The Future European Constitution: The Polish Point of View

The author presents the Polish point of view on the controversy surrounding the decision-making process by a qualified majority in the future European Constitution. At the European Council’s session of 25/26 March of this year real prospects of achieving a compromise on the text of the Constitutional Treaty finally became evident. The Council emphasised that ‘agreement on the Constitutional Treaty should be reached no later than the June European Council’. This statement referred to the Irish Presidency’s opinion that there was a real possibility of reaching a compromise on decision-making by a qualified majority, ‘based on the principle of double majority’, which ‘must allow for greater efficiency in the decision making process than the provisions in the current Treaties, and must have due regard to balance among all member States and to their specific concerns’. In reference to other complex issues, such as the size and composition of the Commission, the scope for qualified majority voting and minimum seat thresholds in the European Parliament, the Irish Presidency considered that an overall solution could be found ‘if there is sufficient political will and flexibility’

Europa à la carte: Konsolidacja czy fragmentacja Unii Europejskiej?

On principle, the member countries of the European Union belong to different decision circles. Nowadays, belonging to the euro zone is becoming of a great importance, due to the fact that over the last few months the decision-making process in the issues most vital for the Union has moved to this group. The countries considering joining this group (e.g. Poland) should take into consideration not only the fulfilment of the economic convergent criteria the basic premise), but also the political aspect: it will be difficult for a country not belonging to the euro zone to build a strong position in the European Union decision-making process. Among various discussed options considering the euro zone in connection with the current economic crisis, the most realistic is the alternative of further existence of the zone but in a different form: the change will consider both the mechanisms of the zone functioning and its scope. The mechanisms accepted by the European Union within the framework of combating the euro zone crisis (the Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism, the Europlus Pact, the Treaty on Fiscal Union) indicate the basic dilemma which the European integration is confronted with: these actions may contribute to the consolidation of the Union and the strengthening of its position, but they may also initiate the process of its fragmentation. Irrespectively of this problem, the current situation resembles the old concept of Europe à la carte, according to which each member state would be able to choose from the European menu the areas which suit them most. However, the difference might be that the status of countries in the European decision-making process will be unalike

Europejska polityka bezpieczeństwa i integracji

Praca recenzowana / peer-reviewed pape

Europe à la carte: Consolidation or fragmentation of the European Union

On principle, the member countries of the European Union belong to different decision circles. Nowadays, belonging to the euro zone is becoming of a great importance, due to the fact that over the last few months the decision-making process in the issues most vital for the Union has moved to this group. The countries considering joining this group (e.g. Poland) should take into consideration not only the fulfilment of the economic convergent criteria the basic premise), but also the political aspect: it will be difficult for a country not belonging to the euro zone to build a strong position in the European Union decision-making process. Among various discussed options considering the euro zone in connection with the current economic crisis, the most realistic is the alternative of further existence of the zone but in a different form: the change will consider both the mechanisms of the zone functioning and its scope. The mechanisms accepted by the European Union within the framework of combating the euro zone crisis (the Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism, the Europlus Pact, the Treaty on Fiscal Union) indicate the basic dilemma which the European integration is confronted with: these actions may contribute to the consolidation of the Union and the strengthening of its position, but they may also initiate the process of its fragmentation. Irrespectively of this problem, the current situation resembles the old concept of Europe à la carte, according to which each member state would be able to choose from the European menu the areas which suit them most. However, the difference might be that the status of countries in the European decision-making process will be unalike

AN EFFICIENT STATE AND EU MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS Amendments in the Polish Constitution 1997 arising from Poland’s membership in the European Union

Accession to the European Union is for each state a substantial challenge of its political system. In order to satisfy its obligations arising from EU membership, and in particular in order to participate actively in the Community’s decision making process, the State must harmonise its system of government and its state system. This requirement is also true for Poland, even though the Polish Constitution of 1997 is a modern solution that establishes a solid and sound foundation for Poland’s participation in an international forum, and in the processes of European integration. And yet, already prior to Poland’s accession, it had been recognised that certain approximations of the Constitutional provisions would be needed. Today, two years after the accession, the postulated amendments of the Constitution are classified as those which are necessary (arising out of the State’s undertaking to transpose, or incorporate into the State’s legal system of the European Arrest Warrant), amendments that are very desirable (such as abolition of the requirement of a 50% participation of entitled voters in a referendum on the ratification of revision agreements amending the TEU, creation of grounds for the issue of executive orders, or of constitutional grounds for the electoral law compatible with the EU requirements) and the desirable (recommended) amendments (that would strengthen Parliament - government collaboration in matters related to the EU membership). However, the internal political situation in Poland has rendered implementation of those amendments impossible. If this situation continues, its consequences shall be not only infringement of the Community laws but also a much lower role that Poland will play in the Community’s decision making process in the future

CONSOLIDATION OF THE EUROGROUP: STRENGTHENING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EFFICIENCY OR A THREAT OF ITS FRAGMENTATION? LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

Podczas spotkania w dniach 24-25 marca 2011 r. Rada Europejska podjęła istotne decyzje nakierowane na przezwyciężenie kryzysu finansowego, zwłaszcza zaś na zapewnienie stabilności strefy euro jako całości, zachowanie stabilności finansowej oraz uzyskanie wzrostu gospodarczego w Unii Europejskiej. Podjęte decyzje, szczególnie w sprawie ustanowienia „Paktu euro plus” i Europejskiego Mechanizmu Stabilizacji (EMS) bez wątpienia konsolidują strefę euro, a tym samym nastawione są na umocnienie Unii Europejskiej (euro bowiem „jest i pozostanie jednym z najważniejszych elementów integracji europejskiej” – tak szefowie państw lub rządów w Konkluzjach ze spotkania w grudniu 2010 r.). Niemniej jednak ich konsekwencją jest stworzenie nowych – obok kryteriów konwergencyjnych − przesłanek włączenia się do strefy euro państw członkowskich UE, które dotychczas poza tą strefą pozostają. Z formalnego punktu widzenia EMS skonstruowany będzie w takiej formule, która umożliwi – w razie trudności przy ustanowieniu Mechanizmu (zwłaszcza gdyby wystąpiły one po stronie państw nie należących do strefy euro, na przykład przy zatwierdzaniu decyzji uzupełniającej art. 146 TFUE) – powołanie EMS jedynie w ramach państw strefy euro. Byłoby to ponowne sięgnięcie do tak zwanej metody schengeńskiej, niebezpiecznej dla spójności Unii: może ona bowiem prowadzić do fragmentacji Unii, a w każdym razie wyobcowania z jej „twardego jądra”, w najlepszym zaś skutkuje ona pominięciem w procesie decyzyjnym instytucji unijnych i pozostałych (poza grupą) państw członkowskich. Przesłanie płynące z przyjętych uzgodnień w sprawie „Paktu euro plus” i EMS jest stosunkowo jednoznaczne: albo państwa członkowskie przeprowadzą programy konsolidacyjne nastawione na umocnienie stabilności finansowej i dyscypliny budżetowej oraz radykalne podniesienie konkurencyjności, dopełniając w ten sposób reformę ustrojową przeprowadzoną na mocy Traktatu z Lizbony i nakierowaną na umocnienie spójności Unii Europejskiej jako całości, albo nastąpi dalsza konsolidacja państw najbardziej wydolnych (skupionych w Eurogrupie), prowadząca do istotnego zróżnicowania w ramach Unii. Obie opcje w obecnej chwili są jeszcze otwarte.*The European Council meeting on 24-25 March 2011 ended with a number of important decisions directed towards overcoming the financial crisis, and, in particular, ensuring the stability of the euro area as a whole, and maintaining economic growth and financial stability within the EU. Those decisions, especially regarding the ‘‘Euro plus pact’’ and the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM), undoubtedly consolidate the euro area and strengthen the European Union (it was concluded that the euro is and shall remain one of the most important elements of European integration). What flows from the above decisions are new reasons for Member states, apart from the existing convergence criteria, for joining the euro zone. The envisaged structure of the EMS makes it possible for it to be established, at least formally, only within the existing euro area, if, for some reason, the non-euro zone members could not join in. This, however, would mean a return to so-called ‘‘Schengen method’’, be dangerous to the EU integrity, and could lead to the fragmentation of the Union. The conclusions agreed with regard the ‘‘Euro plus pact’’ and the EMS are therefore rather univocal: either the Member states implement consolidation programmes aimed at strengthening their financial stability and budget discipline to increase competitiveness (completing in this way the reforms of their regimes as required by the Lisbon Treaty), which will consequently strengthen the European Union as a whole, or the most efficient Member states – already members of the euro-zone consolidate further, which will result in a considerable differentiation within the Union itself. Both options are still possible

Confirmation of the Polish-German Border on the Odra and Nysa Łużycka Rivers in the Process of German Reunification

W artykule poddano analizie proces uznania w toku zjednoczenia Niemiec granicy polsko-niemieckiej. Uprzednio Republika Federalna Niemiec kwestionowała ostateczny charakter tej granicy w świetle prawa międzynarodowego. Powodowało to poważne konflikty polityczne w stosunkach PRL i RFN. Nie zmienił tego Układ o normalizacji stosunków między obu państwami podpisany 7 grudnia 1970 r. Powstanie demokratycznej Polski w 1989 r. i paralelne zjednoczenie Niemiec położyły kres tym konfliktom. Znalazło to wyraz w Traktacie o potwierdzeniu granicy polsko-niemieckiej (podpisanym z 14 listopada 1990 r.) oraz w Traktacie „dwa plus cztery” (podpisanym 12 września 1990 r.). Stało się to podstawą budowania – postulowanej przez ministra Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego – polsko-niemieckiej „wspólnoty interesów” w zjednoczonej Europie. Przypomnieć przy tym należy, że negocjacje nad traktatem o potwierdzeniu granicy przyczyniły się do wypracowania koncepcji Traktatu o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy. Został on podpisany 17 czerwca 1991 r. Wytyczył kierunki dla polsko-niemieckiej „wspólnoty interesów” i utorował drogę Polski do Unii Europejskiej.The article analyzes the process of confirmation of the Polish-German border in the course of German reunification. The Federal Republic of Germany previously contested the ultimate nature of this border under international law. This caused serious political conflicts in relations between the People’s Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany. This was not changed by the Treaty on the Normalization of Relations between the two States, signed on December 7, 1970. The rise of a democratic Poland in 1989 and the parallel reunification of Germany put an end to these conflicts. This was reflected in the Treaty on the Confirmation of the Polish-German border (signed on November 14, 1990) and in the “two plus four” Treaty (signed on September 12, 1990). This became the basis for building the Polish-German “community of interests” in a united Europe, as postulated by Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. It should be remembered that the negotiations on the border Confirmation Treaty contributed to the development of the concept of a Treaty on good neighborhood and friendly cooperation. It was signed on June 17, 1991. It set the directions for the Polish- -German “community of interests” and paved the way for Poland to enter the European Union

Flexible Integration as a Target System of Governance for the European Union

This article is an attempt to formulate a theoretical model for governance of the European Union. On one hand it takes into account the ongoing theoretical debate in this field, and especially the critical analysis of recent years, while on the other it refers tothe actual course of the European Union’s systemic reform in terms of its coherent reform plan for the Economic and Monetary Union (especially the euro area). It also refers to the reforms of the EU proposed in academic literature.1 The article analyses various models of differentiated integration. Regarding the implemented reforms and the future model for the governance of the EU, the starting point is the dominant assumption in the discussions that the focus should be on the cohesion of the institutional and legal system of the EU. The model of ‘fl exible integration’ presented in the article takes as a starting point the fact that the internal differentiation of the various statuses of EU Member States has now become a systemic trend of the European integration process. Within the framework of the ‘fl exible integration’ model, the author identifi es the essential institutional and legal elements of the EU that will allow it to maintain its cohesion

INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY

Continuation of the EU enlargement depends, to some extent, on how well the EU institutional system is prepared to “absorb” new members. The main factors that influence this “absorption capability” are, on the one hand, the weakening willingness, or readiness, of the existing member states to take on new members, and the generally poor, albeit differentiated, level of preparation of individual candidate states for EU membership, on the other. For most candidates the requirements o f adherence to the fundamental principles of a democratic state are still a real challenge. The paper analyses three main institutional questions that play a major role in the adjustment processes when new member states gain EU membership (and which also are the key issue o f the EU reform). They include the qualified majority voting in the EU Council, the allocation of seats in the European Parliament, and the determination of the composition of the European Commission. The analysis of the above leads to a conclusion that although the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty would undoubtedly facilitate further continuation o f the EU enlargement strategy, even under the current Nice Treaty the accession of the West Balean states should pose no real problems. In the case of Turkey, or the Ukraine, however, some basic elements of the “Lisbon Treaty” package would need to be renegotiated