Launch Pad Coatings for Smart Corrosion Control

Corrosion is the degradation of a material as a result of its interaction with the environment. The environment at the KSC launch pads has been documented by ASM International (formerly American Society for Metals) as the most corrosive in the US. The 70 tons of highly corrosive hydrochloric acid that are generated by the solid rocket boosters during a launch exacerbate the corrosiveness of the environment at the pads. Numerous failures at the pads are caused by the pitting of stainless steels, rebar corrosion, and the degradation of concrete. Corrosion control of launch pad structures relies on the use of coatings selected from the qualified products list (QPL) of the NASA Standard 5008A for Protective Coating of Carbon Steel, Stainless Steel, and Aluminum on Launch Structures, Facilities, and Ground Support Equipment. This standard was developed to establish uniform engineering practices and methods and to ensure the inclusion of essential criteria in the coating of ground support equipment (GSE) and facilities used by or for NASA. This standard is applicable to GSE and facilities that support space vehicle or payload programs or projects and to critical facilities at all NASA locations worldwide. Environmental regulation changes have dramatically reduced the production, handling, use, and availability of conventional protective coatings for application to KSC launch structures and ground support equipment. Current attrition rate of qualified KSC coatings will drastically limit the number of commercial off the shelf (COTS) products available for the Constellation Program (CxP) ground operations (GO). CxP GO identified corrosion detection and control technologies as a critical, initial capability technology need for ground processing of Ares I and Ares V to meet Constellation Architecture Requirements Document (CARD) CxP 70000 operability requirements for reduced ground processing complexity, streamlined integrated testing, and operations phase affordability. Researchers at NASA's Corrosion Technology Laboratory at KSC are developing a smart, environmentally friendly coating system for early corrosion detection, inhibition, and self healing of mechanical damage without external intervention. This smart coating will detect and respond actively to corrosion and mechanical damage such as abrasion and scratches, in a functional and predictable manner, and will be capable of adapting its properties dynamically. This coating is being developed using corrosion sensitive microcapsules that deliver the contents of their core (corrosion inhibiting compounds, corrosion indicators, and self healing agents) on demand when corrosion or mechanical damage to the coating occurs

Launch Pad Flame Trench Refractory Materials

The launch complexes at NASA's John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are critical support facilities for the successful launch of space-based vehicles. These facilities include a flame trench that bisects the pad at ground level. This trench includes a flame deflector system that consists of an inverted, V-shaped steel structure covered with a high temperature concrete material five inches thick that extends across the center of the flame trench. One side of the "V11 receives and deflects the flames from the orbiter main engines; the opposite side deflects the flames from the solid rocket boosters. There are also two movable deflectors at the top of the trench to provide additional protection to shuttle hardware from the solid rocket booster flames. These facilities are over 40 years old and are experiencing constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and environmental exposure. The refractory material currently used in launch pad flame deflectors has become susceptible to failure, resulting in large sections of the material breaking away from the steel base structure and creating high-speed projectiles during launch. These projectiles jeopardize the safety of the launch complex, crew, and vehicle. Post launch inspections have revealed that the number and frequency of repairs, as well as the area and size of the damage, is increasing with the number of launches. The Space Shuttle Program has accepted the extensive ground processing costs for post launch repair of damaged areas and investigations of future launch related failures for the remainder of the program. There currently are no long term solutions available for Constellation Program ground operations to address the poor performance and subsequent failures of the refractory materials. Over the last three years, significant liberation of refractory material in the flame trench and fire bricks along the adjacent trench walls following Space Shuttle launches have resulted in extensive investigations of failure mechanisms, load response, ejected material impact evaluation, and repair design analysis (environmental and structural assessment, induced environment from solid rocket booster plume, loads summary, and repair integrity), assessment of risk posture for flame trench debris, and justification of flight readiness rationale. Although the configuration of the launch pad, water and exhaust direction, and location of the Mobile Launcher Platform between the flame trench and the flight hardware should protect the Space Vehicle from debris exposure, loss of material could cause damage to a major element of the ground facility (resulting in temporary usage loss); and damage to other facility elements is possible. These are all significant risks that will impact ground operations for Constellation and development of new refractory material systems is necessary to reduce the likelihood of the foreign object debris hazard during launch. KSC is developing an alternate refractory material for the launch pad flame trench protection system, including flame deflector and flame trench walls, that will withstand launch conditions without the need for repair after every launch, as is currently the case. This paper will present a summary of the results from industry surveys, trade studies, life cycle cost analysis, and preliminary testing that have been performed to support and validate the development, testing, and qualification of new refractory materials

Commercial off-the-Shelf (COTS) Refractory Material Evaluation

Fondu Fyre (FF) is currently the only refractory material qualified for use in the flame trench at KSC's Shuttle Launch Pads 39A and 39B. However, the material is not used as it was qualified and has undergone increasingly frequent and severe degradation due to the launch blasts. This degradation is costly as well as dangerous for launch infrastructure, crew and vehicle. FF is applied at the pad via the gunnite process, where wetted refractory material is sprayed onto a steel grid mounted on a support structure. The water content in this process can be manually adjusted by operators, causing distinct visual and physical discrepancies among repair areas. Since the application process is unlikely to change for new refractory materials, it is important to understand the effects of water content on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) refractory materials. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the performance of the FF with respect to various water contents as well as heat treatments, to simulate aging and exposure to the blast. Initial results indicated that different water contents and heat treatments result in distinct differences in crushing strength, apparent porosity and bulk density. However, water content became an insignificant factor in both crush strength and porosity when FF was cured to at least 1500 deg. Additionally, inspection of the material's surface microstructure by scanning electron microscopy indicated distinguishable characteristics for different heat treatment levels. Results from this study will help guide future studies on the development and identification of new refractory materials

Launch Pad Flame Trench Refractory Materials

The launch complexes at NASA\u27s John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are critical support facilities for the successful launch of space-based vehicles. These facilities include a flame trench that bisects the pad at ground level. This trench includes a flame deflector system that consists of an inverted, V-shaped steel structure covered with a high-temperature concrete material five inches thick that extends across the center of the flame trench. One side of the V receives and deflects the flames from the orbiter main engines; the opposite side deflects the flames from the solid rocket boosters. There are also two movable deflectors at the top of the trench to provide additional protection to shuttle hardware from the solid rocket booster flames. These facilities are over 40 years old and are experiencing constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and environmental exposure. The refractory material currently used in launch pad flame deflectors has become susceptible to failure, resulting in large sections of the material breaking away from the steel base structure and creating high-speed projectiles during launch. These projectiles jeopardize the safety of the launch complex, crew, and vehicle. Post launch inspections have revealed that the number and frequency of repairs, as well as the area and size of the damage, is increasing with the number of launches. The Space Shuttle Program has accepted the extensive ground processing costs for post launch repair of damaged areas and investigations of future launch related failures for the remainder of the program. There currently are no long term solutions available for ground operations at KSC to address the poor performance and subsequent failures of the refractory materials. Over the last three years, significant liberation of refractory material in the flame trench and fire bricks along the adjacent trench walls, following Space Shuttle launches, have resulted in extensive investigations of failure mechanisms, load response, ejected material impact evaluation, and repair design analysis (environmental and structural assessment, induced environment from solid rocket booster plume, loads summary, and repair integrity), assessment of risk posture for flame trench debris, and justification of flight readiness rationale. Although the configuration of the launch pad, water and exhaust direction, and location of the Mobile Launcher Platform between the flame trench and the flight hardware should protect the Space Vehicle from debris exposure, loss of material could cause damage to a major element of the ground facility (resulting in temporary usage loss); and damage to other facility elements is possible. These are all significant risks that will impact future ground operations at KSC and development of new refractory material systems is necessary to reduce the likelihood of the foreign object debris hazard during launch. KSC is identifying an alternate refractory material for the launch pad flame trench protection system, including flame deflector and flame trench walls, that will withstand launch conditions without the need for repair after every launch, as is currently the case. This paper will present a summary of the results from preliminary testing that has been performed to support and validate the development, testing, and qualification of new refractory materials

Paralisia diafragmática unilateral reversível associada a envenenamento loxoscélico sistêmico

Relata-se o caso de um paciente vítima de envenenamento loxoscélico associado a paralisia diafragmática direita reversível. O diagnóstico de envenenamento loxoscélico baseou-se nas informações prestadas pelo paciente de que havia encontrado uma aranha marrom em sua cama no dia seguinte à picada e no quadro clínico típico deste tipo de envenenamento: lesão cutânea necrótica acompanhada de erupção escarlatiniforme e comprometimento sistêmico sob a forma de insuficiência renal aguda, distúrbios da coagulação sangüínea, hemólise intravascular e hemoglobinúria. Estas alterações regrediram completamente com o tratamento conservador. O diagnóstico da paralisia diafragmática baseou-se na elevação da hemicúpula diafragmática direita na radiografia de tórax em inspiração forçada e em sua completa imobilidade no exame radioscópico. A paralisia frênica não existia na radiografia realizada previamente ao acidente e desapareceu completamente trinta dias após o mesmo, o que permitiu associá-la à toxocidade do veneno loxoscélico ou a outras manifestações sistêmicas produzidas por ele