Extending the Bounded Rationality Model: The Distributed Cognition Approach

The way Simon, and the major part of the scholars, presented and used bounded rationality directly refers to human computational capabilities (or “brute-force”). Despite its broad powers of explanation, some problems arise when taking into account the way the human cognitive system really works. In order to avoid these problems, we present an alternative model of rationality, where computation plays only a part, together with the implemented role of external resources, emotional and other non-strictly-rational variables.bounded rationality, distributed cognition, external resources, decision-making, problem solving, emotions

Docility and “through doing” morality: An alternative approach to ethics

In this paper, we aim at presenting the distributed morality approach as it can be described by the docility model of social interactions. The proposition “morality is a matter of social interaction” constitutes our starting point. We aim at pointing out the ways through which individuals create moral alternatives to a given situation. The paper is dedicated to presenting morality as something connected to human cognition. We introduce a “manipulative” way of thinking about morality, and we argue that it is “distributed” through things, animals, computers, and other human beings (section I); furthermore, the idea of a type of “through doing” morality comes up. Then, we find that this model supports an alternative view of the socio-economic system and, therefore, we suggest that the docility model (section II, as amended from Simon’s original model 1990; 1993), fits the case. The field of business ethics exempts useful insights from research on this issue. Recent studies on moral thinking and moral imagination seem to support this research project.cognition, distributed morality, docility, social interactions, socioeconomic system

A phronetic approach to educational design-based research: Issues and aspirations

This paper is a theoretical attempt to show how the Aristotelian notion of phronesis may provide a fruitful viewpoint to trigger and animate a series of discussions on educational design-based research. In particular, we focus on the overall meaning that the notions of intervention and theory can acquire. What concerns the former, phronesis helps avoid interpreting intervention as the making of an object, be it a learning environment, an application, a piece of software. Conversely, it posits that intervention can be fruitfully located within teachers’ professional judgment. The specific focus on professional judgment helps point to a different conception of “theory”, which does not revolve around the development of generalized principles informing the practice. Conversely, theory can be viewed as the effort to articulate teachers’ experiences in the form of stories “from the field”. &nbsp

La moralidad de las tecnologías cotidianas

Our aim in this paper is to show how various new technologies (i.e. computers) play a crucial role in dealing with moral cognition. Following the idea of distributed morality introduced by Magnani, we illustrate the reasons why everyday technologies are not external to the context in which they operate, but they modify our capacity of coping with all those situations that involve some moral concern. An alternative view of moral agency is thus argued. Accordingly, artefacts are not only surrogate agents, but they redefine the boundaries of human moral agency that is continuously shaped by the interplay between an individual and his/her environment.Nuestro propósito en este artículo será mostrar cómo algunas nuevas tecnologías (como por ejemplo los ordenadores) juegan un papel crucial en la cognición moral. Siguiendo la idea de moralidad distribuida de Magnani, ilustraremos las razones por las que las tecnologías cotidianas no son externas al contexto en el que operan, sino que por el contrario modifican nuestra capacidad de hacer frente a las situaciones que implican algún tipo de dilema moral. Sostendremos, por tanto, una visión alternativa de la agencia moral. De acuerdo con esta, los artefactos no son simplemente agentes delegados, sino que redefinen los límites de la agencia moral humana que continuamente es moldeada por la interacción entre un individuo y su ambiente

The Internet as a Moral Mediator. The Quest for Democracy

Recently the impressive growth of the Web, and the Internet in general, has been considered as a promise that may both challenge and boost our representation of democratic institutions. It is well known that modern democracies are based on the possibility to control and even replace who rules by the force of the best arguments. More generally, the control of the government, and the effectiveness of democracy, is possible, if the citizens can access information. Hence, the promise of the Internet mainly relies on the fact that people may more freely access information, because it seems it cannot be controlled or manipulated by the political power. In the first part of this outline we will depict a cognitive framework to deal with the relationships between Internet and democracy. We shall show that Internet, as an information technology, can be considered as a cognitive and moral mediator; it can provide stories, texts, images, combined with sounds, so that the information fosters not only a cognitive, but also an emotional and moral understanding. In this sense, the Internet represents a kind of redistribution of the moral effort through managing objects and information to overcome the poverty and the unsatisfactory character of the options available. In the last part we will illustrate that Internet, as a moral mediator, may enhance democracy in two respects. First, it affords civic engagement and participation; second, it allows people to face different sources of information so that almost everyone can verify and test the information delivered by traditional media

On the quest for defining organisational plasticity: a community modelling experiment

Purpose: This viewpoint article is concerned with an attempt to advance organisational plasticity (OP) modelling concepts by using a novel community modelling framework (PhiloLab) from the social simulation community to drive the process of idea generation. In addition, the authors want to feed back their experience with PhiloLab as they believe that this way of idea generation could also be of interest to the wider evidence-based human resource management (EBHRM) community. Design/methodology/approach: The authors used some workshop sessions to brainstorm new conceptual ideas in a structured and efficient way with a multidisciplinary group of 14 (mainly academic) participants using PhiloLab. This is a tool from the social simulation community, which stimulates and formally supports discussions about philosophical questions of future societal models by means of developing conceptual agent-based simulation models. This was followed by an analysis of the qualitative data gathered during the PhiloLab sessions, feeding into the definition of a set of primary axioms of a plastic organisation. Findings: The PhiloLab experiment helped with defining a set of primary axioms of a plastic organisation, which are presented in this viewpoint article. The results indicated that the problem was rather complex, but it also showed good potential for an agent-based simulation model to tackle some of the key issues related to OP. The experiment also showed that PhiloLab was very useful in terms of knowledge and idea gathering. Originality/value: Through information gathering and open debates on how to create an agent-based simulation model of a plastic organisation, the authors could identify some of the characteristics of OP and start structuring some of the parameters for a computational simulation. With the outcome of the PhiloLab experiment, the authors are paving the way towards future exploratory computational simulation studies of OP

La moralidad de las tecnologías cotidianas

Our aim in this paper is to show how various new technologies (i.e. computers) play a crucial role in dealing with moral cognition. Following the idea of distributed morality introduced by Magnani, we illustrate the reasons why everyday technologies are not external to the context in which they operate, but they modify our capacity of coping with all those situations that involve some moral concern. An alternative view of moral agency is thus argued. Accordingly, artefacts are not only <i>surrogate agents</i>, but they redefine the <i>boundaries</i> of human moral agency that is continuously shaped by the interplay between an individual and his/her environment.<br><br>Nuestro propósito en este artículo será mostrar cómo algunas nuevas tecnologías (como por ejemplo los ordenadores) juegan un papel crucial en la cognición moral. Siguiendo la idea de moralidad distribuida de Magnani, ilustraremos las razones por las que las tecnologías cotidianas no son externas al contexto en el que operan, sino que por el contrario modifican nuestra capacidad de hacer frente a las situaciones que implican algún tipo de dilema moral. Sostendremos, por tanto, una visión alternativa de la agencia moral. De acuerdo con esta, los artefactos no son simplemente <i>agentes delegados</i>, sino que redefinen los <i>límites</i> de la agencia moral humana que continuamente es moldeada por la interacción entre un individuo y su ambiente

Sharing Representations Through Cognitive Niche Construction

As a matter of fact, humans continuously delegate and distribute cognitive functions to the environment to lessen their limits. They build models, representations, and other various mediating structures that are thought to be good constructions. In doing this, humans are engaged in a process of cognitive niche construction. More precisely, we argue that a cognitive niche emerges from a network of continuous interplay between individuals and environment, in which people alter and modify the environment by mimetically externalizing fleeting thoughts, private ideas, etc., into external supports. This can turn out to be useful, especially for all those situations that require information transmission, shared knowledge, and more generally, cognitive resources