Adaptive simulation using mode identification

Adaptive simulation using modal clustering and method of potential function

Spatial patterns and scale freedom in a Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata with Pavlovian strategies

A cellular automaton in which cells represent agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game following the simple "win-stay, loose-shift" strategy is studied. Individuals with binary behavior, such as they can either cooperate (C) or defect (D), play repeatedly with their neighbors (Von Neumann's and Moore's neighborhoods). Their utilities in each round of the game are given by a rescaled payoff matrix described by a single parameter Tau, which measures the ratio of 'temptation to defect' to 'reward for cooperation'. Depending on the region of the parameter space Tau, the system self-organizes - after a transient - into dynamical equilibrium states characterized by different definite fractions of C agents (2 states for the Von Neumann neighborhood and 4 for Moore neighborhood). For some ranges of Tau the cluster size distributions, the power spectrums P(f) and the perimeter-area curves follow power-law scalings. Percolation below threshold is also found for D agent clusters. We also analyze the asynchronous dynamics version of this model and compare results.Comment: Accepted for publication in JSTA

Emotional Strategies as Catalysts for Cooperation in Signed Networks

The evolution of unconditional cooperation is one of the fundamental problems in science. A new solution is proposed to solve this puzzle. We treat this issue with an evolutionary model in which agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma on signed networks. The topology is allowed to co-evolve with relational signs as well as with agent strategies. We introduce a strategy that is conditional on the emotional content embedded in network signs. We show that this strategy acts as a catalyst and creates favorable conditions for the spread of unconditional cooperation. In line with the literature, we found evidence that the evolution of cooperation most likely occurs in networks with relatively high chances of rewiring and with low likelihood of strategy adoption. While a low likelihood of rewiring enhances cooperation, a very high likelihood seems to limit its diffusion. Furthermore, unlike in non-signed networks, cooperation becomes more prevalent in denser topologies.Comment: 24 pages, Accepted for publication in Advances in Complex System

Similarity based cooperation and spatial segregation

We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial extension to a two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts with eight players in a Moore neighborhood. The system shows a strong segregation independent on parameters. The introduction of a local conversion mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of spiral waves in the spatial game. In the case of asymmetric costs of cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on both cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes unstable for high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure

Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under environmental pressure

We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May \cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that individuals need to collect a minimum score $U_{min}$, representing indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (who got $U^{msn}$), also take into account if $U^{msn}$ is above or below the threshold $U_{min}$. If $U^{msn}<U_{min}$ an individual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one used by its most successful neighbour. This modification allows the evolution of cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as it happens, for example, when the sucker's payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which the selective rule is supplemented with a "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion. The cluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex version we found power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures; added figures and revised tex

Social games in a social network

We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different topologies, ranging from regular lattices to random graphs, produce a variety of emergent behaviors. This is a contribution towards the study of social phenomena and transitions governed by the topology of the community

Asymptotic expansions of Witten–Reshetikhin–Turaev invariants for some simple 3‐manifolds

For any Lie algebra @Fg and integral level k, there is defined an invariant Zk∗(M, L) of embeddings of links L in 3‐manifolds M, known as the Witten–Reshetikhin–Turaev invariant. It is known that for links in S3, Zk∗(S3, L) is a polynomial in q=exp (2πi/(k+c@Fgv), namely, the generalized Jones polynomial of the link L. This paper investigates the invariant Zr−2∗(M,○) when @Fg=@Fs@Fl2 for a simple family of rational homology 3‐spheres, obtained by integer surgery around (2, n)‐type torus knots. In particular, we find a closed formula for a formal power series Z∞(M)∊Q[[h]] in h=q−1 from which Zr−2∗(M,○) may be derived for all sufficiently large primes r. We show that this formal power series may be viewed as the asymptotic expansion, around q=1, of a multivalued holomorphic function of q with 1 contained on the boundary of its domain of definition. For these particular manifolds, most of which are not Z‐homology spheres, this extends work of Ohtsuki and Murakami in which the existence of power series with rational coefficients related to Zk∗(M, ○) was demonstrated for rational homology spheres. The coefficients in the formal power series Z∞(M) are expected to be identical to those obtained from a perturbative expansion of the Witten–Chern–Simons path integral formula for Z∗(M, ○). © 1995 American Institute of Physics.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/69725/2/JMAPAQ-36-11-6106-1.pd

Competitive market for multiple firms and economic crisis

The origin of economic crises is a key problem for economics. We present a model of long-run competitive markets to show that the multiplicity of behaviors in an economic system, over a long time scale, emerge as statistical regularities (perfectly competitive markets obey Bose-Einstein statistics and purely monopolistic-competitive markets obey Boltzmann statistics) and that how interaction among firms influences the evolutionary of competitive markets. It has been widely accepted that perfect competition is most efficient. Our study shows that the perfectly competitive system, as an extreme case of competitive markets, is most efficient but not stable, and gives rise to economic crises as society reaches full employment. In the economic crisis revealed by our model, many firms condense (collapse) into the lowest supply level (zero supply, namely bankruptcy status), in analogy to Bose-Einstein condensation. This curious phenomenon arises because perfect competition (homogeneous competitions) equals symmetric (indistinguishable) investment direction, a fact abhorred by nature. Therefore, we urge the promotion of monopolistic competition (heterogeneous competitions) rather than perfect competition. To provide early warning of economic crises, we introduce a resolving index of investment, which approaches zero in the run-up to an economic crisis. On the other hand, our model discloses, as a profound conclusion, that the technological level for a long-run social or economic system is proportional to the freedom (disorder) of this system; in other words, technology equals the entropy of system. As an application of this new concept, we give a possible answer to the Needham question: "Why was it that despite the immense achievements of traditional China it had been in Europe and not in China that the scientific and industrial revolutions occurred?"Comment: 17 pages; 3 figure

Adaptation and enslavement in endosymbiont-host associations

The evolutionary persistence of symbiotic associations is a puzzle. Adaptation should eliminate cooperative traits if it is possible to enjoy the advantages of cooperation without reciprocating - a facet of cooperation known in game theory as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Despite this barrier, symbioses are widespread, and may have been necessary for the evolution of complex life. The discovery of strategies such as tit-for-tat has been presented as a general solution to the problem of cooperation. However, this only holds for within-species cooperation, where a single strategy will come to dominate the population. In a symbiotic association each species may have a different strategy, and the theoretical analysis of the single species problem is no guide to the outcome. We present basic analysis of two-species cooperation and show that a species with a fast adaptation rate is enslaved by a slowly evolving one. Paradoxically, the rapidly evolving species becomes highly cooperative, whereas the slowly evolving one gives little in return. This helps understand the occurrence of endosymbioses where the host benefits, but the symbionts appear to gain little from the association.Comment: v2: Correction made to equations 5 & 6 v3: Revised version accepted in Phys. Rev. E; New figure adde