Russian military capabilities after 20 years of reform

Despite widespread perceptions, Russia is close to having the military it needs

Why Russia is reviving its conventional military power

The revival of Russian military power poses certain challenges to NATO and to the West. However, the exact nature of these challenges is not straightforward. This article discusses why Russia is reviving its conventional military power and argues these developments are not limited to the intention of preparing for offensive action. NATO’s and the West’s policy responses to recent changes in Russian defense policy need to be based on a realistic and nuanced understanding of Russian motivations because ill-considered responses could have serious unintended consequences

Was the Russian Invasion of Ukraine a Failure of Western Deterrence?

In February 2022, many observers initially evaluated the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a failure of Western deterrence. That assessment was and is flawed inasmuch as the West never articulated a clear strategy to deter such an invasion. Engaging with relevant conceptual debates about how deterrence works and relating this information to what the West did and did not do in the run-up to the invasion, this article shows that deterrence efforts were based on problematic assumptions about the Kremlin’s motivations. The study concludes with lessons for Western military and policy practitioners with the intention to enable better future thinking about how to deter Russia

Russian responses to the changing character of war

For much of the post-Soviet era there was a widespread belief that improving capabilities required for dealing with local small wars and insurgencies was the central focus of Russian military reforms. As a result, Moscow's military assertiveness and return to geopolitical rivalries since 2014 came as a surprise to many in the West. The article argues that small wars were never the major focus of Russian military transformation and reforms. Tracing the country's experience of war and conflict regionally and internationally since the end of the Cold War, and the impact this had on Moscow's views on what kind of armed forces it required, the article shows that the Kremlin's military ambitions started to diverge dramatically from western expectations as early as the mid-1990s. Russia never really saw armed forces geared towards small and ‘new war’-type scenarios as sufficient for upholding its regional and international status ambitions. Moreover, the Kremlin's growing preoccupation with internal order and regime stability has increasingly reinforced the rhetoric of a hostile West, which is used to justify the increasing centralization of domestic politics. Russia's military revival has been long in the making and poses serious challenges to its neighbours and to the West

Russlands modernisiertes Militär: Die Lehren aus der Krim und aus Syrien

Die gesteigerten Fähigkeiten der russischen Streitkräfte haben Befürchtungen vor weiterer militärischer Aggression und Expansionismus ausgelöst. Allerdings bestehen weiterhin erhebliche Beschränkungen für Russlands Fähigkeit, seine militärische Stärke auf globaler Ebene zu projizieren oder einzusetzen. Bei der Abschätzung der Implikationen, die ein modernisiertes russisches Militär für die internationale Sicherheit hat, sollte sich die Aufmerksamkeit eher auf mögliche Absichten der russischen Führung hinsichtlich des Einsatzes von Gewalt richten, denn auf die militärische Stärke per se

Die Silowiki in der russischen Politik: Politische Strategie oder Produkt des Systems?

Die steigende Anzahl von Silowiki in der russischen Politik wird oft als politische Strategie Putins interpretiert. Im Rahmen des von Jelzin an Putin ‚vererbten‘ politischen Systems betrachtet, erscheint die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines koordinierten Silowikiprojekts jedoch gering

After ‘hybrid warfare’, what next? – Understanding and responding to contemporary Russia

Raportissa, ”Hybridisodan jälkeen – mitä seuraavaksi?”, korostetaan, ettei ole yksinkertaista vastausta tai käsitettä, kuten ”hybridisota”, jonka avulla voitaisiin arvioida Venäjän ulko-, turvallisuus ja puolustuspolitiikkaa sekä sen erilaisia syy- ja seuraussuhteita. Sen sijaan Venäjän vahvuudet ja heikkoudet tulisi analysoida erikseen. Projektin tutkijat esittävät raportissa oman tutkimusnäkemyksensä kokonaisuuksista, jotka esimerkiksi liittyvät propagandan käyttöön (informaatiosotaan) ja Venäjän yritykseen luoda itsestään kuvaa suurvaltana. Lisäksi tutkijat tarkastelevat, miten Venäjä yhdistää sotilaallista voimaa ja perinteistä armeijan käyttöä ulkopolitiikassa sekä Venäjän parantunutta kykyä koordinoida 2000-luvun sotaoperaatioita. Tutkijat pohtivat myös Venäjän sotilasmenojen tehottoman käytön pitkäaikaisvaikutuksia sekä pelotteen ja ehkäisevän toiminnan merkitystä Venäjän viimeaikaisten sotatoimien valossa