Does the Electoral System Foster a Predominant Party System? Evidence from Turkey

This paper discusses the role of the electoral system in making the Justice and Development Party (AKP) dominant. Drawing on Sartori’s framework, we first clarify the concept of a predominant party system. Second, we examine the impact of the electoral system on the emergence of a predominant party system in Turkey. Analysing election results, we argue that the electoral system fosters dominance in three ways. First, a combination of electoral formula, national threshold and district threshold leads to over‐representation of large parties and under‐representation of small ones. Second, the fear of a wasted vote due to the high threshold prompts voters to support their second‐best option, which concentrates the votes among large parties. Finally, the electoral system increases electoral turnout rates by extending polarization

Small Dreams, Big Failures: The Rise and Fall of Syriza

2007-2008 finansallaşmış kapitalist krizin patlak vermesinin ardından Avrupa’da ulusal hükümetler tarafından izlenen kemer sıkma politikalarına yönelik toplumsal tepki, seçimlerde ana akım partilerin düşüşü ve radikal partilerin yükselişi şeklinde cisimleşerek siyasi paradigma değişikliğini gündeme getirmiştir. Buna rağmen literatürde radikal sola yönelik ilgi düşük düzeyde kalmıştır. Çalışmada, bu minvalde, atipik bir örnek olarak Yunan radikal solunun yükselişi, yapısal politik ekonomik koşullar, toplumsal hareketlilik ve toplumsal protesto dinamikleri ile politik kurumsal koşullar açısından ele alınmaktadır. Araştırmada, Yunan solunun Syriza etrafında yeniden gruplaşmasının arkasında yatan temel nedenin, kemer sıkma ajandasının olumsuz sosyal sonuçlarının tetiklediği değişim arzusunun geleneksel siyasal ayarları alt üst etmesi olduğu savunulmaktadırFollowing the outbreak of the 2007-2008 financialized capitalist crisis, the social reaction to the austerity politics pursued by national governments in Europe disrupted the traditional settings of national politics by embodying in the fall of mainstream parties and the rise of radical parties in elections. However, interest in radical left remains low in the literature. Thus, in this study, as an atypical case, the rise of the Greek radical left is addressed by structural political economic conditions, social mobilization and social protest dynamics as well as political institutional conditions. It is argued that that the main reason behind the regroupment of the Greek left around Syriza is the destruction of traditional political settings by the desire for change, which was triggered by the negative social consequences of the austerity agenda

How Does Clientelism Foster Electoral Dominance? Evidence from Turkey

This article reveals how the AKP’s use of clientelism contributes to its electoral dominance. It does so by examining the features and actors as well as the structure of the clientelist network. The arguments are based on fieldwork in one of the poorest and most densely populated districts of Bağcılar, where in the 2015 legislative elections the AKP achieved more votes than in any other district in Istanbul.Introduction Concept of clientelism Method and case selection Features of the AKP's clientelism The actors The structure Conclusion Notes Reference

State predation in historical perspective: the case of Ottoman müsadere practice during 1695–1839

International audienceThis paper studies the practice of Müsadere in the Ottoman Empire. Müsadere refers to the expropriation of elites—often tax farmers or administrators—by the Sultan. This practice is interesting from both political economy and economic history perspectives as the Ottoman Empire continued to increase its reliance on it during the eighteenth century, a period when European states were investing in fiscal capacity and building bureaucratic tax systems. The main argument is that Sultans faced a “political Laffer curve:” if revenue is too low, the state collapses; if fiscal extraction is too high there is a rebellion and the Sultan risks losing power. While expropriations (müsadere) allow the Sultan to keep taxes low, they are vulnerable to provoking elites to invest in fugitive rather than (more productive) captive assets. We also show that the Sultan is more prone to target politically strong elites when his fiscal capacity is low