Putting the cart before the horse? The origin of information donation

Heintz & Scott-Phillips propose that the partner choice ecology of our ancestors required Gricean cognitive pragmatics for reputation management, which caused a tendency toward showing and expecting prosociality that subsequently scaffolded language evolution. Here, we suggest a cognitively leaner explanation that is more consistent with comparative data and posits that prosociality and eventually language evolved along with cooperative breeding

The proximate regulation of prosocial behaviour: towards a conceptual framework for comparative research

Humans and many other animal species act in ways that benefit others. Such prosocial behaviour has been studied extensively across a range of disciplines over the last decades, but findings to date have led to conflicting conclusions about prosociality across and even within species. Here, we present a conceptual framework to study the proximate regulation of prosocial behaviour in humans, non-human primates and potentially other animals. We build on psychological definitions of prosociality and spell out three key features that need to be in place for behaviour to count as prosocial: benefitting others, intentionality, and voluntariness. We then apply this framework to review observational and experimental studies on sharing behaviour and targeted helping in human children and non-human primates. We show that behaviours that are usually subsumed under the same terminology (e.g. helping) can differ substantially across and within species and that some of them do not fulfil our criteria for prosociality. Our framework allows for precise mapping of prosocial behaviours when retrospectively evaluating studies and offers guidelines for future comparative work

Parental reactions to a dying marmoset infant: conditional investment by the mother, but not the father

The reproductive costs of cooperatively breeding callitrichid mothers are remarkable, and they have to rely on fathers and other group members to raise their offspring. Consequently, maternal responsiveness to and investment in infants tends to be conditional, and especially sensitive to infant cues and signals of vigour. Since fathers do not bear the same excessive reproductive costs, their threshold to invest in a dying immature may be lower than in mothers. We present an anecdotal report of reactions of a first-time breeding pair of captive common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) to their dying infant. We found a male bias in all interactions with the dying infant that did not show typical cues of infant vigour. These results show that the dying infant elicited more investment by the father than the mother. Because of this conditional maternal investment, infants of cooperatively breeding primates may be under selection to advertise their viability, in particular to their mothers

Active sharing of a novel, arbitrary innovation in captive cotton-top tamarins?

Most cultural behaviours in primates stem from innovations that are beneficial since they provide access to food or comfort. Innovations that are seemingly purposeless and arbitrary, and nevertheless spread through a social group, are rarer but particularly relevant to understanding the evolutionary origin of culture. Here, we provide an anecdotal report of a series of non-instrumental woodchip manipulation and modification events in captive cotton-top tamarins. Intriguingly, woodchips were preferentially manipulated in a position that was readily visible to a partner in a different enclosure, and the innovation apparently spread to other individuals. Together, this suggests that the arbitrary innovation was actively shared with a conspecific, which is consistent with the pattern of transmission of another arbitrary innovation in cotton-top tamarins, namely stick-weaving

Do marmosets understand others’ conversations? A thermography approach

What information animals derive from eavesdropping on interactions between conspecifics, and whether they assign value to it, is difficult to assess because overt behavioral reactions are often lacking. An inside perspective of how observers perceive and process such interactions is thus paramount. Here, we investigate what happens in the mind of marmoset monkeys when they hear playbacks of positive or negative third-party vocal interactions, by combining thermography to assess physiological reactions and behavioral preference measures. The physiological reactions show that playbacks were perceived and processed holistically as interactions rather than as the sum of the separate elements. Subsequently, the animals preferred those individuals who had been simulated to engage in positive, cooperative vocal interactions during the playbacks. By using thermography to disentangle the mechanics of marmoset sociality, we thus find that marmosets eavesdrop on and socially evaluate vocal exchanges and use this information to distinguish between cooperative and noncooperative conspecifics

Data from: Reverse audience effects on helping in cooperatively breeding marmoset monkeys

Cooperatively breeding common marmosets show substantial variation in the amount of help they provide. Pay-to-stay and social prestige models of helping attribute this variation to audience effects, i.e. that individuals help more if group members can witness their interactions with immatures, whereas models of kin selection, group augmentation, or ones stressing the need to gain parenting experience do not predict any audience effects. We quantified the readiness of adult marmosets to share food in the presence or absence of other group members. Contrary to both predictions we found a reverse audience effect on food sharing behaviour: marmosets would systematically share more food with immatures when no audience was present. Thus, helping in common marmosets, at least in related family groups, does not support the pay-to-stay or the social prestige model, and helpers do not take advantage of the opportunity to engage in reputation management. Rather, the results appear to reflect a genuine concern for the immatures' wellbeing, which seems particularly strong when solely responsible for the immatures

Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Insights From Non-human Primates

The aim of this contribution is to explore the origins of moral behavior and its underlying moral preferences and intuitions from an evolutionary perspective. Such a perspective encompasses both the ultimate, adaptive function of morality in our own species, as well as the phylogenetic distribution of morality and its key elements across primates. First, with regard to the ultimate function, we argue that human moral preferences are best construed as adaptations to the affordances of the fundamentally interdependent hunter-gatherer lifestyle of our hominin ancestors. Second, with regard to the phylogenetic origin, we show that even though full-blown human morality is unique to humans, several of its key elements are not. Furthermore, a review of evidence from non-human primates regarding prosocial concern, conformity, and the potential presence of universal, biologically anchored and arbitrary cultural norms shows that these elements of morality are not distributed evenly across primate species. This suggests that they have evolved along separate evolutionary trajectories. In particular, the element of prosocial concern most likely evolved in the context of shared infant care, which can be found in humans and some New World monkeys. Strikingly, many if not all of the elements of morality found in non-human primates are only evident in individualistic or dyadic contexts, but not as third-party reactions by truly uninvolved bystanders. We discuss several potential explanations for the unique presence of a systematic third-party perspective in humans, but focus particularly on mentalizing ability and language. Whereas both play an important role in present day, full-blown human morality, it appears unlikely that they played a causal role for the original emergence of morality. Rather, we suggest that the most plausible scenario to date is that human morality emerged because our hominin ancestors, equipped on the one hand with large and powerful brains inherited from their ape-like ancestor, and on the other hand with strong prosocial concern as a result of cooperative breeding, could evolve into an ever more interdependent social niche