The relationship of myocardial contraction and electrical excitation—the correlation between scintigraphic phase image analysis and electrophysiologic mapping

Phase imaging derived from equilibrium radionuclide angiography presents the ventricular contraction sequence. It has been widely but only indirectly correlated with the sequence of electrical myocardial activation. We sought to determine the specific relationship between the sequence of phase progression and the sequence of myocardial activation, contraction and conduction, in order to document a noninvasive method that could monitor both. In 7 normal and 9 infarcted dogs, the sequence of phase angle was correlated with the epicardial activation map in 126 episodes of sinus rhythm and pacing from three ventricular sites. In each episode, the site of earliest phase angle was identical to the focus of initial epicardial activation. Similarly, the serial contraction pattern by phase image analysis matched the electrical epicardial activation sequence completely or demonstrated good agreement in approximately 85% of pacing episodes, without differences between normal or infarct groups. A noninvasive method to accurately determine the sequence of contraction may serve as a surrogate for the associated electrical activation sequence or be applied to identify their differences

Visuo-tactile integration in autism: atypical temporal binding may underlie greater reliance on proprioceptive information

BackgroundEvidence indicates that social functioning deficits and sensory sensitivities in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are related to atypical sensory integration. The exact mechanisms underlying these integration difficulties are unknown; however, two leading accounts are (1) an over-reliance on proprioception and (2) atypical visuo-tactile temporal binding. We directly tested these theories by selectively manipulating proprioceptive alignment and visuo-tactile synchrony to assess the extent that these impact upon body ownership.MethodsChildren with ASD and typically developing controls placed their hand into a multisensory illusion apparatus, which presented two, identical live video images of their own hand in the same plane as their actual hand. One virtual hand was aligned proprioceptively with the actual hand (the veridical hand), and the other was displaced to the left or right. While a brushstroke was applied to the participants’ actual (hidden) hand, they observed the two virtual images of their hand also being stroked and were asked to identify their real hand. During brushing, one of three different temporal delays was applied to either the displaced hand or the veridical hand. Thus, only one virtual hand had synchronous visuo-tactile inputs.ResultsResults showed that visuo-tactile synchrony overrides incongruent proprioceptive inputs in typically developing children but not in autistic children. Evidence for both temporally extended visuo-tactile binding and a greater reliance on proprioception are discussed.ConclusionsThis is the first study to provide definitive evidence for temporally extended visuo-tactile binding in ASD. This may result in reduced processing of amodal inputs (i.e. temporal synchrony) over modal-specific information (i.e. proprioception). This would likely lead to failures in appropriately binding information from related events, which would impact upon sensitivity to sensory stimuli, body representation and social processes such as empathy and imitation

Neural Mechanisms of Interference Control in Working Memory: Effects of Interference Expectancy and Fluid Intelligence

A critical aspect of executive control is the ability to limit the adverse effects of interference. Previous studies have shown activation of left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex after the onset of interference, suggesting that interference may be resolved in a reactive manner. However, we suggest that interference control may also operate in a proactive manner to prevent effects of interference. The current study investigated the temporal dynamics of interference control by varying two factors - interference expectancy and fluid intelligence (gF) - that could influence whether interference control operates proactively versus reactively.A modified version of the recent negatives task was utilized. Interference expectancy was manipulated across task blocks by changing the proportion of recent negative (interference) trials versus recent positive (facilitation) trials. Furthermore, we explored whether gF affected the tendency to utilize specific interference control mechanisms. When interference expectancy was low, activity in lateral prefrontal cortex replicated prior results showing a reactive control pattern (i.e., interference-sensitivity during probe period). In contrast, when interference expectancy was high, bilateral prefrontal cortex activation was more indicative of proactive control mechanisms (interference-related effects prior to the probe period). Additional results suggested that the proactive control pattern was more evident in high gF individuals, whereas the reactive control pattern was more evident in low gF individuals.The results suggest the presence of two neural mechanisms of interference control, with the differential expression of these mechanisms modulated by both experimental (e.g., expectancy effects) and individual difference (e.g., gF) factors

Beyond the Libet clock: modality variants for agency measurements

The Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to our capability to control our own actions and influence the world around us. Recent research in HCI has been exploring SoA to provide users an instinctive sense of “I did that” as opposed to “the system did that”. However, current agency measurements are limited. The Intentional Binding (IB) paradigm provides an implicit measure of the SoA. However, it is constrained by requiring high visual attention to a “Libet clock” onscreen. In this paper, we extend the timing stimulus through auditory and tactile cues. Our results demonstrate that audio timing through voice commands and haptic timing through tactile cues on the hand are alternative techniques to measure the SoA using the IB paradigm. They both address limitations of the traditional method (e.g., lack of engagement and visual demand). We discuss how our results can be applied to measure SoA in tasks involving different interactive scenarios common in HCI

Model-based analyses: Promises, pitfalls, and example applications to the study of cognitive control

We discuss a recent approach to investigating cognitive control, which has the potential to deal with some of the challenges inherent in this endeavour. In a model-based approach, the researcher defines a formal, computational model that performs the task at hand and whose performance matches that of a research participant. The internal variables in such a model might then be taken as proxies for latent variables computed in the brain. We discuss the potential advantages of such an approach for the study of the neural underpinnings of cognitive control and its pitfalls, and we make explicit the assumptions underlying the interpretation of data obtained using this approach

Neural Circuitry of Emotional and Cognitive Conflict Revealed through Facial Expressions

Neural systems underlying conflict processing have been well studied in the cognitive realm, but the extent to which these overlap with those underlying emotional conflict processing remains unclear. A novel adaptation of the AX Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT), a stimulus-response incompatibility paradigm, was examined that permits close comparison of emotional and cognitive conflict conditions, through the use of affectively-valenced facial expressions as the response modality.Brain activity was monitored with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during performance of the emotional AX-CPT. Emotional conflict was manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis, by requiring contextually pre-cued facial expressions to emotional probe stimuli (IAPS images) that were either affectively compatible (low-conflict) or incompatible (high-conflict). The emotion condition was contrasted against a matched cognitive condition that was identical in all respects, except that probe stimuli were emotionally neutral. Components of the brain cognitive control network, including dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), showed conflict-related activation increases in both conditions, but with higher activity during emotion conditions. In contrast, emotion conflict effects were not found in regions associated with affective processing, such as rostral ACC.These activation patterns provide evidence for a domain-general neural system that is active for both emotional and cognitive conflict processing. In line with previous behavioural evidence, greatest activity in these brain regions occurred when both emotional and cognitive influences additively combined to produce increased interference

Embodiment and body awareness in meditators

[EN] Mindfulness practice consists of focusing attention in an intentional way on the experience of the present moment, including bodily sensations, thoughts or feelings, and the environment, with an attitude of acceptance and without judging. The body and, especially, body awareness are key elements in mindfulness. Embodiment or the feeling of being located within one's physical body is a related concept, and it is composed of the sense of ownership, location, and agency of the body. The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm that has been used to understand the mechanisms of embodiment, and evidence shows that body awareness modulates this illusion. To our knowledge, no studies have analyzed embodiment processes in meditators. The aim of this study is to use the RHI to analyze the mechanisms of embodiment and its relationship with body awareness and mindfulness in meditators and non-meditators. The sample was composed of long-term meditators (n = 15) and non-meditators (n = 15). Objective and self-report measures for embodiment with the RHI and self-report questionnaires of body awareness and mindfulness were administered. One-way ANOVA revealed significant differences between groups in sense of agency in the rubber hand. Meditators experienced less sense of agency in the rubber hand than non-meditators. Pearson's correlations showed that this lower sense of agency in the rubber hand was associated with higher body awareness and mindfulness. Results highlight the role of body awareness and mindfulness in embodiment mechanisms. This study has clinical implications, especially in psychopathological disorders that can be influenced by disturbances in these processes.The authors would like to acknowledge the "BODYTA" project (Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, PSI2014-51928-R), "PROMOSAM" (Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, PSI2014-56303-REDT), and "Excellence Research Program PROMETEO II" (Generalitat Valenciana, Conselleria de Educacion, Cultura y Deporte, PROMETEOII/2013/003). CIBERobn is an initiate of the ISCIII. PROMOSAM Excellence in Research Program (PSI2014-56303-REDT), MINECO, Spain.Cebolla, A.; Miragall, M.; Palomo, P.; Llorens Rodríguez, R.; Soler, J.; Demarzo, M.; García Campayo, J.... (2016). Embodiment and body awareness in meditators. Mindfulness. 7(6):1297-1305. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12671-016-0569-xS1297130576Aguado, J., Luciano, J. V., Cebolla, A., Serrano-Blanco, A., Soler, J., & García-Campayo, J. (2015). 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Reaching with alien limbs: visual exposure to prosthetic hands in a mirror biases proprioception without accompanying illusions of ownership. Perception & Psychophysics, 68(4), 685–701.Hölzel, B. K., Ott, U., Gard, T., Hempel, H., Weygandt, M., Morgen, K., et al. (2008). Investigation of mindfulness meditation practitioners with voxel-based morphometry. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 3(1), 55–61.Hölzel, B. K., Lazar, S. W., Gard, T., Schuman-Olivier, Z., Vago, D. R., & Ott, U. (2011). How does mindfulness meditation work? Proposing mechanisms of action from a conceptual and neural perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(6), 537–559.Kalckert, A., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2012). Moving a rubber hand that feels like your own: a dissociation of ownership and agency. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6, 40.Karnath, H. O., & Baier, B. (2010). Right insula for our sense of limb ownership and self-awareness of actions. 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Psychologically induced cooling of a specific body part caused by the illusory ownership of an artificial counterpart. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(35), 13169–13173.Mussap, A. J., & Salton, N. (2006). A ‘rubber-hand’ illusion reveals a relationship between perceptual body image and unhealthy body change. Journal of Health Psychology, 11(4), 627–639.Naranjo, J. R., & Schmidt, S. (2012). Is it me or not me? Modulation of perceptual-motor awareness and visuomotor performance by mindfulness meditation. BMC Neuroscience, 13(1), 88.Parkin, L., Morgan, R., Rosselli, A., Howard, M., Sheppard, A., Evans, D., et al. (2014). Exploring the relationship between mindfulness and cardiac perception. Mindfulness, 5(3), 298–313.Pollatos, O., Kurz, A. L., Albrecht, J., Schreder, T., Kleemann, A. M., Schöpf, V., et al. (2008). Reduced perception of bodily signals in anorexia nervosa. Eating Behaviors, 9(4), 381–388.Quezada-Berumen, L., González-Ramírez, M. 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Conscious perception of errors and its relation to the anterior insula

To detect erroneous action outcomes is necessary for flexible adjustments and therefore a prerequisite of adaptive, goal-directed behavior. While performance monitoring has been studied intensively over two decades and a vast amount of knowledge on its functional neuroanatomy has been gathered, much less is known about conscious error perception, often referred to as error awareness. Here, we review and discuss the conditions under which error awareness occurs, its neural correlates and underlying functional neuroanatomy. We focus specifically on the anterior insula, which has been shown to be (a) reliably activated during performance monitoring and (b) modulated by error awareness. Anterior insular activity appears to be closely related to autonomic responses associated with consciously perceived errors, although the causality and directions of these relationships still needs to be unraveled. We discuss the role of the anterior insula in generating versus perceiving autonomic responses and as a key player in balancing effortful task-related and resting-state activity. We suggest that errors elicit reactions highly reminiscent of an orienting response and may thus induce the autonomic arousal needed to recruit the required mental and physical resources. We discuss the role of norepinephrine activity in eliciting sufficiently strong central and autonomic nervous responses enabling the necessary adaptation as well as conscious error perception