Representing the effects of oligopolistic competition on risk-neutral prices in power markets

Forward transactions are becoming increasingly important in most of electricity markets. In this view, this paper develops a methodology able to capture the complexities of power markets and incorporate them into the framework of risk-neutral probabilities. This is done by the statement of a model that split up the power price dynamics into two different components: on the one hand, a component aimed at representing costs and market power, which will be based on a static, non-cooperative game; on the other,a component representing short-term deviations from the static model

A fundamental power price model with oligopolistic competition representation

Most popular approaches for modeling electricity prices rely at present on microeconomics rationale. They aim to study the interaction between decisions of agents in the market, and usually represent the impact of uncertainty in such decisions in a simplified way. The usual methodology of microeconomics models is the study of the interaction between the profit-maximization problems faced by each of the firms. On the other hand, there is a growing literature that describes the power price dynamics from the financial standpoint, through the statement of a more or less complex stochastic process. However, this theoretical framework is based on the assumption of perfect competition, and therefore the stochastic process may not capture important features of price dynamics. In this paper, we suggest a mixed approach, in the sense that the price is thought of as the composition of a long-term component, where the strategic behavior is represented, and a short-term source of uncertainty that agents cannot take into account when deciding their strategies. The complex distributional implications of the oligopolistic behavior of market players are then given by the long-term-component dynamics, whereas the short-term component captures the uncertainty related to the operation of power systems. In addition, this modeling approach allows for a direct description of the long-term volatility of power markets, which is usually hard to estimate through statistical models

A fundamental power price model with oligopolistic competition representation

Most popular approaches for modeling electricity prices rely at present on microeconomics rationale. They aim to study the interaction between decisions of agents in the market, and usually represent the impact of uncertainty in such decisions in a simplified way. The usual methodology of microeconomics models is the study of the interaction between the profit-maximization problems faced by each of the firms. On the other hand, there is a growing literature that describes the power price dynamics from the financial standpoint, through the statement of a more or less complex stochastic process. However, this theoretical framework is based on the assumption of perfect competition, and therefore the stochastic process may not capture important features of price dynamics. In this paper, we suggest a mixed approach, in the sense that the price is thought of as the composition of a long-term component, where the strategic behavior is represented, and a short-term source of uncertainty that agents cannot take into account when deciding their strategies. The complex distributional implications of the oligopolistic behavior of market players are then given by the long-term-component dynamics, whereas the short-term component captures the uncertainty related to the operation of power systems. In addition, this modeling approach allows for a direct description of the long-term volatility of power markets, which is usually hard to estimate through statistical models

Representing the effects of oligopolistic competition on risk-neutral prices in power markets

Forward transactions are becoming increasingly important in most of electricity markets. In this view, this paper develops a methodology able to capture the complexities of power markets and incorporate them into the framework of risk-neutral probabilities. This is done by the statement of a model that split up the power price dynamics into two different components: on the one hand, a component aimed at representing costs and market power, which will be based on a static, non-cooperative game; on the other,a component representing short-term deviations from the static model

Short-term evolution of forward curves and volatility in illiquid power market

We propose in this paper a model for the description of electricity spot prices, which we use to describe the dynamics of forward curves. The spot price model is based on a long-term/short-term decomposition, where the price is thought of as made up of two factors: A long-term equilibrium level and short-term movements around the equilibrium. We use a non-parametric approach to model the equilibrium level of power prices, and a mean-reverting process with GARCH volatility to describe the dynamics of the short-term component. Then, the model is used to derive the expression of the short-term dynamics of the forward curve implicit in spot prices. The rationale for the approach is that information concerning forward prices is not available in most of power markets, and the direct modeling of the forward curve is a difficult task. Moreover, power derivatives are typically written on forward contracts, and usually based on average prices of forward contracts. Then, it is difficult to obtain analytical expressions for the forward curves. The model of forward prices allows for the valuation of power derivatives, as well as the calculation of the volatilities and correlations required in risk management activities. Finally, the methodology is proven in the context of the Spanish wholesale marke

Short-term evolution of forward curves and volatility in illiquid power markets

We propose in this paper a model for the description of electricity spot prices, which we use to describe the dynamics of forward curves. The spot price model is based on a long-term/short-term decomposition, where the price is thought of as made up of two factors: A long-term equilibrium level and short-term movements around the equilibrium. We use a non-parametric approach to model the equilibrium level of power prices, and a mean-reverting process with GARCH volatility to describe the dynamics of the short-term component. Then, the model is used to derive the expression of the short-term dynamics of the forward curve implicit in spot prices. The rationale for the approach is that information concerning forward prices is not available in most of power markets, and the direct modeling of the forward curve is a difficult task. Moreover, power derivatives are typically written on forward contracts, and usually based on average prices of forward contracts. Then, it is difficult to obtain analytical expressions for the forward curves. The model of forward prices allows for the valuation of power derivatives, as well as the calculation of the volatilities and correlations required in risk management activities. Finally, the methodology is proven in the context of the Spanish wholesale marke

Tumor burden monitoring using cell-free tumor DNA could be limited by tumor heterogeneity in advanced breast cancer and should be evaluated together with radiographic imaging

Clinical and pathological variables. (XLSX 16 kb

Ethics Of English On Business Presentation

Business presentation is needed by persons to inform or persuade audience about certain topics. Through the presentation, information are clearly received by audience. So it needs many aspects to do, such as chronological order of presentation; clear language; good attitude and behavior; and polite ethics. Ethics is the standards one uses to determine right from wrong in terms of thought and behavior. It is one of major components of successful presentation. To do that, ones could adopt ethics from their own culture or culture where they are right now, i.e. in abroad. This paper here intends to show ethic of English business presentation and ethic of presentation to public in order to persuade audience to use the product/ program. It means that it is not to use on presentation of national or International seminar because the rule is not so detailed and complicated The business presentation based on the result of research and good communication is necessary to present objective information, therefore public will get clear and objective understanding. In fact, showing strengths on the own products and showing the weaknesses of others are prohibited to save the existence of brands

El Comité Científico Nacional de Arte Rupestre de ICOMOS-España

En enero de 2021 se constituyó el Comité Científico Nacional de Arte Rupestre de ICOMOS-España (CCNAR ICOMOS-España) como un grupo de miembros expertos en estas manifestaciones culturales con el objeto de dinamizar una reflexión rigurosa sobre la gestión de estos bienes culturales   desde los principios emanados de las cartas y convenios internacionales para la gestión del patrimonio cultural. La creación de este Comité Científico Nacional de Arte Rupestre deriva de los objetivos del plan estratégico 2018-2021 del Comité Nacional de ICOMOS-España, que pretende agrupar a sus expertos en grupos de trabajo temáticos para profundizar en los fines de la institución: la identificación, el conocimiento, la documentación, la conservación, la protección, la gestión y la difusión del patrimonio cultural, en este caso en el ámbito español. Ello no supone una restricción local de la institución internacional, bien al contrario, busca reproducir un organigrama reflejo de los Comités Científicos Internacionales con los que se pretende interactuar y establecer una acción coordinada