Severity as a Priority Setting Criterion: Setting a Challenging Research Agenda

Priority setting in health care is ubiquitous and health authorities are increasingly recognising the need for priority setting guidelines to ensure efficient, fair, and equitable resource allocation. While cost-effectiveness concerns seem to dominate many policies, the tension between utilitarian and deontological concerns is salient to many, and various severity criteria appear to fill this gap. Severity, then, must be subjected to rigorous ethical and philosophical analysis. Here we first give a brief history of the path to today’s severity criteria in Norway and Sweden. The Scandinavian perspective on severity might be conducive to the international discussion, given its long-standing use as a priority setting criterion, despite having reached rather different conclusions so far. We then argue that severity can be viewed as a multidimensional concept, drawing on accounts of need, urgency, fairness, duty to save lives, and human dignity. Such concerns will often be relative to local mores, and the weighting placed on the various dimensions cannot be expected to be fixed. Thirdly, we present what we think are the most pertinent questions to answer about severity in order to facilitate decision making in the coming years of increased scarcity, and to further the understanding of underlying assumptions and values that go into these decisions. We conclude that severity is poorly understood, and that the topic needs substantial further inquiry; thus we hope this article may set a challenging and important research agenda

Cycle-network expansion plan in Oslo: Modeling costeffectiveness analysis and health equity impact

Physical inactivity is the leading cause of non-communicable diseases, and further research on the cost-effectiveness of interventions that target inactivity is warranted. Socioeconomic status is vital in this process. We aim to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of a cycle-network expansion plan in Oslo compared to the status quo by income quintiles. We applied a Markov model using a public payer perspective. Health outcomes were measured by quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained from the prevention of coronary heart disease, stroke, type 2 diabetes, and cancer. We measured equity impact by the concentration index and social welfare using the achievement index. We conducted sensitivity analyses. The intervention was generally more costly and more effective than the status quo. Incremental cost per QALY falls with income quintile, ranging from $10,098 in the richest quintile to$23,053 per QALY gained in the poorest quintile. The base-case intervention increased health inequality. However, a scenario targeting low-income quintiles reduced inequality and increased social welfare. In conclusion, the cycle-network expansion is likely to be cost-effective, but with equity concerns. If decision makers care about health inequalities, the disadvantaged groups could be targeted to produce more equitable and socially desirable outcomes instead of a uniform intervention across income quintiles.publishedVersio

Stroke Mimics on the Stroke Unit – Temporal trends 2008–2017 at a large Norwegian university hospital

Objectives: The objective was to quantify temporal trends in stroke mimics (SM) admissions relative to cerebrovascular accidents (CVA), incidence of hospitalized SMs and characterize the SM case-mix at a general hospital's stroke unit (SU). Materials & Methods: All SU admissions (n = 11240) of patients aged 15 or older to Haukeland University Hospital between 2008–2017 were prospectively included and categorized as CVA or SM. Logistic regression was used to estimate time trends in the proportion of SMs among the admissions. Poisson regression was used to estimate time trends in age- and sex-dependent SM incidence. Results: SMs were on average younger thaan CVA patients (68.3 vs. 71.4 years) and had a higher proportion of females (53.6% vs. 44.5%). The total proportion of SM admissions was 51.0%. There was an increasing time trend in the proportion of SM admissions, odds ratio 1.150 per year (p < 0.001), but this trend appears flattening, represented by a significant quadratic time-term, odds ratio 1.009 (p < 0.001). A higher SM proportion was also associated with the time period of a Mass Media Intervention (FAST campaign) in 2014. There was also an increasing trend in SM incidence, that remains after adjusting for age, sex, and population; also, for incidence the trend appears to be flattening. Conclusions: SMs account for approximately half of the SU admissions, and the proportion has been increasing. A FAST campaign appears to have temporarily increased the SM proportion. The age- and sex-dependent incidence of SM has been increasing but appears to flatten out.publishedVersio

Should we discount future health benefits? Pro et contra

Målet med denne artikkelen er å undersøke de viktigste argumentene for og imot diskontering av fremtidige helsegevinster. Et mer generelt spørsmål dreier seg om hvorvidt vi bør diskontere fremtidig velferd (eng. well-being). Vi begynner med en redegjørelse av hva diskontering er, og hvordan diskontering påvirker evaluering av helsetiltak. Deretter tar vi for oss de mest sentrale argumentene for og imot diskontering av fremtidige helsegevinster. Dette inkluderer velkjente argumenter som grensenytteargumentet, risikoargumentet, utsettelsesargumentet, konsistensargumentet og rene positive tidspreferanser. I tillegg drøfter vi to lite diskuterte argumenter, nemlig det instrumentelle argumentet og argumentet for fordelingsrettferdighet, samt en alternativ form for diskontering, nemlig diskontinuerlig diskontering. Vi konkluderer åpent og lar det være opp til deg som leser å reflektere videre omkring dette viktige spørsmålet.The aim of this article is to examine the arguments for and against the practice of discounting future health benefits. A more general question is whether we should discount future well-being. We begin with an exposition of what discounting means and how this method is used in the evaluation of health interventions. Next, we consider the most central arguments for and against discounting future health benefits. This includes well-known arguments such as the argument of diminishing marginal returns, the risk argument, the delay argument, the consistency argument, and discussions concerning pure positive time preferences. In addition, we discuss two less debated arguments, that is, the instrumental argument and the argument for distributive justice, as well as discontinuous discounting, as an alternative form of discounting. We conclude openly and leave it to you as a reader to reflect further on this important issue.publishedVersio

The Devils in the DALY: Prevailing Evaluative Assumptions

In recent years, it has become commonplace among the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study authors to regard the disability-adjusted life year (DALY) primarily as a descriptive health metric. During the first phase of the GBD (1990–1996), it was widely acknowledged that the DALY had built-in evaluative assumptions. However, from the publication of the 2010 GBD and onwards, two central evaluative practices—time discounting and age-weighting—have been omitted from the DALY model. After this substantial revision, the emerging view now appears to be that the DALY is primarily a descriptive measure. Our aim in this article is to argue that the DALY, despite changes, remains largely evaluative. Our analysis focuses on the understanding of the DALY by comparing the DALY as a measure of disease burden in the two most significant phases of GBD publications, from their beginning (1990–1996) to the most recent releases (2010–2017). We identify numerous assumptions underlying the DALY and group them as descriptive or evaluative. We conclude that while the DALY model arguably has become more descriptive, it remains, by necessity, largely evaluative.publishedVersio

Is COVID-19 severe? The Norwegian severity criterion for priority setting meets the pandemic

Koronapandemien har synliggjort nødvendigheten av prioriteringer i helsetjenesten vår. Helseprioriteringer i Norge skal gjøres etter de tre kriteriene nytte, ressurs og alvorlighetsgrad. Nytte- og ressurskriteriene utgjør til sammen et kostnadseffektivitetskriterium: Høyere prioritet tilfaller tiltak som skaper mye helse med få ressurser. Alvorlighetskriteriet innebærer at en mer alvorlig tilstand kan og skal prioriteres høyere enn kostnadseffektiviteten alene tilsier. I denne artikkelen undersøker vi det norske alvorlighetskriteriet for helseprioriteringer i møte med koronaepidemien i Norge. Vi beskriver utviklingen av alvorlighetskriteriet i den norske prioriteringsdiskursen. Videre diskuterer vi hvordan koronaepidemien fremhever uenigheter og tvetydigheter rundt begrepet «alvorlighet» hva gjelder dødsrisiko, komorbiditet og hastegrad. Vi drøfter også hvordan den norske pandemiberedskapen passer inn i dette landskapet og etterlyser en klarere forståelse av alvorlighet i skillet mellom behandling og forebygging av sykdom. Til sist drøfter vi om det norske alvorlighetskriteriet for helseprioriteringer også kan være relevant for prioriteringer utenfor helsevesenet.publishedVersio

Self-reported cognitive and psychiatric symptoms at 3 months predict single-item measures of fatigue and daytime sleep 12 months after ischemic stroke

Introduction: Post-stroke fatigue and increased need for daytime sleep are multidimensional and insufficiently understood sequelae. Our aim was to study the relationships of self-reported cognitive and psychiatric symptoms at 3 months with fatigue and daytime sleep at 12 months post-stroke. Methods: Ischemic stroke patients without reported history of dementia or depression completed postal surveys 3- and 12-months post-stroke. At 3 months, psychiatric symptoms were assessed with the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS), and self-reported changes in cognitive symptoms (concentration and memory) compared to pre-stroke were assessed using single-item measures. At 12 months, single-item questions about changes in self-reported difficulties sleeping at night, fatigue and daytime sleep were included. First, we studied whether self-reported cognitive and/or psychiatric symptoms at 3 months were associated with daytime sleep and fatigue at 12 months using multiple logistic regression. Second, we fitted 2 structural equation models (SEMs) predicting fatigue and 2 models predicting daytime sleep. We compared a model where only age, sex, stroke severity (National Institutes of Health Stroke Scale; NIHSS), and difficulties sleeping at night predicted fatigue and daytime sleep at 12 months to a model where mental distress (i.e., a latent variable built of cognitive and psychiatric symptoms) was included as an additional predictor of fatigue and daytime sleep at 12 months. Results: Of 156 patients (NIHSS within 24 hours after admission (mean ± SD) = 3.6 ± 4.3, age = 73.0 ± 10.8, 41% female) 37.9% reported increased daytime sleep and 50.0% fatigue at 12 months. Increased psychiatric symptoms and worsened cognitive symptoms were associated with fatigue and daytime sleep at 12 months, after controlling for NIHSS, age, sex, and difficulties sleeping at night. SEM models including mental distress as predictor showed adequate model fit across 3 fit measures (highest RMSEA = 0.063, lowest CFI and TLI, both 0.975). Models without mental distress were not supported. Conclusion: Self-reported cognitive and psychiatric symptoms at 3 months predict increased daytime sleep and fatigue at 12 months. This highlights the relevance of monitoring cognitive and psychiatric symptoms in the subacute phase post-stroke. However, future research using validated measures of self-reported symptoms are needed to further explore these relationships.publishedVersio

Abort og fosterreduksjon: En etisk sammenligning

De siste årene har fosterreduksjon i økende grad vært gjenstand for debatt i Norge, og intensiteten nådde et foreløpig maksimum da Lovavdelingen leverte tolknings-uttalelsen § 2 - Tolkning av abortloven i 2016 som svar på at Helse- og omsorgs-departementet (i 2014) ba Lovavdelingen om å vurdere hvorvidt Lov om svangers-kapsavbrudd åpner for fosterreduksjon av friske fostre ved flerlings-vangerskap. Lovavdelingen konkluderte med at abortloven åpner for fosterreduksjon ved flerlingsvangerskap innenfor de rammene som loven ellers oppstiller. Debatten har ikke stilnet, og utover høsten 2018 ble den ytterligere tilspisset i forbindelse med KrFs veivalg og signaler fra Høyre om å vurdere å fjerne § 2.3c, samt å forby fosterreduksjon. Mange av argumentene i fosterreduksjonsdebatten fremstår tilsynelatende like de argumentene som verserer i abortdebatten, og det mangler en analyse av hva som stiller seg annerledes ved fosterreduksjon. Målet med denne artikkelen er følgelig å undersøke hvorvidt det finnes en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom abort og fosterreduksjon av friske fostre. Vi tar for oss typiske argumenter fra den norske debatten, og belyser dem med fagartikler fra forskningslitteraturen. De mest sentrale argumentene mot fosterreduksjon har vi identifisert som skadeargumentet, skråplansargumentet, intensjonsargumentet, sorgargumentet, psykologiske langtids-effekter for kvinnen og sorteringsargumentet. Vi kommer frem til at motargumentene ikke holder mål hva gjelder å påvise en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom abort og fosterreduksjon av friske fostre. Konklusjonen vår er derfor at det – på tross av hva flere debattanter synes å mene - ikke finnes en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom de to. Når vi derfor tillater abort, så bør vi også tillate fosterreduksjon. Nøkkelord: Abort, etikk, fosterreduksjon, medisinsk etikk, selektiv fosterreduksjon   English summary: Abortion and multifetal pregnancy reduction: An ethical comparison  During recent years, multifetal pregnancy reduction has increasingly been subject to debate in Norway, and this debate reached an apex when the Legislation Department delivered the interpretation statement § 2 - Interpretation of the Abortion Act in 2016 in response to the Ministry of Health and Care Services, who had (in 2014) requested the Legislation Department to assess whether the Abortion Act allowed for multifetal pregnancy reductions of healthy fetuses. The Legislation Department concluded that the Abortion Act does regulate and permit multifetal pregnancy reductions within the framework that the law otherwise stipulates. The debate has not subsided, and in the autumn of 2018, it was further intensified in connection with the Norwegian Christian Democratic Party´s (KrF) "crossroads choice" and the signals from the Norwegian Conservative Party that they would consider reverting the Abortion Act’s section 2.3c [regulating second trimester abortions due to fetal anomalies], as well as a ban on multifetal pregnancy reduction. Many of the arguments in the multifetal pregnancy reduction debate appear very similar to the arguments pending in the general abortion debate, and an analysis of what makes multifetal pregnancy reduction significantly different from abortion is wanting. The aim of this article is, accordingly, to investigate to what extent there is a morally relevant distinction between abortion and multifetal pregnancy reduction of healthy fetuses. We take on board typical arguments from the Norwegian debate and consider them in light of the scholarly literature. We have identified the most central arguments against multifetal pregnancy reduction as the harm argument, the slippery slope argument, the intent argument, the grief argument, the regret argument (concerning long-term psychological effects for the woman), and the sorting argument. We argue that these counter-arguments do not succeed in establishing a morally relevant difference between abortion and multifetal pregnancy reduction of healthy fetuses. Our conclusion is, therefore – that despite what is often held – there is no morally significant difference between the two. Therefore, when we allow abortion, we should also allow multifetal pregnancy reductions. Keywords: Abortion, ethics, fetal reduction, medical ethics, multifetal pregnancy reductio

Shot noise from action correlations

We consider universal shot noise in ballistic chaotic cavities from a semiclassical point of view and show that it is due to action correlations within certain groups of classical trajectories. Using quantum graphs as a model system we sum these trajectories analytically and find agreement with random-matrix theory. Unlike all action correlations which have been considered before, the correlations relevant for shot noise involve four trajectories and do not depend on the presence of any symmetry.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures (a mistake in version 1 has been corrected