Obesity and Sugar‐sweetened Beverages in African‐American Preschool Children: A Longitudinal Study

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/93655/1/oby.2008.656.pd

Reduced fire severity offers near-term buffer to climate-driven declines in conifer resilience across the western United States

Increasing fire severity and warmer, drier postfire conditions are making forests in the western United States (West) vulnerable to ecological transformation. Yet, the relative importance of and interactions between these drivers of forest change remain unresolved, particularly over upcoming decades. Here, we assess how the interactive impacts of changing climate and wildfire activity influenced conifer regeneration after 334 wildfires, using a dataset of postfire conifer regeneration from 10,230 field plots. Our findings highlight declining regeneration capacity across the West over the past four decades for the eight dominant conifer species studied. Postfire regeneration is sensitive to high-severity fire, which limits seed availability, and postfire climate, which influences seedling establishment. In the near-term, projected differences in recruitment probability between low- and high-severity fire scenarios were larger than projected climate change impacts for most species, suggesting that reductions in fire severity, and resultant impacts on seed availability, could partially offset expected climate-driven declines in postfire regeneration. Across 40 to 42% of the study area, we project postfire conifer regeneration to be likely following low-severity but not high-severity fire under future climate scenarios (2031 to 2050). However, increasingly warm, dry climate conditions are projected to eventually outweigh the influence of fire severity and seed availability. The percent of the study area considered unlikely to experience conifer regeneration, regardless of fire severity, increased from 5% in 1981 to 2000 to 26 to 31% by mid-century, highlighting a limited time window over which management actions that reduce fire severity may effectively support postfire conifer regeneration. © 2023 the Author(s)

31st Annual Meeting and Associated Programs of the Society for Immunotherapy of Cancer (SITC 2016) : part two

Background The immunological escape of tumors represents one of the main ob- stacles to the treatment of malignancies. The blockade of PD-1 or CTLA-4 receptors represented a milestone in the history of immunotherapy. However, immune checkpoint inhibitors seem to be effective in specific cohorts of patients. It has been proposed that their efficacy relies on the presence of an immunological response. Thus, we hypothesized that disruption of the PD-L1/PD-1 axis would synergize with our oncolytic vaccine platform PeptiCRAd. Methods We used murine B16OVA in vivo tumor models and flow cytometry analysis to investigate the immunological background. Results First, we found that high-burden B16OVA tumors were refractory to combination immunotherapy. However, with a more aggressive schedule, tumors with a lower burden were more susceptible to the combination of PeptiCRAd and PD-L1 blockade. The therapy signifi- cantly increased the median survival of mice (Fig. 7). Interestingly, the reduced growth of contralaterally injected B16F10 cells sug- gested the presence of a long lasting immunological memory also against non-targeted antigens. Concerning the functional state of tumor infiltrating lymphocytes (TILs), we found that all the immune therapies would enhance the percentage of activated (PD-1pos TIM- 3neg) T lymphocytes and reduce the amount of exhausted (PD-1pos TIM-3pos) cells compared to placebo. As expected, we found that PeptiCRAd monotherapy could increase the number of antigen spe- cific CD8+ T cells compared to other treatments. However, only the combination with PD-L1 blockade could significantly increase the ra- tio between activated and exhausted pentamer positive cells (p= 0.0058), suggesting that by disrupting the PD-1/PD-L1 axis we could decrease the amount of dysfunctional antigen specific T cells. We ob- served that the anatomical location deeply influenced the state of CD4+ and CD8+ T lymphocytes. In fact, TIM-3 expression was in- creased by 2 fold on TILs compared to splenic and lymphoid T cells. In the CD8+ compartment, the expression of PD-1 on the surface seemed to be restricted to the tumor micro-environment, while CD4 + T cells had a high expression of PD-1 also in lymphoid organs. Interestingly, we found that the levels of PD-1 were significantly higher on CD8+ T cells than on CD4+ T cells into the tumor micro- environment (p < 0.0001). Conclusions In conclusion, we demonstrated that the efficacy of immune check- point inhibitors might be strongly enhanced by their combination with cancer vaccines. PeptiCRAd was able to increase the number of antigen-specific T cells and PD-L1 blockade prevented their exhaus- tion, resulting in long-lasting immunological memory and increased median survival

RELATIONAL EGALITARIANISM AND THE GROUNDS OF ENTITLEMENTS TO HEALTHCARE

In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that much theorizing about the value of equality, and about justice more generally, has focused unduly on distributive issues and neglected the importance of egalitarian social relationships. As a result, relational egalitarian views, according to which the value of egalitarian social relations provides the grounds of the commitment that we ought to have to equality, have gained prominence as alternatives to more fundamentally distributive accounts of the basis of egalitarianism, and of justice-based entitlements. In this paper, I will suggest that reflecting on the kind of explanation of a certain class of our justice-based entitlements that relational egalitarian considerations can offer raises doubts about the project, endorsed by at least some relational egalitarians, of attempting to ground all entitlements of justice in the value of egalitarian social relationships. I will use the entitlement to healthcare provision as my central example. The central claim that I will defend is that even if relational egalitarian accounts can avoid implausible implications regarding the extension of justice-based entitlements to health care, it is more difficult to see how they can avoid what seem to me to be implausible explanations of why individuals have the justice-based entitlements that they do. To the extent that I am correct that relational egalitarian views are committed to offering implausible explanations of the grounds of justice-based entitlements to healthcare, this seems to me to provide at least some support for a more fundamentally distributive approach to thinking about justice in healthcare provision.Au cours des dernières années, certains philosophes ont avancé qu’une grande part de la théorisation sur la valeur de l’égalité, et la justice de façon plus générale, s’est concentrée de manière excessive sur des enjeux distributifs et a, par là même, négligé l’importance des relations sociales égalitaires. Par conséquent, les approches relationnelles de l’égalité, selon lesquelles la valeur des relations sociales égalitaires constitue le socle de l’engagement qui doit être pris envers l’égalité, ont pris du terrain en tant qu’alternatives à des explications plus fondamentalement distributives de la base de l’égalitarisme et de l’admissibilité fondée sur la justice. Dans cet article, je propose qu’en réfléchissant au type d’explication d’une certaine catégorie de droits fondés sur la justice que peuvent offrir des considérations liées à l’égalitarisme relationnel, on peut remettre en doute le projet, auquel souscrivent certains partisans de l’égalitarisme relationnel, de baser tous les droits fondés en justice sur la valeur des relations sociales égalitaires. Comme exemple principal, je prendrai le droit à l’accès aux soins de santé. Je défendrai l’argument central suivant : même si les explications relationnelles de l’égalitarisme peuvent éviter des implications peu plausibles quant à l’extension de droits fondés sur la justice aux soins de santé, elles peuvent toutefois plus difficilement éviter ce qui me semble être des explications invraisemblables des raisons pour lesquelles les individus possèderaient de tels droits. S’il est bien vrai que les conceptions de l’égalitarisme relationnel sont contraintes à offrir des explications invraisemblables du fondement en justice des droits aux soins de santé, il me semble que cela offre au moins un certain soutien à une approche plus fondamentalement distributive pour penser les enjeux de justice dans l’accès aux soins de santé

Keynote: Philosophy, Public Engagement, and Social Movements

An examination of the ethical principles essential for social movements and public engagement. Dr. Berkey is an Associate Professor in the Legal Studies and Business Ethics Department in the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. For the 2022-23 academic year, he is a Visiting Associate Professor at the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics. He received his Ph.D. from the Philosophy Department at UC-Berkeley, and has held positions at Harvard, Stanford, and the University of Melbourne, in addition to Penn and Georgetown. His research is in moral and political philosophy, and he has published articles on topics such as moral demandingness, individual and corporate obligations of justice, climate change ethics/justice, ethical consumerism, exploitation, effective altruism, animal ethics/justice, and autonomous vehicle ethics. His work has appeared in journals such as Philosophy & Public Affairs, Mind, Philosophical Studies, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Utilitas, Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, and Journal of Applied Philosophy

RELATIONAL EGALITARIANISM AND THE GROUNDS OF ENTITLEMENTS TO HEALTHCARE

In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that much theorizing about the value of equality, and about justice more generally, has focused unduly on distributive issues and neglected the importance of egalitarian social relationships. As a result, relational egalitarian views, according to which the value of egalitarian social relations provides the grounds of the commitment that we ought to have to equality, have gained prominence as alternatives to more fundamentally distributive accounts of the basis of egalitarianism, and of justice-based entitlements. In this paper, I will suggest that reflecting on the kind of explanation of a certain class of our justice-based entitlements that relational egalitarian considerations can offer raises doubts about the project, endorsed by at least some relational egalitarians, of attempting to ground all entitlements of justice in the value of egalitarian social relationships. I will use the entitlement to healthcare provision as my central example. The central claim that I will defend is that even if relational egalitarian accounts can avoid implausible implications regarding the extension of justice-based entitlements to health care, it is more difficult to see how they can avoid what seem to me to be implausible explanations of why individuals have the justice-based entitlements that they do. To the extent that I am correct that relational egalitarian views are committed to offering implausible explanations of the grounds of justice-based entitlements to healthcare, this seems to me to provide at least some support for a more fundamentally distributive approach to thinking about justice in healthcare provision.Au cours des dernières années, certains philosophes ont avancé qu’une grande part de la théorisation sur la valeur de l’égalité, et la justice de façon plus générale, s’est concentrée de manière excessive sur des enjeux distributifs et a, par là même, négligé l’importance des relations sociales égalitaires. Par conséquent, les approches relationnelles de l’égalité, selon lesquelles la valeur des relations sociales égalitaires constitue le socle de l’engagement qui doit être pris envers l’égalité, ont pris du terrain en tant qu’alternatives à des explications plus fondamentalement distributives de la base de l’égalitarisme et de l’admissibilité fondée sur la justice. Dans cet article, je propose qu’en réfléchissant au type d’explication d’une certaine catégorie de droits fondés sur la justice que peuvent offrir des considérations liées à l’égalitarisme relationnel, on peut remettre en doute le projet, auquel souscrivent certains partisans de l’égalitarisme relationnel, de baser tous les droits fondés en justice sur la valeur des relations sociales égalitaires. Comme exemple principal, je prendrai le droit à l’accès aux soins de santé. Je défendrai l’argument central suivant : même si les explications relationnelles de l’égalitarisme peuvent éviter des implications peu plausibles quant à l’extension de droits fondés sur la justice aux soins de santé, elles peuvent toutefois plus difficilement éviter ce qui me semble être des explications invraisemblables des raisons pour lesquelles les individus possèderaient de tels droits. S’il est bien vrai que les conceptions de l’égalitarisme relationnel sont contraintes à offrir des explications invraisemblables du fondement en justice des droits aux soins de santé, il me semble que cela offre au moins un certain soutien à une approche plus fondamentalement distributive pour penser les enjeux de justice dans l’accès aux soins de santé

Against Moderate Morality: The Demands of Justice in an Unjust World

Extremism about Demands is the view that morality is significantly more demanding than prevailing common-sense morality acknowledges. This view is not widely held, despite the powerful advocacy on its behalf by philosophers such as Peter Singer, Shelly Kagan, Peter Unger, and G.A. Cohen. Most philosophers have remained attracted to some version of Moderation about Demands, which holds that the behavior of typical well-off people is permissible, including the ways that such people tend to employ their economic and other resources. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that proponents of Extremism have not taken sufficiently seriously the central convictions that motivate the Moderate view.This dissertation offers an improved defense of Extremism about Demands. At its center is an argument that appeals dialectically to requirements of justice that Moderates themselves already implicitly accept. Specifically, I claim that any plausible set of Moderate moral principles will, when applied to a world like ours, yield demands on typical well-off people that far exceed the demands of common-sense morality. My argument has two cruxes. The first is the idea that our concern for justice is at least partially grounded in a concern for individuals’ interests, broadly construed. The other is a principle that I call Injustice entails Obligations, which says that we are collectively subject to requirements of justice that, if fully complied with, would ensure the transition from current injustice to a just state of affairs. Any view that is compatible with both the interest-based view of (part of) our concern for justice and Injustice entails Obligations will, I argue, require sacrifices from typical well-off people that substantially exceed what prevailing common-sense morality requires of them.Moderates typically emphasize the idea that each person has an important interest in pursuing the projects, plans, relationships, and commitments that are most important to her. But they also believe that acceptable Moderate principles will properly balance this idea with the idea that from a properly impartial perspective everyone, and everyone's interests, are equally morally important. Because Moderates accept the latter idea, they are already committed to thinking that in a just world, everyone would have a sufficient minimum share of society’s resources. I argue that even if we limit our focus to distributive justice in a single society such as the United States, and even if we assume that distributive justice requires only a sufficient minimum, the extent to which the status quo must be transformed in order for justice to be achieved is still too great to be compatible with Moderate demands on typical well-off people.There are a number of ways to try to argue that Moderate principles and Injustice entails Obligations are compatible with Moderation about Demands. For instance, it might be argued that all or nearly all of the demands to sacrifice in order to promote justice can be assigned to the super-rich, rather than to typical well-off people. Or it might be argued that the sacrifices of a single well-off person cannot be required because they amount to a mere “drop in the bucket” relative to what needs to be done in order to fully achieve justice. I show that such arguments fail. The argument that I consider in greatest detail derives from John Rawls’s view that the principles of justice apply to the institutions of the “basic structure of society,” and do not apply directly to the conduct of individuals. If this “Institutionalism” is right, then it cannot be the case that individuals are obligated to promote justice directly in the way that I suggest they are. Furthermore, it might seem that a view that assigns all of the burdens of promoting justice to the basic structure satisfies the imperative to transition from injustice to justice, since if the relevant institutions were to begin doing everything that the Rawlsian view says they ought to be doing, the requirements of justice would be met. I argue, however, that there is no understanding of Institutionalism on which it is itself consistent with the following desiderata: Moderate principles, and the associated interest-based view of (part of) the ground of our concern for justice; Injustice entails Obligations; and Moderate demands. So, Institutionalism cannot make Moderate principles and Injustice entails Obligations compatible with Moderate demands.Moderate principles and Injustice entails Obligations, then, remain incompatible with Moderation about Demands. Since there are compelling reasons to accept both Moderate principles and In justice entails Obligations, I conclude that we must reject Moderation about Demands. The obligations that justice places on typical well-off people are substantially more extensive than is acknowledged by prevailing common-sense morality