Trust In Fairtrade: The 'Feel-Good' Effect

Fairtrade is nurtured with stories aimed at making consumers feel good by buying Fairtrade products. This ‘feel-good’ factor may vary when it is found that, the proportional division of the benefits between producer and other potential gainers is biased towards the distributors. There is, therefore, an incentive to verify whether the trust accorded to Fairtrade is justified. If trust and therefore the feel-good factor are undermined or enhanced as a result of the validation of the stories, then the whole Fairtrade movement could potentially crumble or burgeon. Drawing on elements in Glaeser (2005)’s model, this paper analyses the factors behind the recent expansion of Fairtrade.Fairtrade

Two-stage public-private partnership proposal for R&D on neglected diseases

We propose a 2-stage procurement model of public-private partnership to provide better incentives for R&D on neglected diseases. The model combines advance market commitment, subsidized clinical trials, and rewards based on therapeutical contributions of new drugs through a prize screening mechanism. The model is primarily intended to facilitate small firms’ R&D by providing cash flow, rewarding quality of new drugs, and sharing risks and costs of new drugs development, while limiting moral hazards. The model’s advantages include reduction of overpayments, better disclosure of information, provision of production licences, and direct targeting of better quality drugs.neglected diseases, prize screening, pharmaceutical R&D

The hope for neglected diseases: R&D incentives

Neglected diseases are neglected because they cannot generate enough return on R&D to pharmaceutical firms. This paper analyzes and compares existing proposals for public intervention in R&D for neglected diseases. Incentives for neglected diseases are comprehensively evaluated based on seventeen selected criteria grouped into four categories: efficiency, feasibility, fairness, and sustainability. Our conclusion is that public-private partnerships coordinated through a centralized service platform have the highest potential to satisfy the criteria for the successful development..neglected diseases, incentives, pharmaceutical R&D, policy analysis

German macro: how it's different and why that matters. EPC Discussion Paper, May 2016

Do the macroeconomics of the German political establishment really differ from standard western macroeconomics? That question was the starting point for the seminar on ‘German macro: How it’s Different and Why that Matters’, which was held at Heriot-Watt University in December 2015, with financial support from the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) and the Money, Macro & Finance Research Group (MMF). This ebook, edited by George Bratsiotis and David Cobham, is the result of that exercise; six of the papers were presented at the seminar in earlier versions, and the editors sought some additional papers to complete the range of perspectives offered. The authors all sought out to discover whether or not there is something unique about German macroeconomics, and in what ways it differs from standard western macroeconomics; is it true that the former neglects demand management (although it may be quite interventionist in other ways), rejects debt relief and emphasises structural reform designed to improve competitiveness as the (only) key to economic growth? How much of whatever difference exists is due to a well worked out set of ideas in the form of Ordoliberalism? In what way does it relate to Germany’s own experiences in different periods? And how far is this the result of political preferences and how much do the idiosyncrasies of these German views matter, for the development of the Eurozone and indeed the health of the German economy

L'échec de la stabilisation monétaire en Russie : 1991-1998

An experiment of monetary stabilisation took place in Russia between two bankrupties: December 1991 and August 1998. This paper's aim is to show that the strategy to peg the exchange rate adopted by Russia in July 1995 was a mistake. By attracting capital inflows, it relaxed the constraints on public finances and encouraged a poorly regulated Russian banking system to borrow heavily. Moreover, following the 1997 Asiatic financial crisis, monetary policy had to be dramatically tightened for the exchange rate peg to be held. The tight monetary policy by drying up liquidity pushed the whole banking system to insolvency and ultimately led to the 17 August decision.Une expérience de stabilisation monétaire a été tentée en Russie entre deux banqueroutes : décembre 1991 et août 1998. Cet article l'étudié d'un point de vue historique et analytique, défendant l'argument que la stratégie du taux de change glissant, adoptée par la Russie en juillet 1995, fut une erreur. En encourageant l'afflux de capitaux, cette stratégie desserra la contrainte sur la politique fiscale tout en encourageant le système bancaire à emprunter. Par ailleurs, pour maintenir la parité du taux de change, après la crise financière asiatique de 1997, une politique monétaire excessivement restrictive s'avéra nécessaire, d'où la faillite d'un système bancaire déjà chancelant, qui précipita la crise financière en Russie et détermina la décision du 17 août 1998.Granville Brigitte. L'échec de la stabilisation monétaire en Russie : 1991-1998. In: Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 30, 1999, n°2-3. Les économies post-socialistes: une décennie de transformation, sous la direction de Éric Magnin et Ramine Motamed-Nejad. pp. 61-87

Ending high inflation : the case of Russia versus Poland and the CSFR

Defence date: 25 June 1997Examining board: Prof. Peter Boone, London School of Economics; Prof. Emil Claassen, Université Paris Dauphine (Supervisor); Prof. Gérard Roland, Université Libre de Bruxelles; Prof. Robert Waldmann, EUIFirst made available online on 31 May 2017This dissertation analyses the efficacy of stabilisation policies in the early period of transition to the market, marshalling evidence from the experience of three countries - the Russian Federation, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). The Russian experience is the central focus, whilst evidence drawn from Poland and the former CSFR allows more rigorous testing of the central analytical conclusions. What can such a study add to the arsenal of economics? The nature of the Russian inflation and stabilisation remains a theoretically and empirically disputed question, with critical policy implications. Thus the systematic, analytically-based account of this, underpinned by econometric evidence, could be considered a contribution on its own. Clearly this account is also one more opportunity for empirical examination of fundamental theories on the nature of inflation and the impact of alternate stabilisation measures, still much disputed in the literature. A key conclusion of this part of the work has been that inflation in Russia was mainly a monetary phenomenon, and that the expansion of the money supply has been driven by the size of quasi-fiscal expenditures and the way they were financed. The reader will find standard modelling of the Russian case

The IMF and the Ruble Zone: Response to Odling-Smee and Pastor

This commentary examines how closely Odling-Smee and Pastor (2002)'s account and their defense of the IMF's role matches the known facts and evidence on the Ruble Zone. This evidence shows that in the 12-24 months following the Soviet collapse, the IMF took the view that the prompt introduction of new currencies in the successor states would be more dangerous and damaging than sticking to the ruble. This article questions the assumptions behind this view, and argues that it was not correct for the IMF to confine itself to advising on the pros and cons of either course. The decisions by Post-Soviet states on the currency issue had a key bearing on whether IMF financial assistance would be forthcoming making, the IMF's ‘neutrality’ as recorded by the authors objectionable in principle. The bias of IMF advice in favor of retaining the Ruble Zone reflected many other interests besides Russia's own. The real aim of this commentary is not point-scoring in long-past debates, but to share an historical understanding. Comparative Economic Studies (2002) 44, 59–80; doi:10.1057/ces.2002.19