42 research outputs found

    Blair and Howard: Predominant Prime Ministers Compared

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    The Liaison Committee: taking evidence from the Prime Minister

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    The Liaison Committee was formally established in 1980, following the creation of departmental select committees in 1979. However, since 1967 select committee chairs had met to co-ordinate administrative matters. The Liaison Committee comprises all the chairs of select committees in the House of Commons. It considers matters relating to select committees and has administrative, advisory and co-ordinating roles. It advises House authorities on select committee matters; determines which select committees reports are debated; considers issues facing committees; reviews committee practice; and takes oral evidence from the Prime Minister

    The limits to prime ministerial autonomy: Cameron and the constraints of coalition

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    In heading up a coalition David Cameron has had to confront two unusual constraints that prevent him from being a dominant prime minister. The first constraint, something unfamiliar to previous prime ministers, is his having to work with and through a coalition partner firmly placed to the Conservatives’ left. The second constraint, equally problematic but more familiar, is that Cameron has faced a restive Conservative parliamentary party in which a sizable minority of Tory MPs remained unreconciled to his political agenda. These two interrelated constraints mean Cameron has lacked the freedom of manoeuvre enjoyed by most past prime ministers. Two aspects of Cameron’s premiership help cast light on his predicament: first, his relations with Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats and second, the nature of his dependency upon Conservative MPs. We look at these in turn and conclude by assessing Cameron’s effectiveness as prime minister

    Rebels leading London: the mayoralties of Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson compared

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    This article compares the mayoralties of the first two directly elected Mayors of London, Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson. The position offers a commanding electoral platform, but weak powers to lead a city regarded as ‘ungovernable’ (Travers 2004). The two mayors had some obvious points of comparison: both were party rebels, mavericks and skilled media operators. Both also used publicity to make up for weak powers, but courted controversy and faced charges of corruption and cronyism. Utilising Hambleton and Sweeting (2004), this article compares their mayoralties in terms of vision, leadership style and policies. Livingstone had a powerful vision that translated into clear policy aims while Johnson was more cautious, shaped by a desire for higher office. In terms of style, Livingstone built coalitions but proved divisive whereas Johnson retained remarkable levels of popularity. Where Livingstone bought experience and skill, Johnson delegated. In policy terms, the two mayors found themselves pushed by their institutional powers towards transport and planning while struggling with deeper issues such as housing. Livingstone introduced the radical congestion charge and a series of symbolic policies. Johnson was far more modest – championing cycling, the 2012 Olympics and avoiding difficult decisions. The two used their office to negotiate, but also challenge, central government. Livingstone’s rebel mayoralty was a platform for personalised change, Johnson’s one for personal ambition

    The shifting landscape of prime ministerial accountability to parliament: an analysis of Liaison Committee scrutiny sessions

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    Prime ministerial power is always contingent, based on the utilisation of personal and institutional resources, subject to various formal and informal constraints. Parliament is both a political resource to be utilised, but also a veto-player. In the absence of formal mechanisms setting out the requirements for UK prime ministerial accountability to parliament, a fluid and essentially personalised relationship has developed. Regular prime ministerial appearances before the House of Commons Liaison Committee, begun in 2002, have added to parliament’s scrutiny toolkit. This article considers the accountability of the prime minister to parliament by analysing the emergence and development of the Liaison Committee evidence sessions, and draws on interviews with participants and examination of the session transcripts, in order to assess the value of this scrutiny mechanism within the broader framework of prime ministerial-legislative relation

    The ‘Electoral Presidentialization’ of Silvio Berlusconi and Boris Johnson: chaos, controversy and lost chances

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    This article tests Poguntke and Webb’s (2005, 2013) theory of ‘electoral presidentialization’ through a comparison of Silvio Berlusconi and Boris Johnson. Johnson and Berlusconi were particular examples of ‘electoral presidentialization’, where dominance lies in power as an election ‘winner’ and ‘mediatised leader’. This is highly contingent and reliant on continuous validation; these two leaders failed to translate electoral ‘autonomy’ into concrete and lasting change. Utilising the three presidentialization ‘faces’ we identify three crucial weaknesses. First, their own electoral and mediatized focus created a pressure to permanently campaign and generate conflict, driving a ‘politics of spectacle’ that distracted from the politics of governing. Second, the centrality of their personality left them exposed to personal scrutiny, which increasingly focused on corruption, wrongdoing, and irregularities. Third, despite electoral command, their ‘presidentialized’ style rested on fragile party and coalition dynamics, leading to volatility and internal conflict

    Austerity, ageing and the financialisation of pensions policy in the UK

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    This article offers a detailed analysis of the recent history of pensions policy in the United Kingdom, culminating in two apparent ‘revolutions’ in policy now underway: the introduction of ‘automatic enrolment’ into private pensions, and proposals for a new ‘single-tier’ state pension. These reforms are considered exemplary of the ‘financialisation’ of UK welfare provision – typified in pensions policy by the notion that individuals must take personal responsibility for their own long-term financial security, and engage intimately with the financial services industry to do so. As such, the reforms represent the continuation of pensions policy between the Labour and coalition governments, despite the coalition government’s novel rhetorical commitment to austerity. In fact, the pensions revolutions will actually cost the state significantly more than current arrangements, yet the importance of fears about population ageing means that the government is both able to marshal the imagery of austerity to justify financialisation, but is also required to partly conceal the increased expenditure this requires. The article shows therefore how the financialisation agenda in pensions policy was evident before the financial crisis, but has evolved to both take advantage, and mitigate the constraints, of a post-crisis political climate

    Tony Blair and John Howard: comparative predominance and 'Institution Stretch' in the UK and Australia

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    It has recently been argued that the UK premier enjoys a level of executive power unavailable to US presidents, but how does he or she compare to another prime minister operating within a broadly similar system? Commonalities of intra-executive influence and capacity exist under the premierships in the UK and Australia. Discrete institutional constraints and deviations are evident, but trends and similarities in resource capacity can be clearly identified. These include: the growth of the leaders' office; broadening and centralising of policy advice and media operations; and strengthening of the role and function of ministerial advisers. I contend that this amounts to 'institution stretch', with new structures, processes and practices becoming embedded in the political system by the incumbents. © 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association

    Assessing the authority of political office-holders: the leadership capital index

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    This article argues that the extent to which political office-holders can effectively attain and wield authority is a function of the stock of ‘leadership capital.’ Drawing on the concept of political capital, we define leadership capital as aggregate authority composed of three dimensions: skills; relations; and reputation of a leader. Leadership capital ebbs and flows over time within a trajectory of acquisition, expenditure and inevitable depreciation. We present a Leadership Capital Index (LCI) that systematically maps out the three broad areas combining concrete measures with interpretive aspects. This can be used as a tool for systematically tracking and comparing the political fortunes of leaders in a way that is both more nuanced and robust than exclusive reliance on the latest approval ratings. We offer an illustrative case study of Tony Blair demonstrating the LCI. We conclude by discerning several promising paths for future development of the LCI
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