Kant on Biology and the Experience of Life

This is the published version. It first appeared at http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110246490.3879

One Imagination in Experiences of Beauty and Achievements of Understanding

I argue for the unity of imagination in two prima facie diverse contexts: experiences of beauty and achievements of understanding. I develop my argument in three steps. First, I begin by describing a type of aesthetic experience that is grounded in a set of imaginative activities on the part of the person having the experience. Second, I argue that the same set of imaginative activities that grounds this type of aesthetic experience also contributes to achievements of understanding. Third, I show that my unified account of imagination has important implications: it sheds light on two puzzling phenomena, the aesthetic value of science and the cognitive value of art.Riksbankens Jubileumsfon

Understanding Kantian Understanding

Over the last decade or so philosophers have become increasingly dissatisfied with the dominant focus on the notion of knowledge in contemporary epistemology. Understanding, it has been suggested, is an important intellectual goal, often valuable over and above knowing the facts. But there is much disagreement over how exactly this suggestion is to be spelt out. Does understanding consist in a specific form of knowledge? Or is it a cognitive state intrinsically distinct from, and irreducible to, knowledge? And if the latter, how does understanding differ from knowledge? In this paper, I sketch an answer to these questions which I attribute to Kant. By contrast with contemporary accounts, Kant’s primary epistemological concern lies not with knowledge but with cognition and its intuitive and conceptual conditions. What contemporary epistemologists call ‘understanding’ is, for Kant, a type of cognition. Knowledge, by contrast, does not present a form of cognition and, hence, differs in important respects from understanding. This conclusion, however, does not imply a multiplicity of potentially conflicting cognitive goals. The important insight of Kant’s account, I argue, is that the search for understanding is an indispensable means in the search for knowledge.This is the author accepted manuscript. It is currently under an indefinite embargo pending publication by De Gruyter

Purification of a lectin with antibacterial activity from Bothrops leucurus snake venom

A novel lectin was isolated from Bothrops leucurus snake venom using a combination of affinity and gel filtration chromatographies. the lectin (BIL) agglutinated glutaraldehyde-treated rabbit and human erythrocytes with preference for rabbit erythrocytes. Galactose, raffinose, lactose, fetal bovine serum and casein inhibited lectin-induced rabbit erythrocyte agglutination. BIL, with a molecular mass of 30 kDa and composed of two subunits of 15 kDa, showed dependence on calcium. BIL is an acidic protein with highest activity over the pH range of 4.0-7.0 and stable under heating to 70 degrees C. Fluorescence emission spectra showed tryptophan residues partially buried within the lectin structure. the percentages of secondary structure revealed by circular dichroism were 1% alpha-helix, 44% beta-sheet, 24% beta-turn and 31% unordered. BIL showed effective antibacterial activity against Gram-positive bacteria Staphylococcus aureus, Enterococcus faecalis and Bacillus subtilis with minimal inhibitory concentrations of 31.25, 62.25 and 125 mu g/mL, respectively. in conclusion, B. leucurus snake venom contains a galactoside-binding lectin with antibacterial activity. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)Univ Fed Pernambuco, Dept Bioquim, BR-50670420 Recife, PE, BrazilUniv Fed Bahia, Dept Zool, BR-40170210 Salvador, BA, BrazilUniversidade Federal de São Paulo, Dept Bioquim, BR-04044020 São Paulo, BrazilUniv Fed Pernambuco, Dept Zool, BR-50670420 Recife, PE, BrazilUniv Estadual Oeste Parana, Ctr Engn & Ciencias Exatas, BR-85903000 Toledo, Parana, BrazilUniversidade Federal de São Paulo, Dept Bioquim, BR-04044020 São Paulo, BrazilWeb of Scienc

Imaginative Reflection in Aesthetic Judgment and Cognition

Kant is well known for his strict distinction between aesthetic judgments and judgments of determinate cognition. Aesthetic judgments, and in particular judgments of beauty, are the domain of the reflecting power of judgment; they involve the free play of imagination and understanding.1 Judgments of determinate cognition, and in particular empirical cognition, are the domain of the determining power of judgment; in them the products of the imagination are subordinated to the concepts and principles of the understanding.2 This contrast notwithstanding, Kant takes both types of judgment to be related in important ways. Both involve the same faculties. And in both, these faculties are employed in a way that is sufficiently similar to warrant treatment in one book: the Critique of the Power of Judgment develops Kant’s aesthetics as well as key tenets of his theory of cognition

KANT ON THE VALUE OF NATURE

I set out a Kantian account of the value of nature. My proposal is motivated by Kant’s teleological conception of nature. In the «Critique of Teleological Judgement», Kant shows that our conception of nature is fundamentally informed by an analogy with reason. I argue that our practical relationship with nature must be guided by the same analogy: we must regard nature as if it had value as an end in itself, and we must regard ourselves as if we were obligated towards it. On my Kantian account, the value of nature is thus independent of its usefulness for human beings and yet essentially tied to the value of reason. I take my account to be based on ideas Kant is explicitly committed to, even though it is not fully developed by Kant himself