der Einrichtung zugangsbeschränkter Fora zur Interessenvertretung nicht nur as 'policy entrepreneur' tätig wurde, sondern auch als 'political entrepreneur' kollektives Handeln von Interessenvertretern förderte.

Lobbying Systems in the European Union: A Quantitative Study

This paper presents and tests a micro-theoretical model of EU lobbying across policy domains. In particular, we focus on two questions: first, we want to know why the number of interest representatives differs across policy domains and, second, we investigate why we find institutionalized fora for interest representation in some policy domains but not in others. Our argument focuses on the Commission's need for expert information and its costs of managing contacts with a large number of interest representatives. Both factors provide incentives for the Commission to create restricted-access fora as the number of interest representatives increases. Using cross-sectional data on interest representation in a wide range of policy domains, we find some support for our hypotheses.In diesem Artikel entwickeln und testen wir ein mikrotheoretisches Modell, das zur Erklärung der Interessenvertretung in verschiedenen Politikfeldern in der Europäischen Union beiträgt. Dabei stehen zwei erkenntnisleitende Fragen im Vordergrund: Was beeinflusst die Zahl der Interessenvertreter in verschiedenen Politikfeldern? Und weshalb richtet die EU-Kommission in einigen Politikfeldern Foren mit beschränktem Zugang für Interessenvertreter ein? Unsere Erklärung basiert auf der Beobachtung, dass der Expertisebedarf der Kommission hauptsächlich durch Interessenvertreter gedeckt wird, dass aber die Interaktion mit einer großen Zahl von Interessenvertretern der Kommission Kosten (unter anderem Informationskosten) verursacht. Beide Beobachtungen führen unseres Erachtens dazu, dass die Kommission Foren mit beschränktem Zugang einführt, wenn die Zahl der Interessenvertreter ein bestimmtes Maß überschreitet. Wir vollziehen einen ersten Test unserer Hypothesen mit Querschnittsdaten der Interessenvertretung in verschiedenen EU-Politikfeldern, und finden unsere Erwartungen zumindest teilweise erfüllt.Introduction Micro and macro studies of lobbying Why are there more lobbyists in some policy domains than in others? Empirically testing the first two hypotheses Why are there more interest representation fora in some policy domains than in others? Empirically testing hypotheses three and four Discussion Conclusion Data Appendix Reference

Zur statistischen Analyse von Vollerhebungen

"Inferenzstatistische Methoden müssen selbst bei fehlerfrei gemessenen Vollerhebungsdaten angewendet werden, wenn allgemeine Erklärungen damit empirisch überprüft werden sollen. Präzision und Qualität von Erklärungen, egal ob sie einer quantitativen oder einer qualitativen Forschungslogik entspringen, sind abhängig von der theoretischen Vorstellung, die wir von den Einflüssen stochastischer Faktoren auf den zu erklärenden sozialen Prozess haben. Die getroffenen Annahmen über die Form der Stochastizität müssen adressiert und rechtfertigt werden – sei es qualitativ oder quantitativ in Form von diagnostischen Tests. Aus forschungspraktischer Sicht ist die Abhängigkeit der inhaltlichen Schlussfolgerungen von den Annahmen, die über die Form der Stochastizität gemacht werden, besonders relevant und wird im vorliegenden Aufsatz anhand zahlreicher Beispiele verdeutlicht." (Autorenreferat

Stimmensplitting und Koalitionswahl

Hat sich die Unabhängigkeitsstrategie der FDP bei der letzten Bundestagswahl ausgezahlt? Wäre die FDP erfolgreicher gewesen, wenn sie im Vorfeld klar signalisiert hätte, dass man eine Koalition mit der Union anstrebt? Wie war das bei den Grünen, die ja im Gegensatz zur FDP keine Zweifel aufkommen ließen? Natürlich können wir nicht wie in einer Simulation oder einem Experiment einfach den Wahlkampf wiederholen und noch einmal wählen lassen. Um eine befriedigende Antwort auf diese Frage zu finden, vergleichen wir den Kontext der Bundestagswahl 2002 mit den zurückliegenden Bundestagswahlen. Aus dem Längsschnittvergleich versuchen wir Rückschlüsse auf den substanziellen Einfluss von strategischem Stimmensplitting im Sinne einer Koalitionswahl auf das Wahlergebnis gerade der kleinen Parteien zu ziehen. Um unsere Forschungsfrage zu beantworten und substanzielle Schlüsse ziehen zu können, muss zuerst klar sein, in welcher Form und warum Stimmensplitting relevant sein kann, welche Rolle dabei Koalitionsabsprachen vor einer jeden Wahl spielen und, schließlich, welche alternativen Erklärungsmöglichkeiten die Literatur zum Thema Stimmensplitting und strategischem Wählen anzubieten hat. Nur wenn wir auch die Wirkung alternativer und zum Teil konkurrierender Hypothesen zulassen, können wir unserer Schlußfolgerungen sicher sein

Interest representation in the EU: an open and structured dialogue?

Since 1992, the European Commission has sought to build ‘An Open and Structured Dialogue’ with interest groups, and since 2001 a broader ‘Dialogue with Civil Society’. A core feature of this dialogue involves instruments of transparency, and pluralism, with funding to ensure the presence of a wide range of voices. Consultation procedures provide for a ‘marketplace of ideas’ which simulate political competition and contestation, with a ‘voice but not a vote’, and which are supposed to provide for answerability by the European Commission for its policy choices. The European Commission also selects its allies to support its regulatory proposals, with NGOs frequent allies as well as firms and business sectors supporting higher standards. The EU’s fragmented decision-making system helps to provide a naturally pluralist environment, although some recent research suggests that NGOs are more likely to be successful in securing their policy goals than business organizations. NGOs work mostly in coalitions, with the size of coalition a factor in lobbying success. The saliency of issues is another substantial feature of variation in lobbying success and where NGOs can raise the contention of issues they can bring wider participation in EU issues

Corporate philanthropy, political influence, and health policy

Background The Framework Convention of Tobacco Control (FCTC) provides a basis for nation states to limit the political effects of tobacco industry philanthropy, yet progress in this area is limited. This paper aims to integrate the findings of previous studies on tobacco industry philanthropy with a new analysis of British American Tobacco's (BAT) record of charitable giving to develop a general model of corporate political philanthropy that can be used to facilitate implementation of the FCTC. Method Analysis of previously confidential industry documents, BAT social and stakeholder dialogue reports, and existing tobacco industry document studies on philanthropy. Results The analysis identified six broad ways in which tobacco companies have used philanthropy politically: developing constituencies to build support for policy positions and generate third party advocacy; weakening opposing political constituencies; facilitating access and building relationships with policymakers; creating direct leverage with policymakers by providing financial subsidies to specific projects; enhancing the donor's status as a source of credible information; and shaping the tobacco control agenda by shifting thinking on the importance of regulating the market environment for tobacco and the relative risks of smoking for population health. Contemporary BAT social and stakeholder reports contain numerous examples of charitable donations that are likely to be designed to shape the tobacco control agenda, secure access and build constituencies. Conclusions and Recommendations Tobacco companies' political use of charitable donations underlines the need for tobacco industry philanthropy to be restricted via full implementation of Articles 5.3 and 13 of the FCTC. The model of tobacco industry philanthropy developed in this study can be used by public health advocates to press for implementation of the FCTC and provides a basis for analysing the political effects of charitable giving in other industry sectors which have an impact on public health such as alcohol and food

The Policy Dystopia Model:an interpretive analysis of tobacco industry political activity

BACKGROUND: Tobacco industry interference has been identified as the greatest obstacle to the implementation of evidence-based measures to reduce tobacco use. Understanding and addressing industry interference in public health policy-making is therefore crucial. Existing conceptualisations of corporate political activity (CPA) are embedded in a business perspective and do not attend to CPA's social and public health costs; most have not drawn on the unique resource represented by internal tobacco industry documents. Building on this literature, including systematic reviews, we develop a critically informed conceptual model of tobacco industry political activity. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We thematically analysed published papers included in two systematic reviews examining tobacco industry influence on taxation and marketing of tobacco; we included 45 of 46 papers in the former category and 20 of 48 papers in the latter (n = 65). We used a grounded theory approach to build taxonomies of "discursive" (argument-based) and "instrumental" (action-based) industry strategies and from these devised the Policy Dystopia Model, which shows that the industry, working through different constituencies, constructs a metanarrative to argue that proposed policies will lead to a dysfunctional future of policy failure and widely dispersed adverse social and economic consequences. Simultaneously, it uses diverse, interlocking insider and outsider instrumental strategies to disseminate this narrative and enhance its persuasiveness in order to secure its preferred policy outcomes. Limitations are that many papers were historical (some dating back to the 1970s) and focused on high-income regions. CONCLUSIONS: The model provides an evidence-based, accessible way of understanding diverse corporate political strategies. It should enable public health actors and officials to preempt these strategies and develop realistic assessments of the industry's claims

"Towards a European FDA? The review of European pharmaceuticals authorization"

In this paper, we investigate revisions to the system of European medicines authorization that were passed in early 2004. The 1993 legislation establishing the Centralized Procedure of European pharmaceuticals authorization as well as the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) (Regulation 2309/93/EEC) provided for a report by the Commission on the experiences with this Regulation six years after the new procedures had come into effect. Following evaluatory reports by different actors, the most extensive one on behalf of the Commission prepared by Consulting firms Anderson and Cameron/McKennan, the Commission launched a broad “review” process in 2001 to revise the existing system, which ended in 2004 with the passage of several pieces of legislation. We are interested in the extent to which the 2004 reforms have expanded the Europeanization of pharmaceuticals regulation in terms of the harmonization of standards, a further shift of regulatory decision-making authority to the European level, and an increase in the "European character" of the regulatory bodies, especially EMEA (now: EMA) and its Scientific Committee, CPMP (now:CHMP). In addition, we try to identify the social, political, and institutional actors whose interests are reflected in the various policy changes, in order to get a sense of whether the changes might have been due to specific demands or whether they seem to exhibit a largely irreversible dynamic

Ending Cooperation: A Formal Model of Organizational Change in German Pharmaceutical Interest Representation

This paper uses a game theoretic model to investigate the 1993/94 split-up of the main German pharmaceutical association into an association for multinational, research-based companies and an association representing small and medium-sized firms. In order to explain the breakdown of cooperation among group members, the paper employs a model that combines collective action and bargaining. The model suggests that changing issues can play an important role in organizational change. In the case of the German pharmaceutical industry, the key issue changed from pharmaceutical registration to cost control. With respect to the former issue, the different factions in the pharmaceutical industry had complementary interests and were able to find a compromise position. The latter issue led to a conflict over the redistribution of scarce resources between the factions; formally, this meant that all issue dimensions were equally important to all factions. As a result, it became impossible to realize policy gains through a political compromise. Die folgende Studie untersucht den Austritt forschender Arzneimittelhersteller aus dem Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie (BPI) zum Jahreswechsel 1993/1994 und die darauf folgende Gründung des Verbands forschender Arzneimittelhersteller (VFA). Unter Zuhilfenahme eines spieltheoretischen Modells, das Verhandlungstheorie mit der Theorie kollektiven Handelns verbindet, wird hier argumentiert, dass Änderungen im Issuekontext organisatorischen Wandel verursachen können. Im Falle der deutschen Pharmainteressen wurde die Zulassung von Arzneimitteln als dominantes Issue von der Frage der Kostenkontrolle abgelöst. Im Falle der Arzneimittelzulassung konnten die verschiedenen Herstellergruppen Kompromisspositionen erreichen, während im Falle der Kostenkontrolle zu einem schwer lösbaren Verteilungskonflikt zwischen innovativen, OTC- und Nachahmerprodukt-Herstellern führte, der auf die Gründung getrennter Verbände hinauslief.Introduction The BPI and pharmaceuticals policy before 1994 A theory of coalition building in interest groups Basic assumptions Constant association policy: The free-rider outcome Association policy as a function of member contributions Summary of results Back to German pharmaceutical interests Changing issues: Safety versus price control Selective incentives: The changing Red List Conclusion Appendix: Formal presentation of model, proofs Reference