\u3ci\u3eSay It Safely, Legal Limits in Journalism and Broadcasting\u3c/i\u3e, by Paul P. Ashley (1956)

Mr. Ashley\u27s book is a revision of his earlier volume, Essentials of Libel, published in 1948. It is a small book in which the author, a member of the Seattle Bar experienced in newspaper law, has attempted to provide the journalist and broadcaster with a handy check-list of the danger spots confronting them through the law of the press. It is, in the words of the author, a Stop, Look and Listen handbook. Mr. Ashley has accomplished his purpose quite successfully

Sales

The cases handed down in 1953 added little to the law of sales

An Outline of the Law of Libel in Washington

For legal writers, the law of defamation has provided one of the fairest targets for criticism. It is an area of law which in many respects is extremely anomalous and confused. The Washington law in this respect is no different from that of other jurisdictions. But in reading over the cases it seemed that, rather than criticise or discuss the problems to any great extent, it might be helpful to those concerned with the subject to provide an outline and citations which would serve as a starting point and guide for further research. This is the purpose of this article

Maximizing educational opportunities

Plan discussing primarily the virtual and online methods to meet educational need of the students and school staff of Manchester, N.H

Manchester redistricting plan

This study provides a description of the Manchester School District\u27s re-districting project and uses data and statistics to explain their recommendations and plan

Do Labyrinthine Legal Limits on Leverage Lessen the Likelihood of Losses? An Analytical Framework

A common theme in the regulation of financial institutions and transactions is leverage constraints. Although such constraints are implemented in various ways—from minimum net capital rules to margin requirements to credit limits—the basic motivation is the same: to limit the potential losses of certain counterparties. However, the emergence of dynamic trading strategies, derivative securities, and other financial innovations poses new challenges to these constraints. We propose a simple analytical framework for specifying leverage constraints that addresses this challenge by explicitly linking the likelihood of financial loss to the behavior of the financial entity under supervision and prevailing market conditions. An immediate implication of this framework is that not all leverage is created equal, and any fixed numerical limit can lead to dramatically different loss probabilities over time and across assets and investment styles. This framework can also be used to investigate the macroprudential policy implications of microprudential regulations through the general-equilibrium impact of leverage constraints on market parameters such as volatility and tail probabilities.Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Financial EngineeringNorthwestern University School of Law (Faculty Research Program

An Evolutionary Model of Bounded Rationality and Intelligence

Background: Most economic theories are based on the premise that individuals maximize their own self-interest and correctly incorporate the structure of their environment into all decisions, thanks to human intelligence. The influence of this paradigm goes far beyond academia–it underlies current macroeconomic and monetary policies, and is also an integral part of existing financial regulations. However, there is mounting empirical and experimental evidence, including the recent financial crisis, suggesting that humans do not always behave rationally, but often make seemingly random and suboptimal decisions. Methods and Findings: Here we propose to reconcile these contradictory perspectives by developing a simple binary-choice model that takes evolutionary consequences of decisions into account as well as the role of intelligence, which we define as any ability of an individual to increase its genetic success. If no intelligence is present, our model produces results consistent with prior literature and shows that risks that are independent across individuals in a generation generally lead to risk-neutral behaviors, but that risks that are correlated across a generation can lead to behaviors such as risk aversion, loss aversion, probability matching, and randomization. When intelligence is present the nature of risk also matters, and we show that even when risks are independent, either risk-neutral behavior or probability matching will occur depending upon the cost of intelligence in terms of reproductive success. In the case of correlated risks, we derive an implicit formula that shows how intelligence can emerge via selection, why it may be bounded, and how such bounds typically imply the coexistence of multiple levels and types of intelligence as a reflection of varying environmental conditions. Conclusions: Rational economic behavior in which individuals maximize their own self interest is only one of many possible types of behavior that arise from natural selection. The key to understanding which types of behavior are more likely to survive is how behavior affects reproductive success in a given population’s environment. From this perspective, intelligence is naturally defined as behavior that increases the probability of reproductive success, and bounds on rationality are determined by physiological and environmental constraints.Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Financial Engineerin

Impossible Frontiers

A key result of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is that the market portfolio—the portfolio of all assets in which each asset's weight is proportional to its total market capitalization—lies on the mean-variance-efficient frontier, the set of portfolios having mean-variance characteristics that cannot be improved upon. Therefore, the CAPM cannot be consistent with efficient frontiers for which every frontier portfolio has at least one negative weight or short position. We call such efficient frontiers “impossible,” and show that impossible frontiers are difficult to avoid. In particular, as the number of assets, n, grows, we prove that the probability that a generically chosen frontier is impossible tends to one at a geometric rate. In fact, for one natural class of distributions, nearly one-eighth of all assets on a frontier is expected to have negative weights for every portfolio on the frontier. We also show that the expected minimum amount of short selling across frontier portfolios grows linearly with n, and even when short sales are constrained to some finite level, an impossible frontier remains impossible. Using daily and monthly U.S. stock returns, we document the impossibility of efficient frontiers in the data.AlphaSimplex Group, LLCMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Financial Engineerin

Effectiveness of anonymised information sharing and use in health service, police, and local government partnership for preventing violence related injury: experimental study and time series analysis

Objective: To evaluate the effectiveness of anonymised information sharing to prevent injury related to violence. Design: Experimental study and time series analysis of a prototype community partnership between the health service, police, and local government partners designed to prevent violence. Setting: Cardiff, Wales, and 14 comparison cities designated "most similar" by the Home Office in England and Wales. Intervention After a 33 month development period, anonymised data relevant to violence prevention (precise violence location, time, days, and weapons) from patients attending emergency departments in Cardiff and reporting injury from violence were shared over 51 months with police and local authority partners and used to target resources for violence prevention. Main outcome measures: Health service records of hospital admissions related to violence and police records of woundings and less serious assaults in Cardiff and other cities after adjustment for potential confounders. Results: Information sharing and use were associated with a substantial and significant reduction in hospital admissions related to violence. In the intervention city (Cardiff) rates fell from seven to five a month per 100 000 population compared with an increase from five to eight in comparison cities (adjusted incidence rate ratio 0.58, 95% confidence interval 0.49 to 0.69). Average rate of woundings recorded by the police changed from 54 to 82 a month per 100 000 population in Cardiff compared with an increase from 54 to 114 in comparison cities (adjusted incidence rate ratio 0.68, 0.61 to 0.75). There was a significant increase in less serious assaults recorded by the police, from 15 to 20 a month per 100 000 population in Cardiff compared with a decrease from 42 to 33 in comparison cities (adjusted incidence rate ratio 1.38, 1.13 to 1.70). Conclusion: An information sharing partnership between health services, police, and local government in Cardiff, Wales, altered policing and other strategies to prevent violence based on information collected from patients treated in emergency departments after injury sustained in violence. This intervention led to a significant reduction in violent injury and was associated with an increase in police recording of minor assaults in Cardiff compared with similar cities in England and Wales where this intervention was not implemented

Dynamic Loss Probabilities and Implications for Financial Regulation

Much of financial regulation and supervision is devoted to ensuring the safety and soundness of financial institutions. Such micro- and macro-prudential policies are almost always formulated as capital requirements, leverage constraints, and other statutory restrictions designed to limit the probability of extreme financial loss to some small but acceptable threshold. However, if the risks of a financial institution\u27s assets vary over time and across circumstances, then the efficacy of financial regulations necessarily varies in lockstep unless the regulations are adaptive. We illustrate this principle with empirical examples drawn from the financial industry, and show how the interaction of certain regulations with dynamic loss probabilities can have the unintended consequence of amplifying financial losses. We propose an ambitious research agenda in which legal scholars and financial economists collaborate to develop optimally adaptive regulations that anticipate the endogeneity of risk-taking behavior