On the formation of coalitions to provide public goods: Experimental evidence from the lab

The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements serve as one example. This paper experimentally tests theory on the formation of coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from the theory: only few players form a coalition when the institution prescribes the full internalization of mutual benefits of members. Contrary to theory, coalitions that try to reduce the freeriding incentives by requiring less provision from their members, do not attract additional members. Substantial efficiency gains occur, however, both along the extensive and intensive margin when coalition members can each suggest a minimum contribution level with the smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the acceptance of institutions depends on how terms of coalitions are reached. --public goods,institutions,coalition formation,cooperation

On the formation of coalitions to provide public goods : experimental evidence from the lab

The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements serve as one example. This paper experimentally tests theory on the formation of coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from the theory: only few players form a coalition when the institution prescribes the full internalization of mutual benefits of members. Contrary to theory, coalitions that try to reduce the freeriding incentives by requiring less provision from their members, do not attract additional members. Substantial efficiency gains occur, however, both along the extensive and intensive margin when coalition members can each suggest a minimum contribution level with the smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the acceptance of institutions depends on how terms of coalitions are reached

The impact of burden sharing rules on the voluntary provision of public goods

We investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum provision level of the public good that is allocated across agents according to some predetermined rule. We find that rule-based contribution schemes significantly increase payoff levels relative to the VCM. Important differences exist between the rules. Contrary to theory predictions, the equal-payoff rule Pareto-dominates all other rules. This also holds relative to a scheme where different types of players separately can determine their minimum contribution levels. Our results lend insights into the efficient institutional design for voluntary private provision of public goods, and how burden sharing rules interact with efficiency when agents are heterogeneous

On the performance of rule-based contribution schemes under endowment heterogeneity

We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the efficiency gains from minimum contribution rules under random allocation. Under effort-based allocations, substantial efficiency gains relative to a VCM occur, though being largely driven by significant reductions of contributions in VCM. By apparently influencing the perception of fair burden sharing, the endowment allocation procedure crucially impacts voluntary contributions under VCM, while the rule-based mechanisms generate stable efficiency levels, even though endowment heterogeneity substantially limits the ability of rule-based mechanisms to achieve the potential efficiency gains

On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods - Experimental Evidence from the Lab

The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements serve as one example. This paper experimentally tests theory on the formation of coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from the theory: only few players form a coalition when the institution prescribes the full internalization of mutual benefits of members. Contrary to theory, coalitions that try to reduce the free-riding incentives by requiring less provision from their members, do not attract additional members. Substantial efficiency gains occur, however, both along the extensive and intensive margin when coalition members can each suggest a minimum contribution level with the smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the acceptance of institutions depends on how terms of coalitions are reached.

B-Meson Distribution Amplitudes of Geometric Twist vs. Dynamical Twist

Two- and three-particle distribution amplitudes of heavy pseudoscalar mesons of well-defined geometric twist are introduced. They are obtained from appropriately parametrized vacuum-to-meson matrix elements by applying those twist projectors which determine the enclosed light-cone operators of definite geometric twist and, in addition, observing the heavy quark constraint. Comparing these distribution amplitudes with the conventional ones of dynamical twist we derive relations between them, partially being of Wandzura-Wilczek type; also sum rules of Burkhardt-Cottingham type are derived.The derivation is performed for the (double) Mellin moments and then re-summed to the non-local distribution amplitudes. Furthermore, a parametrization of vacuum-to-meson matrix elements for non-local operators off the light-cone in terms of distribution amplitudes accompanying independent kinematical structures is derived.Comment: 18 pages, Latex 2e, no figure

Pea-derived vaccines demonstrate high immunogenicity and protection in rabbits against rabbit haemorrhagic disease virus

Vaccines against rabbit haemorrhagic disease virus (RHDV) are commercially produced in experimentally infected rabbits. A genetically engineered and manufactured version of the major structural protein of RHDV (VP60) is considered to be an alternative approach for vaccine production. Plants have the potential to become an excellent recombinant production system, but the low expression level and insufficient immunogenic potency of plant-derived VP60 still hamper its practical use. In this study, we analysed the expression of a novel multimeric VP60-based antigen in four different plant species, including Nicotiana tabacum L., Solanum tuberosum L., Brassica napus L. and Pisum sativum L. Significant differences were detected in the expression patterns of the novel fusion antigen cholera toxin B subunit (CTB)::VP60 (ctbvp60(SEKDEL)) at the mRNA and protein levels. Pentameric CTB::VP60 molecules were only detected in N. tabacum and P. sativum, and displayed equal levels of CTB, at approximately 0.01% of total soluble protein (TSP), and traces of detectable VP60. However, strong enhancement of the CTB protein content via self-fertilization was only observed in P. sativum, where it reached up to 0.7% of TSP. In rabbits, a strong decrease in the protective vaccine dose required from 48-400 microg potato-derived VP60 [Castanon, S., Marin, M.S., Martin-Alonso, J.M., Boga, J.A., Casais, R., Humara, J.M., Ordas, R.J. and Parra, F. (1999) Immunization with potato plants expressing VP60 protein protects against rabbit hemorrhagic disease virus. J. Virol. 73, 4452-4455; Castanon, S., Martin-Alonso, J.M., Marin, M.S., Boga, J.A., Alonso, P., Parra, F. and Ordas, R.J. (2002) The effect of the promoter on expression of VP60 gene from rabbit hemorrhagic disease virus in potato plants. Plant Sci. 162, 87-95] to 0.56-0.28 microg antigenic VP60 (measured with VP60 enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay) of crude CTB::VP60 pea extracts was demonstrated. Rabbits immunized with pea-derived CTB::VP60 showed anti-VP60-specific antibodies, similar to RikaVacc((R))-immunized rabbits, and survived RHDV challenge

Characterization of C-strain “Riems” TAV-epitope escape variants obtained through selective antibody pressure in cell culture

Classical swine fever virus (CSFV) C-strain “Riems” escape variants generated under selective antibody pressure with monoclonal antibodies and a peptide-specific antiserum in cell culture were investigated. Candidates with up to three amino acid exchanges in the immunodominant and highly conserved linear TAV-epitope of the E2-glycoprotein, and additional mutations in the envelope proteins E(RNS) and E1, were characterized both in vitro and in vivo. It was further demonstrated, that intramuscular immunization of weaner pigs with variants selected after a series of passages elicited full protection against lethal CSFV challenge infection. These novel CSFV C-strain variants with exchanges in the TAV-epitope present potential marker vaccine candidates. The DIVA (differentiating infected from vaccinated animals) principle was tested for those variants using commercially available E2 antibody detection ELISA. Moreover, direct virus differentiation is possible using a real-time RT-PCR system specific for the new C-strain virus escape variants or using differential immunofluorescence staining

Sphingosine-1-phosphate receptor 3 promotes leukocyte rolling by mobilizing endothelial P-selectin

Sphingosine-1-phosphate (S1P) participates in inflammation;however, its role in leukocyte rolling is still unclear. Here we use intravital microscopy in inflamed mouse cremaster muscle venules and human endothelial cells to show that S1P contributes to P-selectin-dependent leukocyte rolling through endothelial S1P receptor 3 (S1P(3)) and G alpha(q), PLC beta and Ca2+. Intraarterial S1P administration increases leukocyte rolling, while S1P(3) deficiency or inhibition dramatically reduces it. Mast cells involved in triggering rolling also release S1P that mobilizes P-selectin through S1P(3). Histamine and epinephrine require S1P(3) for full-scale effect accomplishing it by stimulating sphingosine kinase 1 (Sphk1). In a counter-regulatory manner, S1P1 inhibits cAMP-stimulated Sphk1 and blocks rolling as observed in endothelial-specific S1P(1)(-/-) mice. In agreement with a dominant pro-rolling effect of S1P(3),FTY720 inhibits rolling in control and S1P(1)(-/-) but not in S1P(3)(-/-) mice. Our findings identify S1P as a direct and indirect contributor to leukocyte rolling and characterize the receptors mediating its action

Experimental validation of computerised models of clustering of platelet glycoprotein receptors that signal via tandem SH2 domain proteins

The clustering of platelet glycoprotein receptors with cytosolic YxxL and YxxM motifs, including GPVI, CLEC-2 and PEAR1, triggers activation via phosphorylation of the conserved tyrosine residues and recruitment of the tandem SH2 (Src homology 2) domain effector proteins, Syk and PI 3-kinase. We have modelled the clustering of these receptors with monovalent, divalent and tetravalent soluble ligands and with transmembrane ligands based on the law of mass action using ordinary differential equations and agent-based modelling. The models were experimentally evaluated in platelets and transfected cell lines using monovalent and multivalent ligands, including novel nanobody-based divalent and tetravalent ligands, by fluorescence correlation spectroscopy. Ligand valency, receptor number, receptor dimerisation, receptor phosphorylation and a cytosolic tandem SH2 domain protein act in synergy to drive receptor clustering. Threshold concentrations of a CLEC-2-blocking antibody and Syk inhibitor act in synergy to block platelet aggregation. This offers a strategy for countering the effect of avidity of multivalent ligands and in limiting off-target effects