Social consistency and individual rationality

This paper aims at proving that social interactions can easily be rationalized by individual preferences as defined in standard microeconomic theory. For that purpose, we show individual choice rationality to be logically equivalent to social consistency, when individual rationality means that individual preferences are completely ordered and social consistency that there is a one-to-one mapping between a given family of social communities and the existence of a particular (unique, reflexive and symmetric) interaction relation between individuals. Moreover, continuity and monotonicity of individual preferences are shown to fit the modeling of group loyalty when group loyalty is defined as the ability to freely accept a personal loss for the global gain of a particular population.preferences ; social interaction ; communities ; group loyalty

How to shake the Invisible Hand (when Robinson meets Friday)

We propose to define the invisible hand by (i) modelling the mechanism itself (not to just assume its existence) and (ii) making explicit the limit conditions for its working. For that purpose, we simply assimilate the working of the invisible hand mechanism to the existence of a social preference such that individual and social optimalities are consistent. In introducing the possibility of interaction among individuals, we then suggest that the standard Robinson case or social atomicity is just a degenerate feature of a more general requirement that we call the Global Network Agreement. Our main result is that the invisible hand mechanism does keep on working when there is an interaction between Robinson and Friday if the former (resp. the latter) is sensitive to the latter (resp. the former) in such a way that they exhibit some agreement in preferences. Hence, the Robinson case naturally satisfies this property since nor Robinson neither Friday can disagree with himself. But more cooperative situations are also allowed in order to extent the invisible hand mechanism to cases with interactions.preferences ; social interaction ; invisible hand

Axiomatization of an Exponential Similarity Function

An agent is asked to assess a real-valued variable y based on certain characteristics x=(x^{1},...,x^{m}), and on a database consisting of n observations of (x^{1},...,x^{m},y). A possible approach to combine past observations of x and y with the current values of x to generate an assessment of y is similarity-weighted averaging. It suggests that the predicted value of y, y_{n+1}^{s}, be the weighted average of all previously observed values y_{i}, where the weight of y_{i} is the similarity between the vector x_{n+1}^{1},...,x_{n+1}^{m}, associated with y_{n+1}, and the previously observed vector, x_{i}^{1},...,x_{i}^{m}. This paper axiomatizes, in terms of the prediction y_{n+1}, a similarity function that is a (decreasing) exponential in a norm of the difference between the two vectors compared.Similarity, exponential

How to shake the Invisible Hand (when Robinson meets Friday)

We propose to define the invisible hand by (i) modelling the mechanism itself (not to just assume its existence) and (ii) making explicit the limit conditions for its working. For that purpose, we simply assimilate the working of the invisible hand mechanism to the existence of a social preference such that individual and social optimalities are consistent. In introducing the possibility of interaction among individuals, we then suggest that the standard Robinson case or social atomicity is just a degenerate feature of a more general requirement that we call the Global Network Agreement. Our main result is that the invisible hand mechanism does keep on working when there is an interaction between Robinson and Friday if the former (resp. the latter) is sensitive to the latter (resp. the former) in such a way that they exhibit some agreement in preferences. Hence, the Robinson case naturally satisfies this property since nor Robinson neither Friday can disagree with himself. But more cooperative situations are also allowed in order to extent the invisible hand mechanism to cases with interactions.Nous proposons de définir la main invisible sous la forme d'un mécanisme formel explicite. Pour cela, nous assimilons ce mécanisme à l'existence d'une relation de préférence sociale telle que les optimalités individuelle et collective soient compatibles. Puis en introduisant une possibilité d'interaction entre agents, nous suggérons que le cas standard (Adam Smith) d'atomicité sociale constitue le cas limite d'une classe plus générale de situations satisfaisant toutes une certaine contrainte appelée le Global Network Agreement (ou Accord Global de Réseau). Notre résultat principal est alors que le mécanisme de la main invisible s'applique même en présence d'interactions dès lors que les agents qui interagissent sont sensibles en préférence les uns aux autres d'une manière telle qu'ils manifestent entre eux un consensus minimal. Aussi, le cas standard (chaque agent est un Robinson) satisfait naturellement cette propriété, cependant, d'autres cas, beaucoup plus coopératifs sont eux aussi aussi compatibles avec le mécanisme de la main invisible

Learning by Helping: A Bounded Rationality Model of Mentoring

Within an organization, a bounded rational principal organizes a promotion test based on a sequence of test regarding candidates' relative performances. We assume the principal to suffer from limited ability to rank the performances, only identifying the best in each test. Furthermore, he satisfies the expected gains do not decreases whit the information generated by additional tests. Then, mentoring is shown to improve the information about candidates' ability when the principal offers help to the current best candidate provided by a manager promoted after a similar contest.Mentoring; Selection; Contests; Bounded Rationality

The imagined and the real: identifying the tensions for academic identity

Changes within the higher education sector have had significant effects on the identity of the individual academic. As institutions transform in response to government-driven policy and funding directives, there is a subsequent impact upon the roles and responsibilities of those employed as educational professionals. Academic practices are changing as multiple roles emerge from the reshaping of academic work. Institutional pressures to produce specific research outputs at the same time as teaching and undertaking managerial/administrative responsibilities are creating tension between what academics perceive as their professional identity and that prescribed by their employing organisation. Reconciling this disconnect is part of the challenge for academics, who are now seeking to understand and manage their changing identity. Narratives obtained from research in a university with a polytechnic background and an institute of technology (aspiring to be a university), provide some subjective reflections for examining this issue

Islands apart: leadership studies in two island states

School leadership is situated within a context of social and political factors that work to distribute power while also holding it in check. There are connections between how societal political structures facilitate democratic participation and the operation of schools. Educational leadership straddles the interface between proactive agency and the politics of social control. This tension between holding and using authority, yet acceding to political and social practice, is one which many school leaders face. Research studies conducted in two island nations, Jersey (Channel Islands) and Tonga (Pacific Islands), in different hemispheres of the world, illustrated contrasting forms of educational service and different challenges for school principals. As island communities, the context was clearly definable and provided a set of variables that were manifested through sector processes. The principals held pivotal roles that were molded by the contextual factors which shaped the delivery of educational practice. School principals in Jersey and Tonga illustrated how leadership is complicated if the purposes leadership should serve are unclear or contested (O'Brien, Murphy, and Draper 2003)

Multiplayer belief revision

One main topic of the epistemic program of game theory deals with the value of information. To study this question in a broad context, one needs to adapt some of the tools used in multiplayer epistemic logic. A hierarchical belief structure is introduced both in a syntactical and semantical framework. In the same framework, a generalized notion of message is characterized by its content and its status. For a given message, a multiplayer belief revision rule that transforms any initial belief structure into a final belief one is designed. A representation theorem relates syntactical axioms to the belief revision rule.Belief revision, message, epistemic logic.