Working Around the CCP’s Insecurities

Language is a sensitive matter for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a fact made clear by the well-documented mechanisms of party-state censorship and propaganda, which aim to repel criticism and set the agenda in the CCP’s favor. Less widely acknowledged, however, is the extent to which even terms of praise and devotion must be subjected to careful scrutiny in China. Two recent catchphrases in particular that speak anew to deeper anxieties about the image of the CCP and its top leader, Xi Jinping. These are “low-level red” and “high-level black,” odd phrases in English that invite some elucidation. The terms, which first emerged on the internet, refer in both cases to covert or unintentional acts of criticism. “Low-level red,” or dijihong (低級紅), refers in official parlance to language or conduct that is intended to praise the Party or government, but which ultimately has the opposite effect because it is patently false, cheap, or ill-considered. “High-level black,” or gaojihei (高级黑), refers on the other hand to more deliberate and skilful acts of disguised sabotage, in which language is deployed in obscurely humorous ways, or cloaked in academic respectability, in order to criticise or ridicule. 對中國共產黨來說，語言是一個敏感的問題， 這在中國的審查和宣傳機制中得到了充分的證實。審查的目的是為了排斥批評，營造有利於中國共產黨的輿情。然而，鮮為人知的是，在中國，即使是讚美和奉承的詞彙也會受到審查。尤其是最近的兩個流行語 —— "低級紅"和"高級黑"，再次體現了人們對中共及其最高領導人習近平形象的深層憂慮。這兩個詞最早出現在互聯網，均為隱蔽或無意的批評。 "低級紅"指的是那些旨在讚美黨或政府的語言或行為，但最終卻因明顯的虛假、低級或考慮不周而產生相反的效果。而"高級黑"則指更有心機、更有技巧的變相貶低。它以隱晦幽默的方式運用語言，或披上學術的外衣，以達到批評或嘲笑的目的。對中國共產黨來說，語言是一個敏感的問題， 這在中國的審查和宣傳機制中得到了充分的證實。審查的目的是為了排斥批評，營造有利於中國共產黨的輿情。然而，鮮為人知的是，在中國，即使是讚美和奉承的詞彙也會受到審查。尤其是最近的兩個流行語 —— "低級紅"和"高級黑"，再次體現了人們對中共及其最高領導人習近平形象的深層憂慮。這兩個詞最早出現在互聯網，均為隱蔽或無意的批評。 "低級紅"指的是那些旨在讚美黨或政府的語言或行為，但最終卻因明顯的虛假、低級或考慮不周而產生相反的效果。而"高級黑"則指更有心機、更有技巧的變相貶低。它以隱晦幽默的方式運用語言，或披上學術的外衣，以達到批評或嘲笑的目的

He Qinglian, Wusuo Zhongguo. Zhongguo dalu kongzhi meiti celüe da jiemi (China locked in mist: Revelations on the Mainland's policy to control the media), Taipei, Liming wenhua chubanshe, 2006, 462 pp.

Trudge through the muck and mist of China’s media terrain and you will quickly feel lost. Government policies fog up with official jargon, and the gritty facts of the media and censorship at work can be even more mystifying. Fortunately, readers of Chinese can now navigate by the compass of He Qinglian’s China Locked in Mist, a thorough review of PRC media controls. The book is a welcome expansion of the slim and simply titled “Media Control in China,” He’s 2003 research report prepared for t..

Do guidelines influence breathlessness management in advanced lung diseases? A multinational survey of respiratory medicine and palliative care physicians

Background: Respiratory medicine (RM) and palliative care (PC) physicians’ management of chronic breathlessness in advanced chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), fibrotic interstitial lung disease (fILD) and lung cancer (LC), and the influence of practice guidelines was explored via an online survey. Methods: A voluntary, online survey was distributed to RM and PC physicians via society newsletter mailing lists. Results: 450 evaluable questionnaires (348 (77%) RM and 102 (23%) PC) were analysed. Significantly more PC physicians indicated routine use (often/always) of opioids across conditions (COPD: 92% vs. 39%, fILD: 83% vs. 36%, LC: 95% vs. 76%; all p < 0.001) and significantly more PC physicians indicated routine use of benzodiazepines for COPD (33% vs. 10%) and fILD (25% vs. 12%) (both p < 0.001). Significantly more RM physicians reported routine use of a breathlessness score (62% vs. 13%, p < 0.001) and prioritised exercise training/rehabilitation for COPD (49% vs. 7%) and fILD (30% vs. 18%) (both p < 0.001). Overall, 40% of all respondents reported reading non-cancer palliative care guidelines (either carefully or looked at them briefly). Respondents who reported reading these guidelines were more likely to: routinely use a breathlessness score (χ2 = 13.8; p < 0.001), use opioids (χ2 = 12.58, p < 0.001) and refer to pulmonary rehabilitation (χ2 = 6.41, p = 0.011) in COPD; use antidepressants (χ2 = 6.25; p = 0.044) and refer to PC (χ2 = 5.83; p = 0.016) in fILD; and use a handheld fan in COPD (χ2 = 8.75, p = 0.003), fILD (χ2 = 4.85, p = 0.028) and LC (χ2 = 5.63; p = 0.018). Conclusions: These findings suggest a need for improved dissemination and uptake of jointly developed breathlessness management guidelines in order to encourage appropriate use of existing, evidence-based therapies. The lack of opioid use by RM, and continued benzodiazepine use in PC, suggest that a wider range of acceptable therapies need to be developed and trialled

A Global Building Occupant Behavior Database

This paper introduces a database of 34 field-measured building occupant behavior datasets collected from 15 countries and 39 institutions across 10 climatic zones covering various building types in both commercial and residential sectors. This is a comprehensive global database about building occupant behavior. The database includes occupancy patterns (i.e., presence and people count) and occupant behaviors (i.e., interactions with devices, equipment, and technical systems in buildings). Brick schema models were developed to represent sensor and room metadata information. The database is publicly available, and a website was created for the public to access, query, and download specific datasets or the whole database interactively. The database can help to advance the knowledge and understanding of realistic occupancy patterns and human-building interactions with building systems (e.g., light switching, set-point changes on thermostats, fans on/off, etc.) and envelopes (e.g., window opening/closing). With these more realistic inputs of occupants’ schedules and their interactions with buildings and systems, building designers, energy modelers, and consultants can improve the accuracy of building energy simulation and building load forecasting

Designing authoritarian deliberation: how social media platforms influence political talk in China

Discussion is often celebrated as a critical element of public opinion and political participation. Recently, scholars have suggested that the design and features of specific online platforms shape what is politically expressed online and how. Building on these findings and drawing on 112 semi-structured qualitative interviews with information technology experts and internet users, we explain how major Chinese social media platforms differ in structure and motivation. Drawing upon a nationwide representative survey and an online experiment, we find that platforms aiming to make users a source of information through public, information-centred communication, such as the Twitter-like Weibo, are more conducive to political expression; while platforms built to optimize building social connections through private, user-centred communication, such as WhatsApp and Facebook-like WeChat, tend to inhibit political expression. These technological design effects are stronger when users believe the authoritarian state tolerates discussion, but less important when political talk is sensitive. The findings contribute to the debate on the political consequences of the internet by specifying technological and political conditions

A News Story on School Collapses Tantalizes, Then Disappears

Yesterday, China Media Project’s David Bandurski published a post that highlights the best of what CMP does: muckraking in the China media and blogosphere, in this case regarding school construction in Sichuan. If CMP isn’t already on your RSS feed, we encourage you to add them. In the meantime, Bandurski kindly agreed to let us re-post this piece on the suppression of findings regarding shoddy school construction in Sichuan. China Economic Weekly, a spin-off magazine of the official People’s Daily, ran an important story Monday about the collapse of school buildings in last year’s Sichuan earthquake. But the story, posted initially to People’s Daily Online, was removed by day’s end, a sign that some important officials at least were not pleased. The original URL for the story at People’s Daily Online is now replaced with a tell-tale trace: “The page you wish to view no longer exists.” Nevertheless, this is a story to keep your eyes on and one that amply illustrates the complexity of China’s media environment. Where did the story come from? Why was it allowed to appear at all? The story’s jumping-off point is an academic study on construction quality in the quake zone launched last year by Tsinghua University, but it makes much more explicit the findings of the study as they are relevant to the problem of school collapses

Things We’d Rather You Not Say on the Web, Or Anywhere Else

I love words. And I thank you in advance, dear citizens, for obeying mine. Words are dangerous and slippery things. Some people in the West will tell you that words are playthings, and that we should all be free to do with them as we please. But I want to tell you that words are really all we have – and this is why the Party has troubled itself to choose them so carefully on your behalf. You will have heard, I suppose, that Article 35 of our nation’s constitution guarantees that you enjoy “freedom of expression.” You will no doubt agree, however, as a matter of moral principle, that responsible citizens must enjoy all things in moderation. No good can come of enjoying words too much – and this is why we have taken it upon ourselves to parcel out this freedom, so that all Chinese can enjoy words with more or less equal moderation. Comrade Mao Zedong once said, “Power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” But words too are powerful. It is not my intention to spook you, dear citizens, but we must all remember the way that too many words under the policy of “glasnost” – a Russian word whose direct translation is “chaos” – spelled the end of the Soviet Union. We must not forget – and this begins with not remembering – how Zhao Ziyang said on May 6, 1989, in the midst of popular demonstrations, that propaganda leaders should “open things up just a bit.” “There is no big danger in that,” he said. His words were careless, and the end result was chaos. Nobody wants chaos. Just try to picture what it does to GDP

He Qinglian, Wusuo Zhongguo. Zhongguo dalu kongzhi meiti celüe da jiemi (La Chine enfermée dans le brouillard : révélations sur les politiques de contrôle des médias en Chine continentale)

Bandurski David. He Qinglian, Wusuo Zhongguo. Zhongguo dalu kongzhi meiti celüe da jiemi (La Chine enfermée dans le brouillard : révélations sur les politiques de contrôle des médias en Chine continentale). In: Perspectives chinoises, n°102, 2008. pp. 122-123

He Qinglian, Wusuo Zhongguo. Zhongguo dalu kongzhi meiti celüe da jiemi (La Chine enfermée dans le brouillard : révélations sur les politiques de contrôle des médias en Chine continentale)

Bandurski David. He Qinglian, Wusuo Zhongguo. Zhongguo dalu kongzhi meiti celüe da jiemi (La Chine enfermée dans le brouillard : révélations sur les politiques de contrôle des médias en Chine continentale). In: Perspectives chinoises, n°102, 2008. pp. 122-123