5 research outputs found

    Corporate information transparency on the Internet by listed companies in Spain (IBEX35) and Mexico (IPYC)

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    Financial and non-financial disclosure play a central role in the functioning of capital markets. In this context, the Internet has been adopted as an effective mechanism for large companies to disseminate corporate information. The institutional theory approach has been applied to identify both formal (fundamentally legal and economic) and informal factors that significantly influence listed companies’ level of corporate transparency on the Internet. Our work aims to build on existing study by focusing on two main objectives. Firstly, to make a comparative study of the corporate transparency of listed companies from Mexico and Spain by creating an index of corporate transparency on the Internet (e-CTI). And secondly, to identify the factors that affect this index using multiple regression analysis. Our study population is comprised of 70 companies, of which 35 belong to the Mexican Price and Quotations Index (IPyC) and 35 to the Spanish IBEX 35 index. The descriptive analysis reveals significant differences in the level of information disclosure between the two countries. The companies listed in Mexico obtain an e-CTI of 59%, while the Spanish ones register 80%, i.e. more importance is assigned to the disclosure of corporate governance data in Spain than in Mexico. Furthermore, this analysis shows that the factors most telling with regards to corporate transparency are the strength and application of law, GDP per capita, inflation and firm-level variables such as ownership concentration and Chairman of the Board-Chief Executive Officer (COB-CEO) duality. However, other variables such as board size and composition, profitability, leverage and firm size are not significant for the purposes of this analysis. Our work is of great relevance today, since most studies have focused on developed countries, mainly in the U.S. and Europe, with few comparisons being made between developed and developing countries, such as Spain and Mexico

    Performance and abilities of family-member ceos in a context of formal institutional weakness

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    Antecedentes: desde la perspectiva de la teoría institucional, este artículo estudia la relación entre las habilidades de los directores generales pertenecientes a la familia y el desempeño financiero de las empresas familiares listadas en un entorno caracterizado por la debilidad de las instituciones formales. Metodología: la muestra se compone de empresas familiares no financieras listadas en la Bolsa Mexicana de Valores durante el periodo 2001-2014. El análisis econométrico utiliza modelos lineales para datos de panel estimados por mínimos cuadrados ordinarios (mco). Para tomar en cuenta la endogeneidad, las regresiones se corren con el método generalizado de momentos (mgm). Conclusiones: en un contexto de debilidad institucional, invertir en educación superior en el área de negocios —de alta calidad y proporcionada en el propio país— es una buena estrategia a largo plazo para empresas familiares que quieran promover a un director general de la familia.Background: From the perspective of institutional theory, this paper studies the relation between the abilities of family-member ceos and the financial performance of listed family companies, in a setting of formal institutional weakness. Methodology: The study sample is composed of non-financial family firms listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange during the 2001-2014 period. Econometric analysis is attained through linear models for panel data, estimated by ordinary least squares (ols). To take into account endogeneity concerns, regressions are run through the generalized method of moments (gmm). Conclusions: In a context of formal institutional weakness, investment in businessrelated higher education —of high quality, and in one’s own country— is a good long-term strategy for family businesses that wish to promote a family-member ce

    Universidad y emprendimiento: un caso de estudio en la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales de la UGR

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    Con el objetivo de fomentar una cultura emprendedora dentro del ámbito educativo, se desarrollaron prácticas en las cuales los estudiantes de la licenciatura en administración y dirección de empresas, debían realizar las distintas etapas del plan de empresa que el emprendedor tiene en cuenta en el momento de poner en marcha su negocio. En este trabajo, analizamos esta experiencia en emprendimiento, destacando el importante desafío que tienen las instituciones educativas en desarrollar programas, en los cuales, los estudiantes puedan contar con herramientas que les sirvan a la hora de emprender su propio negocio en un mercado laboral competitivo. Con el fin de contribuir al desarrollo económico y social del país. Observamos que antes de esta practica, la mayoría de los alumnos no habían tenido una experiencia de emprendimiento es su carrera universitaria. Además, al finalizar dicha práctica más de la mitad de los estudiantes desean continuar con su proyecto de empresa.Departamento de Psicología Socia

    Gender diversity on the board of directors and corporate risk: A behavioural agency theory perspective

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    The benefit of gender diversity on the board of directors is a subject of current debate. We contribute to the literature on diversity and its impact on businesses from an analytical framework that incorporates agency theory and the concept of socioemotional wealth (SEW). Our findings suggest that the inclusion of women on the board goes beyond ethical concerns being also relevant from a business perspective (i.e. increases risk-taking). The proportion of independent female directors on the board is shown to increase venturing risk (i.e. with the expectation of improving future performance), but does not interfere with performance hazard risk which conceptualizes the family desire to preserve SEW, especially in firms where these risks are low. By contrast, the proportion of non-independent female directors on the board increases significantly performance hazard risk, but only in family firms. In summary, we find with data from Latin America that the motivation for risk-taking differs depending on whether the appointment is as an independent female director, the type of risk and on whether the firm is controlled by a family

    El Efecto de la Composición del Consejo en los Dividendos: El Caso de Empresas Familiares Brasileñas y Chilenas

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    Based on the agency theory, this paper analyzes whether family firms pay more dividends compared to no-family firms and identifies whether the board composition affects the dividend policy. Brazil and Chile have established mandatory dividends, retain lower cash holdings, pay higher dividends compared with other markets in the region. The sample of study is composed by 853 observations from 49 Brazilian and 32 Chilean top publicly listed firms in terms of market capitalization over the 11-year period from 2004 to 2014. Using an unbalanced panel data, results indicate that family controlled firms distribute more dividends and board composition namely; board size and the proportion of women on the board have a significant and positive impact on the dividend policy of the firm. By contrast, COB-CEO duality has a negative effect. Thus, dividend policy constitutes an effective corporate governance mechanism in mitigating the family’ expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth.Basado en la teoría de la agencia, este trabajo analiza si las empresas familiares pagan más dividendos en comparación con las empresas no familiares e identifica si la composición del consejo de administración incide la política de dividendos. Brasil y Chile han establecido a los dividendos como mandatorios, retienen menos efectivo y pagan mayores dividendos  en comparación con otros mercados de la región. La muestra del estudio se conforma por 853 observaciones (49 empresas brasileñas y 32 chilenas) las de mayor cotización bursátil en términos de capitalización de mercado durante el período de  2004 a 2014. A través de un panel de panel no balanceado, los resultados indican que las empresas controladas por la familia distribuyen más dividendos y la composición del consejo; particularmente, el tamaño y la participación de mujeres en el consejo tienen un impacto significativo y positivo en la política de dividendos de la empresa. Por el contrario, la dualidad COB-CEO afecta negativamente esta relación. En este contexto, la política de dividendos constituye un mecanismo de gobierno corporativo eficaz para mitigar la expropiación de los accionistas minoritarios por parte de la propiedad en manos de la familia
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