Is the State still in International Relations Theorising?

From 1945 to date, the state has been at the centre of debates in IR theorizing. While the anti-statist theorists had contested and are still contesting its centrality in IR theorizing, the unrepentant state-centric theorists even in the era of technological globalization still consider it, the fulcrum of IR. This paper in a discursive cum historical fashion, drawn mainly from secondary source, examined the nature of the debates in order to decipher its limit or limitlessness in comtemporary IR theorising. The paper, after a careful diagnosis of the concept of the state as well as undergoing the genealogical survey of state centrism in IR theorising, concludes that the state though is still the primary actor in IR but the empirical realities of the post WWII World have confirmed that it is no longer, what it used to be. Hence, it has limits in contemporary IR theorizing

Jonathan’s Constitutional Conference in Nigeria: A reflection and a radical critique

The process of bringing forth a constitution is as crucial and important as the constitution itself. However, while this ideal has been institutionalized in many liberal democracies, it is yet to be fully embraced in many illiberal countries. In Nigeria, the focus of this discourse, the process of constitution-making is as old as the country itself but such processes had always followed the same pattern: elite engineered, paternalistically-driven and above all, devoid of citizens’ imprints via a referendum. It is against this backdrop that this article, in a retrospective and analytical manner, examines and offers a democratic critique ofNigeria’s most recent attempt at Nigeria’s constitutional engineering, the Jonathan’s Constitutional Conference (JCC) of 2014. It observes that President Jonathan-initiated Constitutional Conference mimicked the paternalistic character of the previous attempts at constitution-making and as such the process is not markedly different from the old. It submits that as long as the state elites, acting on behalf of the hegemonic faction of the dominant class, continue to see constitution-making as their exclusive reserve and are always willing to defend even a bad constitution, the search for a people’s constitution would continue.Keywords: constitution, Nigerian state, referendum, hegemony, paternalism, Goodluck Jonatha

NIGÉRIA PÓS-AUTORITÁRIA: DEMOCRATIZANDO SOB CORRUPÇÃO GENERALIZADA

This article, adopting descriptive, historical and analytical methods of inquiry and using the post-authoritarian Nigeria as research backdrop, examines the contours and terrains of democratization processes, in Africa, under condition of pervasive corruption. It observes that democratic institutions, in Nigeria since the termination of the authoritarian order in 1999, have performed abysmally in checking the incidences of corruption contrary to the expectations in the donor community, based on the experiences of the advanced democracies, that democracy and its appurtenances once launched, could reduced the incidence of corruption. It notes and argues that this state of affairs is not unconnected to a non-autonomous and a prebendal state, which offers almost limitless opportunities for official corruption to thrive.   Este artigo, adotando métodos descritivos, históricos e analíticos de investigação e utilizando a Nigéria pós-autoritária como pano de fundo da investigação, examina os contornos e terrenos dos processos de democratização na África, sob condições de corrupção generalizada. Observa-se que as instituições democráticas na Nigéria, desde a cessação da ordem autoritária em 1999, têm tido um desempenho abismal na verificação dos casos de corrupção, contrariamente às expectativas da comunidade de doadores, com base nas experiências das democracias avançadas, de que a democracia e os seus apetrechos, uma vez lançados, poderiam reduzir a incidência da corrupção. Ele observa e argumenta que esta situação não está desligada de um Estado não autônomo e prebendal, que oferece oportunidades quase ilimitadas para que a corrupção oficial prospere

GRUPOS DE VIGILANTES E DE POLICIAMENTO EM UMA NIGÉRIA DEMOCRATIZADA: NAVEGANDO NO CONTEXTO E QUESTÕES

In the last few years, vigilante groups and other informal policing structures have assumed a greater role in the security architecture of many countries, especially those that exited from authoritarian order. In spite of this development, however, issues and concerns are constantly being raised about them regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing against the backdrop of their penchant for human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. It is against this background that this article examines the balance sheet of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria. Following an extensive review of extant literature on police, policing, vigilantism and vigilante groups, as well as relevant studies on vigilante groups in Nigeria, it observes and notes that unlike the practice in liberal democracies, where vigilante groups - in conduct and practice - conform to principles of rule of law and constitutionalism, the opposite is the case in a democratizing Nigeria. It argues and concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remain the instruments of intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them; the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of ‘anocracy’. Nos últimos anos, grupos de vigilantes e outras estruturas informais de policiamento assumiram um papel maior na arquitetura de segurança de muitos países, especialmente aqueles que saíram da ordem autoritária. Apesar deste desenvolvimento, no entanto, questões e preocupações são constantemente levantadas sobre se eles realmente poderiam ser agentes do policiamento democrático contra o pano de fundo de sua propensão para violações de direitos humanos e assassinatos extrajudiciais. É contra esse cenário que este artigo examina o balanço de grupos de vigilantes em uma Nigéria em democratização. Após uma extensa revisão da literatura existente sobre grupos policiais, de policiamento, de vigilantismo e grupos de vigilantes, bem como estudos relevantes sobre grupos vigilantes na Nigéria, observa-se que ao contrário da prática em democracias liberais, onde grupos de vigilantes, - em conduta e prática - , seguem os princípios do estado de direito e constitucionalismo, o oposto é o caso de uma Nigéria em democratização Argumenta-se e conclui-se que enquanto os grupos de vigilantes, como os estabelecimentos formais de policiamento, continuam sendo instrumentos de intimidação política de opositores políticos pelos políticos que os controlam; o terreno do vigilantismo continuaria a ser no reino da "anocracia"

Africa and Pax-Africana in The Age of Interventionism

This article, drawing data from library and online sources, examines and engages issues in Africa’s quest for pax-Africana in the age of interventionism. It notes that Africa’s quest for pax-Africana in the age of interventionism is undercut by many factors, chief among which is the dependency and weaknesses of African states which always predispose extra-African powers to intervene in matters that should exclusively be handled by Africans. It concludes that as long as Africa remains trapped in dependent relations and the climate of disunity persists among African statesmen, its quest for pax-Africana would remain daunting

Between the Rock and a Hard Place: The Africa Union and Democracy Promotion in Africa

While the Cold War lasted, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) never considered democracy promotion in member states as a priority. What mattered to the body was the safeguard of the sovereignties of member states? The globalization of the third democratic wave however, changed that as democracy promotion, courtesy of Donor’s aid agenda became a core objective of the OAU/AU. Deploying descriptive, historical, and analytical methods of inquiry with a focus on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG), this article assesses the extent of AU’s commitments to promoting democracy in Africa. Following an extensive review of conceptual literature on democracy, as well as relevant studies on OAU/AU’s democracy promotion initiatives in Africa, it notes that OAU/AU, no doubt, has robust normative frameworks for dealing with an unconstitutional change of government and other actions that could constitute a threat to the growth of democracy in Africa but in enforcing these frameworks, it is often stuck between a rock and a hard place. It suggests, among others, the strengthening of the enforcement mechanisms of the organization

The Protective Effect of Polyphenol - Rich Extract of Syzygium cumini Leaves on Cholinesterase and Brain Antioxidant Status in Alloxan - Induced Diabetic Rats

Syzygium cumini leaves are used locally especially in Nigeria for the treatment \ management of diabetes mellitus and Alzheimer’s disease. This study was designed to investigate the effects of polyphenols extracted from Syzygium cumini l eaves on the occurrence of oxidative stress in the brain of rats with diabetes, which can trigger Alzheimer’s disease by determining both in vitro and in vivo c holinesterase, the antioxidant defense system, and the extent of oxidative damage. The effect of polyphenols extracted from Syzygium cumini leaves was investigated on in vitro c holinesterase. Thereafter, the extract (400 mg/kg body weight) of both free and bound polyphenols was administered orally to alloxan - induced rats, and the effect were monitore d on in vivo c holinesterase, superoxide dismutase, catalase, glutathione peroxidase, reduced glutathione, lipid peroxidation and hydroperoxides. The extract demonstrated inhibitory effects against in vitro c holinesterase. A significant reduction in the c ho linesterase activities increased the activities of superoxide dismutase, catalase, glutathione peroxidase, and reduced glutathione. A reduction in lipid peroxidation and hydroperoxide concentrations was observed in the brain of diabetic rats treated with p olyphenols extracted from Syzygium cumini leaves. This study suggests that the polyphenols of Syzygium cumini leaves have anti - Alzheimer and antioxidant boosters, as well as antiperoxidative activities. Therefore, the plant is recommended for both diabetic and Alzheimer’s disease patients worldwid

Global burden of 288 causes of death and life expectancy decomposition in 204 countries and territories and 811 subnational locations, 1990–2021: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2021

Background Regular, detailed reporting on population health by underlying cause of death is fundamental for public health decision making. Cause-specific estimates of mortality and the subsequent effects on life expectancy worldwide are valuable metrics to gauge progress in reducing mortality rates. These estimates are particularly important following large-scale mortality spikes, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. When systematically analysed, mortality rates and life expectancy allow comparisons of the consequences of causes of death globally and over time, providing a nuanced understanding of the effect of these causes on global populations. Methods The Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2021 cause-of-death analysis estimated mortality and years of life lost (YLLs) from 288 causes of death by age-sex-location-year in 204 countries and territories and 811 subnational locations for each year from 1990 until 2021. The analysis used 56 604 data sources, including data from vital registration and verbal autopsy as well as surveys, censuses, surveillance systems, and cancer registries, among others. As with previous GBD rounds, cause-specific death rates for most causes were estimated using the Cause of Death Ensemble model—a modelling tool developed for GBD to assess the out-of-sample predictive validity of different statistical models and covariate permutations and combine those results to produce cause-specific mortality estimates—with alternative strategies adapted to model causes with insufficient data, substantial changes in reporting over the study period, or unusual epidemiology. YLLs were computed as the product of the number of deaths for each cause-age-sex-location-year and the standard life expectancy at each age. As part of the modelling process, uncertainty intervals (UIs) were generated using the 2·5th and 97·5th percentiles from a 1000-draw distribution for each metric. We decomposed life expectancy by cause of death, location, and year to show cause-specific effects on life expectancy from 1990 to 2021. We also used the coefficient of variation and the fraction of population affected by 90% of deaths to highlight concentrations of mortality. Findings are reported in counts and age-standardised rates. Methodological improvements for cause-of-death estimates in GBD 2021 include the expansion of under-5-years age group to include four new age groups, enhanced methods to account for stochastic variation of sparse data, and the inclusion of COVID-19 and other pandemic-related mortality—which includes excess mortality associated with the pandemic, excluding COVID-19, lower respiratory infections, measles, malaria, and pertussis. For this analysis, 199 new country-years of vital registration cause-of-death data, 5 country-years of surveillance data, 21 country-years of verbal autopsy data, and 94 country-years of other data types were added to those used in previous GBD rounds. Findings The leading causes of age-standardised deaths globally were the same in 2019 as they were in 1990; in descending order, these were, ischaemic heart disease, stroke, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and lower respiratory infections. In 2021, however, COVID-19 replaced stroke as the second-leading age-standardised cause of death, with 94·0 deaths (95% UI 89·2–100·0) per 100 000 population. The COVID-19 pandemic shifted the rankings of the leading five causes, lowering stroke to the third-leading and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease to the fourth-leading position. In 2021, the highest age-standardised death rates from COVID-19 occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (271·0 deaths [250·1–290·7] per 100 000 population) and Latin America and the Caribbean (195·4 deaths [182·1–211·4] per 100 000 population). The lowest age-standardised death rates from COVID-19 were in the high-income super-region (48·1 deaths [47·4–48·8] per 100 000 population) and southeast Asia, east Asia, and Oceania (23·2 deaths [16·3–37·2] per 100 000 population). Globally, life expectancy steadily improved between 1990 and 2019 for 18 of the 22 investigated causes. Decomposition of global and regional life expectancy showed the positive effect that reductions in deaths from enteric infections, lower respiratory infections, stroke, and neonatal deaths, among others have contributed to improved survival over the study period. However, a net reduction of 1·6 years occurred in global life expectancy between 2019 and 2021, primarily due to increased death rates from COVID-19 and other pandemic-related mortality. Life expectancy was highly variable between super-regions over the study period, with southeast Asia, east Asia, and Oceania gaining 8·3 years (6·7–9·9) overall, while having the smallest reduction in life expectancy due to COVID-19 (0·4 years). The largest reduction in life expectancy due to COVID-19 occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean (3·6 years). Additionally, 53 of the 288 causes of death were highly concentrated in locations with less than 50% of the global population as of 2021, and these causes of death became progressively more concentrated since 1990, when only 44 causes showed this pattern. The concentration phenomenon is discussed heuristically with respect to enteric and lower respiratory infections, malaria, HIV/AIDS, neonatal disorders, tuberculosis, and measles. Interpretation Long-standing gains in life expectancy and reductions in many of the leading causes of death have been disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, the adverse effects of which were spread unevenly among populations. Despite the pandemic, there has been continued progress in combatting several notable causes of death, leading to improved global life expectancy over the study period. Each of the seven GBD super-regions showed an overall improvement from 1990 and 2021, obscuring the negative effect in the years of the pandemic. Additionally, our findings regarding regional variation in causes of death driving increases in life expectancy hold clear policy utility. Analyses of shifting mortality trends reveal that several causes, once widespread globally, are now increasingly concentrated geographically. These changes in mortality concentration, alongside further investigation of changing risks, interventions, and relevant policy, present an important opportunity to deepen our understanding of mortality-reduction strategies. Examining patterns in mortality concentration might reveal areas where successful public health interventions have been implemented. Translating these successes to locations where certain causes of death remain entrenched can inform policies that work to improve life expectancy for people everywhere

Global fertility in 204 countries and territories, 1950–2021, with forecasts to 2100: a comprehensive demographic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2021

Background Accurate assessments of current and future fertility—including overall trends and changing population age structures across countries and regions—are essential to help plan for the profound social, economic, environmental, and geopolitical challenges that these changes will bring. Estimates and projections of fertility are necessary to inform policies involving resource and health-care needs, labour supply, education, gender equality, and family planning and support. The Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2021 produced up-to-date and comprehensive demographic assessments of key fertility indicators at global, regional, and national levels from 1950 to 2021 and forecast fertility metrics to 2100 based on a reference scenario and key policy-dependent alternative scenarios. Methods To estimate fertility indicators from 1950 to 2021, mixed-effects regression models and spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression were used to synthesise data from 8709 country-years of vital and sample registrations, 1455 surveys and censuses, and 150 other sources, and to generate age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) for 5-year age groups from age 10 years to 54 years. ASFRs were summed across age groups to produce estimates of total fertility rate (TFR). Livebirths were calculated by multiplying ASFR and age-specific female population, then summing across ages 10–54 years. To forecast future fertility up to 2100, our Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) forecasting model was based on projections of completed cohort fertility at age 50 years (CCF50; the average number of children born over time to females from a specified birth cohort), which yields more stable and accurate measures of fertility than directly modelling TFR. CCF50 was modelled using an ensemble approach in which three sub-models (with two, three, and four covariates variously consisting of female educational attainment, contraceptive met need, population density in habitable areas, and under-5 mortality) were given equal weights, and analyses were conducted utilising the MR-BRT (meta-regression—Bayesian, regularised, trimmed) tool. To capture time-series trends in CCF50 not explained by these covariates, we used a first-order autoregressive model on the residual term. CCF50 as a proportion of each 5-year ASFR was predicted using a linear mixed-effects model with fixed-effects covariates (female educational attainment and contraceptive met need) and random intercepts for geographical regions. Projected TFRs were then computed for each calendar year as the sum of single-year ASFRs across age groups. The reference forecast is our estimate of the most likely fertility future given the model, past fertility, forecasts of covariates, and historical relationships between covariates and fertility. We additionally produced forecasts for multiple alternative scenarios in each location: the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) for education is achieved by 2030; the contraceptive met need SDG is achieved by 2030; pro-natal policies are enacted to create supportive environments for those who give birth; and the previous three scenarios combined. Uncertainty from past data inputs and model estimation was propagated throughout analyses by taking 1000 draws for past and present fertility estimates and 500 draws for future forecasts from the estimated distribution for each metric, with 95% uncertainty intervals (UIs) given as the 2·5 and 97·5 percentiles of the draws. To evaluate the forecasting performance of our model and others, we computed skill values—a metric assessing gain in forecasting accuracy—by comparing predicted versus observed ASFRs from the past 15 years (2007–21). A positive skill metric indicates that the model being evaluated performs better than the baseline model (here, a simplified model holding 2007 values constant in the future), and a negative metric indicates that the evaluated model performs worse than baseline. Findings During the period from 1950 to 2021, global TFR more than halved, from 4·84 (95% UI 4·63–5·06) to 2·23 (2·09–2·38). Global annual livebirths peaked in 2016 at 142 million (95% UI 137–147), declining to 129 million (121–138) in 2021. Fertility rates declined in all countries and territories since 1950, with TFR remaining above 2·1—canonically considered replacement-level fertility—in 94 (46·1%) countries and territories in 2021. This included 44 of 46 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which was the super-region with the largest share of livebirths in 2021 (29·2% [28·7–29·6]). 47 countries and territories in which lowest estimated fertility between 1950 and 2021 was below replacement experienced one or more subsequent years with higher fertility; only three of these locations rebounded above replacement levels. Future fertility rates were projected to continue to decline worldwide, reaching a global TFR of 1·83 (1·59–2·08) in 2050 and 1·59 (1·25–1·96) in 2100 under the reference scenario. The number of countries and territories with fertility rates remaining above replacement was forecast to be 49 (24·0%) in 2050 and only six (2·9%) in 2100, with three of these six countries included in the 2021 World Bank-defined low-income group, all located in the GBD super-region of sub-Saharan Africa. The proportion of livebirths occurring in sub-Saharan Africa was forecast to increase to more than half of the world's livebirths in 2100, to 41·3% (39·6–43·1) in 2050 and 54·3% (47·1–59·5) in 2100. The share of livebirths was projected to decline between 2021 and 2100 in most of the six other super-regions—decreasing, for example, in south Asia from 24·8% (23·7–25·8) in 2021 to 16·7% (14·3–19·1) in 2050 and 7·1% (4·4–10·1) in 2100—but was forecast to increase modestly in the north Africa and Middle East and high-income super-regions. Forecast estimates for the alternative combined scenario suggest that meeting SDG targets for education and contraceptive met need, as well as implementing pro-natal policies, would result in global TFRs of 1·65 (1·40–1·92) in 2050 and 1·62 (1·35–1·95) in 2100. The forecasting skill metric values for the IHME model were positive across all age groups, indicating that the model is better than the constant prediction. Interpretation Fertility is declining globally, with rates in more than half of all countries and territories in 2021 below replacement level. Trends since 2000 show considerable heterogeneity in the steepness of declines, and only a small number of countries experienced even a slight fertility rebound after their lowest observed rate, with none reaching replacement level. Additionally, the distribution of livebirths across the globe is shifting, with a greater proportion occurring in the lowest-income countries. Future fertility rates will continue to decline worldwide and will remain low even under successful implementation of pro-natal policies. These changes will have far-reaching economic and societal consequences due to ageing populations and declining workforces in higher-income countries, combined with an increasing share of livebirths among the already poorest regions of the world

Global, regional, and national burden of disorders affecting the nervous system, 1990–2021: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2021

Background Disorders affecting the nervous system are diverse and include neurodevelopmental disorders, late-life neurodegeneration, and newly emergent conditions, such as cognitive impairment following COVID-19. Previous publications from the Global Burden of Disease, Injuries, and Risk Factor Study estimated the burden of 15 neurological conditions in 2015 and 2016, but these analyses did not include neurodevelopmental disorders, as defined by the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)-11, or a subset of cases of congenital, neonatal, and infectious conditions that cause neurological damage. Here, we estimate nervous system health loss caused by 37 unique conditions and their associated risk factors globally, regionally, and nationally from 1990 to 2021. Methods We estimated mortality, prevalence, years lived with disability (YLDs), years of life lost (YLLs), and disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs), with corresponding 95% uncertainty intervals (UIs), by age and sex in 204 countries and territories, from 1990 to 2021. We included morbidity and deaths due to neurological conditions, for which health loss is directly due to damage to the CNS or peripheral nervous system. We also isolated neurological health loss from conditions for which nervous system morbidity is a consequence, but not the primary feature, including a subset of congenital conditions (ie, chromosomal anomalies and congenital birth defects), neonatal conditions (ie, jaundice, preterm birth, and sepsis), infectious diseases (ie, COVID-19, cystic echinococcosis, malaria, syphilis, and Zika virus disease), and diabetic neuropathy. By conducting a sequela-level analysis of the health outcomes for these conditions, only cases where nervous system damage occurred were included, and YLDs were recalculated to isolate the non-fatal burden directly attributable to nervous system health loss. A comorbidity correction was used to calculate total prevalence of all conditions that affect the nervous system combined. Findings Globally, the 37 conditions affecting the nervous system were collectively ranked as the leading group cause of DALYs in 2021 (443 million, 95% UI 378–521), affecting 3·40 billion (3·20–3·62) individuals (43·1%, 40·5–45·9 of the global population); global DALY counts attributed to these conditions increased by 18·2% (8·7–26·7) between 1990 and 2021. Age-standardised rates of deaths per 100 000 people attributed to these conditions decreased from 1990 to 2021 by 33·6% (27·6–38·8), and age-standardised rates of DALYs attributed to these conditions decreased by 27·0% (21·5–32·4). Age-standardised prevalence was almost stable, with a change of 1·5% (0·7–2·4). The ten conditions with the highest age-standardised DALYs in 2021 were stroke, neonatal encephalopathy, migraine, Alzheimer's disease and other dementias, diabetic neuropathy, meningitis, epilepsy, neurological complications due to preterm birth, autism spectrum disorder, and nervous system cancer. Interpretation As the leading cause of overall disease burden in the world, with increasing global DALY counts, effective prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation strategies for disorders affecting the nervous system are needed. Funding Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation