What explains the North–South divide in Italian tax compliance? An experimental analysis

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Palgrave Macmillan via the DOI in this recordI undertake a comparative study assessing the North–South divide in Italian tax compliance, employing the largest behavioral tax compliance experiment to date. Contrary to a large body of literature, I argue that willingness to pay taxes is constructed within a specific institutional environment and reflects the country’s quality of institutions. To test this hypothesis, I use controlled tax compliance experiments from four laboratories in Capua, Rome, Bologna, and Milan. By employing the experimental method, I am able to hold institutions constant allowing me to isolate cultural variation. Contrary to cultural explanations for tax compliance, when controlling the institutional environment, there is no difference in tax compliance. Furthermore, using social value orientation to compare prosociality, I also find no differences between the two regions. I therefore conclude that individuals’ relationship to their states shapes these behavioral differences in tax compliance.Funds for this research were provided by the European Research Council (Grant Agreement No. 295675 )

Two sides of the same coin? An investigation on the effects of frames on tax compliance and charitable giving

Despite tax compliance being mandatory and charitable giving being voluntary, both can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Paying taxes and making monetary donations are two complementary ways to financially provide for the common good. Using goal-framing theory, an experimental study with a mixed-factorial design (N = 435) was conducted to test the effects of different frames on the intention to pay taxes and make charitable donations. Our results showed that for real taxpayers (i.e., for employees, self-employed, and entrepreneurs, but not for students) using a gain goal frame as a support to the normative goal frame was only effective in increasing intended tax compliance, whereas a supporting hedonic goal frame was only effective in increasing donation intention. In addition, it was found that gain and hedonic goal frames worked differently according to the prevailing motivation behind tax compliance and charitable giving. When the intrinsic motivation was already high, frames were ineffective (in the tax context) or even counter-productive (in the charitable giving context). In the presence of extrinsic motivations, instead, frames are especially effective.Social decision makin

Impegno, soddisfazione e fiducia del cliente bancario: un'analisi empirica a Roma e in Sardegna

La presente ricerca analizza il modello dell'investimento di Rusbult esaminando il rapporto tra cliente e banca. Utilizzando due campioni italiani, mira a testare il modello di ricerca rispetto alla provenienza geografica e la fiducia dei clienti bancari. I risultati mostrano che in generale la soddisfazione del cliente viene influenzata dai vantaggi e dagli svantaggi del rapporto con la banca. La soddisfazione e gli investimenti influenzano l'impegno del cliente, mentre quest'ultimo influenza in modo negativo la conclusione di un rapporto. Inoltre abbiamo rilevato le differenze tra i clienti romani e quelli sardi, e tra clienti con basso e alto livello di fiducia verso la loro banca

Powerful authorities and trusting citizens: The Slippery Slope Framework and tax compliance in Italy

The Slippery Slope Framework of tax compliance postulates that citizens\u2019 compliance depends on the power of the authorities to enforce compliance and/or trust in the authorities and voluntary cooperation. While trust is widely recognized as a strong determinant of cooperation, empirical evidence is less clear on power: severe fines may lead towards compliance or even have the opposite effect. We propose a thorough investigation of the nature of power (coercive versus legitimate) within the theoretical framework of tax compliance to shed light on the ambiguous results and to clarify the complex relation between power and trust. We use structural equation modeling to test the assumptions of the Slippery Slope Framework by taking into account coercive power and legitimate power on a sample of N = 389 self-employed Italian taxpayers and entrepreneurs. We found evidence that trust is positively related to voluntary tax compliance. Trust was found to be negatively related to coercive power and positively related to legitimate power. Both coercive power and legitimate power were correlated with enforced compliance. However, the effect of enforced compliance leads to increased evasion. The results evidence the multifaceted nature of power and trust and their relation with tax compliance, and the importance of power and trust in political regulatory strategies