El giro a la izquierda en América Latina: ¿una política post-liberal?

When Hugo Chavez was elected president of Venezuela the left governed only in one other country, Cuba. Since then, there has been a tectonic shift in Latin American politics. Left-of-center coalitions are now in office in more than half a dozen countries and many observers speak of a pink wave or left turns in the region. This article seeks to shed some light on this process. It outlines criteria of theoretical and practical reason to address what it means to speak of the left in this juncture and looks at ways of characterizing its resurgence. Winning elections is the undisputed benchmark to assess the left turns. It is also restrictive because the ongoing changes in the region seem to go beyond the fortunes of short-term coalitions. This is why I propose to supplement the standard benchmark with additional criteria. The main one is the success of the left in redefining the parameters of the political and ideological center. In the final section, I focus on what I see as the most innovative aspect of these turns, namely, their challenge to the conventionally liberal understanding of politics. A post-liberal political scenario is emerging as actors experiment with various formats and sites of engagement alongside the liberal sphere of electoral representation. It is not a Manichean either/or situation; ongoing insurgencies are weary of liberal politics but are nonetheless contaminated by them. My conclusion is that we are bound to see more rather than less hybridity in this post-liberal scenario. Key words: left politics, Latin America, post-liberal politics.Cuando Hugo Chávez fue electo como presidente de Venezuela la izquierda gobernaba sólo en Cuba. En el tiempo transcurrido desde entonces otra media docena de países se sumaron a la lista y muchos comentaristas han comenzado a hablar de una ola rosada o del giro a la izquierda en la región. Este artículo intenta conceptualizar lo ocurrido. Propone un marco analítico para caracterizar a la izquierda y el giro a la izquierda en la política latinoamericana. El éxito electoral sigue siendo el criterio habitual para determinar dónde ha habido un giro a la izquierda, y está bien que así sea. Pero se trata de un criterio restrictivo dado que los procesos en curso en la región parecen ir más allá de las vicisitudes electorales. Por eso propongo suplementar el criterio electoral con otros. Entre ellos, la capacidad de la izquierda para confi gurar la agenda política y el hecho de que ella está redefiniendo el centro político e ideológico. En la sección final abordo lo que me parece ser el aspecto más innovador de estos giros, a saber, su incipiente desafío al esquema liberal de la política. Un escenario post-liberal está surgiendo a medida en que los actores experimentan con formatos y lugares de intercambio político paralelos a los de la esfera liberal de la representación electoral. No se trata de proponer un maniqueísmo de lo uno o lo otro pues las insurgencias en curso son críticas de la política liberal pero no dejan de estar contaminadas por ella. Mi conclusión es que el escenario post-liberal está caracterizado por la hibridación política. Palabras clave: izquierda política, América Latina, política post-liberal

Bacillus Calmette-Guérin vaccination as defense against SARS-CoV-2 (BADAS):a randomized controlled trial to protect healthcare workers in the USA by enhanced trained immune responses

Background: A large epidemic, such as that observed with SARS-CoV-2, seriously challenges available hospital capacity, and this would be augmented by infection of healthcare workers (HCW). Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) is a vaccine against tuberculosis, with protective non-specific effects against other respiratory tract infections in vitro and in vivo. Preliminary analyses suggest that regions of the world with existing BCG vaccination programs have lower incidence and mortality from COVID-19. We hypothesize that BCG vaccination can reduce SARS-CoV-2 infection and disease severity. Methods: This will be a placebo-controlled adaptive multi-center randomized controlled trial. A total of 1800 individuals considered to be at high risk, including those with comorbidities (hypertension, diabetes, obesity, reactive airway disease, smokers), racial and ethnic minorities, elderly, teachers, police, restaurant wait-staff, delivery personnel, health care workers who are defined as personnel working in a healthcare setting, at a hospital, medical center or clinic (veterinary, dental, ophthalmology), and first responders (paramedics, firefighters, or law enforcement), will be randomly assigned to two treatment groups. The treatment groups will receive intradermal administration of BCG vaccine or placebo (saline) with groups at a 1:1 ratio. Individuals will be tracked for evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection and severity as well as obtaining whole blood to track immunological markers, and a sub-study will include cognitive function and brain imaging. The majority of individuals will be followed for 6 months, with an option to extend for another 6 months, and the cognitive sub-study duration is 2 years. We will plot Kaplan-Meier curves that will be plotted comparing groups and hazard ratios and p-values reported using Cox proportional hazard models. Discussion: It is expected this trial will allow evaluation of the effects of BCG vaccination at a population level in high-risk healthcare individuals through a mitigated clinical course of SARS-CoV-2 infection and inform policy making during the ongoing epidemic. Trial registration: ClinicalTrials.gov NCT04348370. Registered on April 16, 2020.</p

Vision in high-level football officials

YesOfficiating in football depends, at least to some extent, upon adequate visual function. However, there is no vision standard for football officiating and the nature of the relationship between officiating performance and level of vision is unknown. As a first step in characterising this relationship, we report on the clinically-measured vision and on the perceived level of vision in elite-level, Portuguese football officials. Seventy-one referees (R) and assistant referees (AR) participated in the study, representing 92% of the total population of elite level football officials in Portugal in the 2013/2014 season. Nine of the 22 Rs (40.9%) and ten of the 49 ARs (20.4%) were international-level. Information about visual history was also gathered. Perceived vision was assessed using the preference-values-assigned-to-global-visual-status (PVVS) and the Quality-of-Vision (QoV) questionnaire. Standard clinical vision measures (including visual acuity, contrast sensitivity and stereopsis) were gathered in a subset (n = 44, 62%) of the participants. Data were analysed according to the type (R/AR) and level (international/national) of official, and Bonferroni corrections were applied to reduce the risk of type I errors. Adopting criterion for statistical significance of p<0.01, PVVS scores did not differ between R and AR (p = 0.88), or between national- and international-level officials (p = 0.66). Similarly, QoV scores did not differ between R and AR in frequency (p = 0.50), severity (p = 0.71) or bothersomeness (p = 0.81) of symptoms, or between international-level vs national-level officials for frequency (p = 0.03) or bothersomeness (p = 0.07) of symptoms. However, international-level officials reported less severe symptoms than their national-level counterparts (p<0.01). Overall, 18.3% of officials had either never had an eye examination or if they had, it was more than 3 years previously. Regarding refractive correction, 4.2% had undergone refractive surgery and 23.9% wear contact lenses when officiating. Clinical vision measures in the football officials were similar to published normative values for young, adult populations and similar between R and AR. Clinically-measured vision did not differ according to officiating level. Visual acuity measured with and without a pinhole disc indicated that around one quarter of participants may be capable of better vision when officiating, as evidenced by better acuity (≥1 line of letters) using the pinhole. Amongst the clinical visual tests we used, we did not find evidence for above-average performance in elite-level football officials. Although the impact of uncorrected mild to moderate refractive error upon officiating performance is unknown, with a greater uptake of eye examinations, visual acuity may be improved in around a quarter of officials.Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) in the framework of the Strategic Funding UID/FIS/04650/2013

Modern American populism: Analyzing the economics behind the Silent Majority, the Tea Party and Trumpism

This article researches populism, more specifically, Modern American Populism (MAP), constructed of white, rural, and economically oppressed reactionarianism, which was borne out of the political upheaval of the 1960’s Civil Rights movement. The research looks to explain the causes of populism and what leads voters to support populist movements and politicians. The research focuses on economic anxiety as the main cause but also examines an alternative theory of racial resentment. In an effort to answer the question, what causes populist movements and motivations, I apply a research approach that utilizes qualitative and quantitative methods. There is an examination of literature that defines populism, its causes and a detailed discussion of the case studies, including the 1972 election of Richard Nixon; the Tea Party election of 2010; and the 2016 election of Donald Trump. In addition, statistical data analysis was run using American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys associated with each specific case study. These case studies were chosen because they most represent forms of populist movements in modern American history. While ample qualitative evidence suggested support for the hypothesis that economic anxiety is a necessary condition for populist voting patterns that elected Nixon, the Tea Party and Trump, the statistical data only supported the hypothesis in two cases, 2010 and 2016, with 1972 coming back inconclusive. The data also suggested that both economic anxiety and racial resentment played a role in 2010 and 2016, while having no significant effect in 1972 in either case. This suggests that further research needs to be conducted into additional populist case studies, as well as an examination into the role economic anxiety and economic crises play on racial resentment and racially motivated voting behavior

Populism, inequality and representation: Negotiating ‘the 99%’ with Occupy London

When Occupy London emerged with a global wave of protest movements in October 2011, it embodied and advanced discursive forms that have characterised the unsettling of political consensus following the financial crisis. The central claim that ‘We are the 99%’ staged a fundamental tension, between a populist appeal to the figure of ‘the people’, and a contrary orientation seeking to critique inequality while rejecting forms of representation and identity. This article – which draws on three years of ethnographic fieldwork with Occupy London (October 2011–October 2014) and a critical theorisation of the figure of ‘the people’ in radical movements – follows movement participants’ negotiation of the tension at the heart of the discourse of ‘the 99%’. It offers an account of the conflicting meanings and practices that emerged, arguing that the result was a creative contradiction that sustained the movement for a time, while setting the terms of its ultimate breakdown. Identifying the concept of ‘representation’ as the site of particular controversy, this is unpicked through a number of key figures (Pitkin, Marx, Spivak, Puchner, Deleuze and Guattari) as the basis for an empirical account of Occupy’s practice of assembly, which offered partial, imperfect ‘solutions’ to these tensions. The article concludes with some implications for the limits and possibilities of both a grassroots populism and a politics against representation, in the context of political developments since

Materializing digital collecting: an extended view of digital materiality

If digital objects are abundant and ubiquitous, why should consumers pay for, much less collect them? The qualities of digital code present numerous challenges for collecting, yet digital collecting can and does occur. We explore the role of companies in constructing digital consumption objects that encourage and support collecting behaviours, identifying material configuration techniques that materialise these objects as elusive and authentic. Such techniques, we argue, may facilitate those pleasures of collecting otherwise absent in the digital realm. We extend theories of collecting by highlighting the role of objects and the companies that construct them in materialising digital collecting. More broadly, we extend theories of digital materiality by highlighting processes of digital material configuration that occur in the pre-objectification phase of materialisation, acknowledging the role of marketing and design in shaping the qualities exhibited by digital consumption objects and consequently related consumption behaviours and experiences

Las insurgencias no tienen un plan —ellas son el plan: performativos políticos y mediadores evanescentes

El 2011 resultó ser un año extraordinario. La convergencia de insurgencias en torno a tiempos y geografía le imprimió un tono político a las estaciones. Los comentaristas hablaban de la primavera árabe, el verano europeo y el otoño estadounidense. La revista TIME incluso designó al manifestante como su personaje del año. Posteriormente surgieron revueltas similares en México, Turquía y Brasil. Algunos cuestionaron su falta de planes y propuestas. Esta crítica es injusta pues confunde la disrupción de lo dado con la tarea de reconfigurarlo. Las insurgencias no son prácticas políticas cotidianas o ejercicios de elaboración de políticas públicas. Son actos colectivos en los que la gente dice “basta!” y se niega a continuar como antes. Son operadores de la diferencia: las insurgencias son el plan en el sentido de que el medio es el mensaje. Abren posibilidades que pueden o no materializarse pero nos ayudan a vislumbrar algo diferente por venir, son performativos políticos —los participantes comienzan a experimentar aquello por lo cual luchan— y funcionan como mediadores evanescentes o portales que comunican al mundo existente con uno posible. Discuto estos puntos en relación con el remanente material de dos insurgencias, la primavera árabe y las movilizaciones estudiantiles en Chile

El giro a la izquierda en América Latina: ¿una política post-liberal?

Cuando Hugo Chávez fue electo como presidente de Venezuela la izquierda gobernaba sólo en Cuba. En el tiempo transcurrido desde entonces otra media docena de países se sumaron a la lista y muchos comentaristas han comenzado a hablar de una ola rosada o del giro a la izquierda en la región. Este artículo intenta conceptualizar lo ocurrido. Propone un marco analítico para caracterizar a la izquierda y el giro a la izquierda en la política latinoamericana. El éxito electoral sigue siendo el criterio habitual para determinar dónde ha habido un giro a la izquierda, y está bien que así sea. Pero se trata de un criterio restrictivo dado que los procesos en curso en la región parecen ir más allá de las vicisitudes electorales. Por eso propongo suplementar el criterio electoral con otros. Entre ellos, la capacidad de la izquierda para configurar la agenda política y el hecho de que ella está redefiniendo el centro político e ideológico. En la sección final abordo lo que me parece ser el aspecto más innovador de estos giros, a saber, su incipiente desafío al esquema liberal de la política. Un escenario post-liberal está surgiendo a medida en que los actores experimentan con formatos y lugares de intercambio político paralelos a los de la esfera liberal de la representación electoral. No se trata de proponer un maniqueísmo de lo uno o lo otro pues las insurgencias en curso son críticas de la política liberal pero no dejan de estar contaminadas por ella. Mi conclusión es que el escenario post-liberal está caracterizado por la hibridación política

El populismo como periferia interna de la política democrática

Los estudios acerca del populismo han tendido a resaltar la conexión entre éste y la modernización, la irrupción de los excluidos en la arena política, y la importancia dada a los liderazgos carismáticos. Más recientemente, la literatura ha comenzado a discutir la relación entre el populismo y la democracia. Este artículo aborda esa relación y propone pensar el populismo como una periferia interna de la política democrática. Procede a desarrollar esta intuición identificando tres posibilidades del populismo. La primera discute el populismo como un modo de representación. La segunda posibilidad lo ve como síntoma de la política democrática y examina las tensiones que empujan al populismo a los bordes de la democracia sin que ello necesariamente le coloque extramuros. La tercera y última explora aspectos más inquietantes del populismo y ve a éste como un posible reverso o némesis de la democracia