Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under environmental pressure

We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May \cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that individuals need to collect a minimum score $U_{min}$, representing indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (who got $U^{msn}$), also take into account if $U^{msn}$ is above or below the threshold $U_{min}$. If $U^{msn}<U_{min}$ an individual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one used by its most successful neighbour. This modification allows the evolution of cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as it happens, for example, when the sucker's payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which the selective rule is supplemented with a "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion. The cluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex version we found power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures; added figures and revised tex

Competitive market for multiple firms and economic crisis

The origin of economic crises is a key problem for economics. We present a model of long-run competitive markets to show that the multiplicity of behaviors in an economic system, over a long time scale, emerge as statistical regularities (perfectly competitive markets obey Bose-Einstein statistics and purely monopolistic-competitive markets obey Boltzmann statistics) and that how interaction among firms influences the evolutionary of competitive markets. It has been widely accepted that perfect competition is most efficient. Our study shows that the perfectly competitive system, as an extreme case of competitive markets, is most efficient but not stable, and gives rise to economic crises as society reaches full employment. In the economic crisis revealed by our model, many firms condense (collapse) into the lowest supply level (zero supply, namely bankruptcy status), in analogy to Bose-Einstein condensation. This curious phenomenon arises because perfect competition (homogeneous competitions) equals symmetric (indistinguishable) investment direction, a fact abhorred by nature. Therefore, we urge the promotion of monopolistic competition (heterogeneous competitions) rather than perfect competition. To provide early warning of economic crises, we introduce a resolving index of investment, which approaches zero in the run-up to an economic crisis. On the other hand, our model discloses, as a profound conclusion, that the technological level for a long-run social or economic system is proportional to the freedom (disorder) of this system; in other words, technology equals the entropy of system. As an application of this new concept, we give a possible answer to the Needham question: "Why was it that despite the immense achievements of traditional China it had been in Europe and not in China that the scientific and industrial revolutions occurred?"Comment: 17 pages; 3 figure

Adaptation and enslavement in endosymbiont-host associations

The evolutionary persistence of symbiotic associations is a puzzle. Adaptation should eliminate cooperative traits if it is possible to enjoy the advantages of cooperation without reciprocating - a facet of cooperation known in game theory as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Despite this barrier, symbioses are widespread, and may have been necessary for the evolution of complex life. The discovery of strategies such as tit-for-tat has been presented as a general solution to the problem of cooperation. However, this only holds for within-species cooperation, where a single strategy will come to dominate the population. In a symbiotic association each species may have a different strategy, and the theoretical analysis of the single species problem is no guide to the outcome. We present basic analysis of two-species cooperation and show that a species with a fast adaptation rate is enslaved by a slowly evolving one. Paradoxically, the rapidly evolving species becomes highly cooperative, whereas the slowly evolving one gives little in return. This helps understand the occurrence of endosymbioses where the host benefits, but the symbionts appear to gain little from the association.Comment: v2: Correction made to equations 5 & 6 v3: Revised version accepted in Phys. Rev. E; New figure adde

Chaos and unpredictability in evolutionary dynamics in discrete time

A discrete-time version of the replicator equation for two-strategy games is studied. The stationary properties differ from that of continuous time for sufficiently large values of the parameters, where periodic and chaotic behavior replace the usual fixed-point population solutions. We observe the familiar period-doubling and chaotic-band-splitting attractor cascades of unimodal maps but in some cases more elaborate variations appear due to bimodality. Also unphysical stationary solutions have unusual physical implications, such as uncertainty of final population caused by sensitivity to initial conditions and fractality of attractor preimage manifolds.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

Quantum Games and Quantum Strategies

We investigate the quantization of non-zero sum games. For the particular case of the Prisoners' Dilemma we show that this game ceases to pose a dilemma if quantum strategies are allowed for. We also construct a particular quantum strategy which always gives reward if played against any classical strategy.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, typographic sign error in the definition of the operator J correcte

“An ethnographic seduction”: how qualitative research and Agent-based models can benefit each other

We provide a general analytical framework for empirically informed agent-based simulations. This methodology provides present-day agent-based models with a sound and proper insight as to the behavior of social agents — an insight that statistical data often fall short of providing at least at a micro level and for hidden and sensitive populations. In the other direction, simulations can provide qualitative researchers in sociology, anthropology and other fields with valuable tools for: (a) testing the consistency and pushing the boundaries, of specific theoretical frameworks; (b) replicating and generalizing results; (c) providing a platform for cross-disciplinary validation of results

Diffusion, peer pressure and tailed distributions

We present a general, physically motivated non-linear and non-local advection equation in which the diffusion of interacting random walkers competes with a local drift arising from a kind of peer pressure. We show, using a mapping to an integrable dynamical system, that on varying a parameter, the steady state behaviour undergoes a transition from the standard diffusive behavior to a localized stationary state characterized by a tailed distribution. Finally, we show that recent empirical laws on economic growth can be explained as a collective phenomenon due to peer pressure interaction.Comment: RevTex: 4 pages + 3 eps-figures. Minor Revision and figure 3 replaced. To appear in Phys. Rev. Letter

Robustness of Cooperation in the Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on Complex Networks

Recent studies on the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in scale-free networks have demonstrated that the heterogeneity of the network interconnections enhances the evolutionary success of cooperation. In this paper we address the issue of how the characterization of the asymptotic states of the evolutionary dynamics depends on the initial concentration of cooperators. We find that the measure and the connectedness properties of the set of nodes where cooperation reaches fixation is largely independent of initial conditions, in contrast with the behavior of both the set of nodes where defection is fixed, and the fluctuating nodes. We also check for the robustness of these results when varying the degree heterogeneity along a one-parametric family of networks interpolating between the class of Erdos-Renyi graphs and the Barabasi-Albert networks.Comment: 18 pages, 6 figures, revised version accepted for publication in New Journal of Physics (2007

Cultural propagation on social networks

In this work we present a model for the propagation of culture on networks of different topology and by considering different underlying dynamics. We extend a previous model proposed by Axelrod by letting a majority govern the dynamics of changes. This in turn allows us to define a Lyapunov functional for the system.Comment: 8 pages, 9 figures include

Nongaussian fluctuations arising from finite populations: Exact results for the evolutionary Moran process

The appropriate description of fluctuations within the framework of evolutionary game theory is a fundamental unsolved problem in the case of finite populations. The Moran process recently introduced into this context [Nowak et al., Nature (London) 428, 646 (2004)] defines a promising standard model of evolutionary game theory in finite populations for which analytical results are accessible. In this paper, we derive the stationary distribution of the Moran process population dynamics for arbitrary $2\times{}2$ games for the finite size case. We show that a nonvanishing background fitness can be transformed to the vanishing case by rescaling the payoff matrix. In contrast to the common approach to mimic finite-size fluctuations by Gaussian distributed noise, the finite size fluctuations can deviate significantly from a Gaussian distribution.Comment: 4 pages (2 figs). Published in Physical Review E (Rapid Communications