What do we know through improvisation?

In this paper, which is exploratory in character, I address the question of whether, how, and what we know through artistic improvisation. Has artistic improvisation a specific cognitive supply? Can this alleged cognitive supply contribute to the aesthetic merit of the performance? And how? In order to answer these questions I will first explain which is exactly the problem we face. Secondly, I will try to give some suggestions to solve this problem

Contemplating Music

La filosofia della musica \ue8 uno dei principali campi cui Jerrold Levinson ha dedicato la sua riflessione e anche in CA, cos\uec come in Music, Art and Metaphysics (MAM) e The Pleasures of Aesthetics (PA), all\u2019arte dei suoni \ue8 dedicata una specifica sezione che valorizza, accanto alla costituzione formale, i possibili contenuti della musica, emergenti in una contemplazione che \ue8 al contempo partecipazione attiva, di tipo sia emotivo sia riflessivo, da parte dell\u2019ascoltatore. I saggi \u2018musicali\u2019 di CA, le cui tesi Levinson ha pi\uf9 recentemente sviluppato in varie direzioni1, 1. approfondiscono la teoria dell\u2019espressivit\ue0 musicale gi\ue0 presentata in MAM e PA (la cosiddetta \u2018teoria della persona\u2019, TP), 2. la articolano in relazione ad aspetti particolari dell\u2019esperienza musicale (per es. la performance), e 3. ne esaminano il contributo per la comprensione della dimensione narrativa e drammatica della musica nonch\ue9, in generale 4., come elemento centrale del suo valore artistico. Qui mi concentrer\uf2 soprattutto sul punto 1., toccando poi pi\uf9 brevemente i punti 2., 3. e 4. Non muover\uf2 particolari critiche alle tesi qui argomentate da Levinson (eccettuata la proposta di un\u2019integrazione alla sua tesi sul valore intrinseco-esperienziale della musica), perch\ue9 a differenza di alcune posizioni di altri filosofi analitici della musica, e anche di alcuni orientamenti dello stesso Levinson rispetto all\u2019ontologia della musica (cui CA non offre particolari contributi), le condivido in larghissima misura. Piuttosto, presenter\uf2 quelli che mi sembrano i punti salienti della sezione musicale di CA, provando, in un caso, a difendere le proposte levinsoniane da alcune obiezioni

Body and Soul . . . and the Artifact: The Aesthetically Extended Self

By thinking on my personal (som)aesthetic experience as a would-be jazz saxophonist, I will argue that the relationship between musician and instrument can exemplify the “extended self” thesis in the artistic/aesthetic realm. As can happen with a human partner, a special affective relationship may arise between human being and instrument and, through repeated practice, the instrument can become an indispensable element of the aesthetic habits by virtue of which we interact with the environment, thus becoming part of the (extended) self. As I will suggest, this special bodily and affective relationship is due to the affordances offered by the instrumental partner and to the expressive experiences that this encounter makes possible. This affective relationship is one of the reasons behind the regret we feel for the destruction or loss of artifacts. Thanks to the assiduity of a somaesthetic relationship, it happens that these objects become extensions not only of the body but also of the mind or “soul.

Ontologie musicali

This special issue of "Aisthesis" explores the ways in which contemporary ontologies have helped to deepen our understanding of music in its various genres and forms of expression: oral, written, and phonographic. Besides investigating the evolution of the ontological status of musical objects in the light of the technological innovations occurred over the last century, the articles collected here investigate the relationship between ontology and aesthetics and address the question of the criteria for the identification and the evaluation of musical works, musical performances, and improvisations

\u201cMind the gap\u201d. L\u2019improvvisazione come agire intenzionale

n this paper I aim at discussing the following questions: is improvisation an intentional action? If it is an intentional action, in what sense is improvisation intentional? Can improvisation contribute to the understanding of intentional action? I will argue that improvisation is not a bizarre case of action or a weakened action, but an intentional action in the proper sense (provided with some specific properties). Moreover, improvisation exemplifies key features of intentional action as such